REESE  LIBRARY 

OF  THE 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA. 

Deceived  ,  igo     . 

^Accession  No.  . 


NOTES  ON  THE 

SUPPLY  OF  AN  ARMY 

DURING  ACTIVE  OPERATIONS, 

By  (X  ESPANET, 
Sous-Intendant  Militaire  de  2e  Classe. 

TRANSLATED  BY 
CAPTAIN  H.  F.  KENDALL,  8TH  CAVALRY, 

AND 

LIEUT.-COL.  HENRY  G.  SHARPE,  A.  C.  G.  S., 
UNITED  STATES  ARMY. 


The  Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the 

Field  as  Exemplified  During 

the  Civil  War. 


PRIZE  ESSAY. 

By  CAPTAIN  HENRY  G.  SHARPE7 

Subsistence  Department. 

From  the  Journal  of  ike  Military  Service  Institution  of  the  United 
States,  January,  1896. 


KANSAS  CITY,  MO.: 
HUDSON-KIMBERLY  PUBLISHING  COMPANY, 

1899. 


COPYRIGHTED  1899,   BY   HuDSON-KlMBEKLY   PUB.   Co., 

KANSAS  CITY,  MISSOURI. 


NOTES  ON  THE  SUPPLY  OF  AN  ARMY. 


CONTENTS. 


INTRODUCTION 3 

PREFACE 9 

CHAPTER  1 11 

General  Order  of  March  of  an  Army 13 

Dimensions  of  the  Order  of  March 16 

Disposition  and  Extent  of  the  Cantonments 20 

Length  of  the  Marches 27 

CHAPTER  II 31 

General  Methods  of  Subsistence 31 

Preliminary  Study  of  the  Resources 32 

Comparison  of  the  Wants  and  the  Resources 37 

Possibility  of  Directly  Securing  the  Supply 37 

Administrative  Reconnaissances 45 

CHAPTER  III 51 

Application  of  the  Different  Methods  of  Subsistence  by  the 

Local  Resources 51 

Billeting  upon  the  Inhabitants 51 

Utilization  of  the  Local  Resources  by  the  Corps;  Supply  from 

the  Regimental  Trains 56 

General  Requisitions  Imposed  by  the  Administrative  Services'.  69 
Comparison  of  the  Different  Methods  of  Utilizing  the  Local 

Resources 88 

Maximum  Length  of  Time  during  Which  It  Will  be  Possible 
to  Subsist  an  Army  from  the  Resources  of  the  Same  Region 

of  Country * 92 

CHAPTER  IV 98 

General  Methods  of  Supply 98 


8552 


1st  Method:     Transports  of  Supplies  in  the  Rear  of  the 

Column 99 

2d  Method:  The  Continued  Supply  by  Means  of  Trains 
Forming  an  Integral  Part  of  the  Columns  and  Perma- 
nently Attached  Thereto 103 

Application  to  the  Principal  Column  Formations 117 

3d   Method:     Consignment  of  Rations  Drawn  from  the 

Depots  in  Rear  by  the  Requisitioned  Trains 136 

Employment  of  Railways  and  Navigable  Streams 151 

Modifications  of  the  Arrangement  in  Accordance  with  the 

Kind  of  Formation  to  Which  It  May  be  Applied 158 

Application  to  a  Particular  Case 160 

Summary  and  Conclusion 164 


PRIZE  ESSAY 173 

The  Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field  as  Exemplifi  d 

during  the  Civil  War 173 

Supply  Service  Working  at  the  Rear 174 

Procuration 177 

Transportation 189 

Supply  Service  Working  in  the  Field 201 

Utilizing  the  Local  Resources 22 1 


INTRODUCTION. 

It  is  a  well-recognized  fact  that  success  in  any  profession 
can  only  be  achieved  by  hard  and  conscientious  study.  This 
is  particularly  true  of  the  Military  profession,  wherein  a 
lack  of  familiarity  with  the  principles  of  the  art  may  cause 
not  only  severe  reverses  to  an  army,  but  will  entail  need- 
less loss  of  life,  and  avoidable  suffering. 

Our  officers  have  recognized  the  necessity  and  obligation 
of  studying  the  art  of  troop-leading  and  battle-tactics,  and 
service  schools  have  been  established,  whereat  officers  are 
compelled  to  study  these  branches,  and  are  given  such 
practical  experience  as  it  is  possible  to  obtain  during  a 
period  of  peace.  But  we  have  almost  entirely  neglected 
that  great  branch  of  the  art  which  has  to  do  with  mainte 
nance  of  troops  in  the  field;  that  is,  Military  Administration. 

The  importance  of  this  subject  is  recognized  in  all  for- 
eign services,  and  Staff  Schools  are  now  considered  absolute- 
ly necessary.  The  result  being  that  the  literature  of  this 
branch  of  the  Military  profession  is  most  profuse.  In  the 
French  Army  the  officers  connected  with  the  Supply  Corps 
are  obliged  to  attend  a  course  in  one  of  the  schools  estab- 
lished for  that  branch  of  the  Service,  and  it  is  recognized 
as  necessary  that  all  officers,  both  of  the  staff  and  line, 
•should  have  some  knowledge  of  the  art  of  supplying  troops 
in  the  field,  to  the  end  that  they  can  lend  a  more  intelligent 
assistance  when  occasion  requires,  and  can  thereby  keep 
their  men  in  a  better  condition  of  health,  and  husband  their 
strength,  so  as  to  put  the  greatest  possible  effective  force 
in  line  of  battle  at  a  critical  moment. 


4  Introduction. 

Xapoleon  has  declared  that  the  study  of  Military  His- 
tory is  essential  in  order  to  develop  a  commander.  This 
history,  of  course,  pertains  to  wars  in  all  countries,  and 
the  student  notes  any  improvements  in  the  question  of 
armament,  and  upon  this  bases  the  organization  to  be 
adopted  in  the  army,  and  the  battle  tactics  which  must  con- 
form to  these  improvements  and  developments.  The  same 
study  must  be  pursued  in  the  branch  of  Military  Administra- 
tion, and  each  army  must  perfect  itself  by  adopting  those 
methods  which  have  proved  advantageous  in  former  cam- 
paigns. The  general  officers,  and  all  line  officers,  must  be 
thoroughly  familiar  with  these  conditions  and  requirements; 
otherwise  the  Administrative  Departments,  would  be  apt  to 
insist  that  the  administrative  necessities  are  mere  important 
than  the  purely  military;  but,  as  General  Lewal  expresses  it, 
udans  une  arme'e,  le  chef  est  tout  on  il  n'est  rien.  S'il  ne 
domine  pas  ses  services  auxiliares,  il  est  domine  par  eux. 
Maitre  ou  soliveau,  il  n'y  a  pas  d'autre  alternative/' 

In  the  last  thirty  years  the  Science  of  Statistics  has 
taken  long  strides,  and  the  reports  made  by  the  Statistical 
Departments  of  each  country  are  becoming  each  year  more 
valuable,  because  more  accurate.  The  whole  question  of 
supplying  armies,  now  that  they  have  reached  such  enor- 
mous size,  is  largely  dependent  upon  the  resources  of  the 
theatre  in  which  the  operations  are  conducted.  To  thor- 
oughly utilize  these  resources,  they  must  be  known  before- 
hand, or,  in  other  words,  the  Supply  Departments  of  the 
army  must  have  familiarized  themselves  with  the  statistical 
data  of  the  countries  in  which  the  operations  are  conducted. 
The  accompanying  work  of  Espanet  is  the  most  concise 
work  on  the  subject  of  supplying  an  army  which  has  been 
published,  and  shows  the  necessity  for  studying  the  statis- 
tical resources  of  countries,  and  the  manner  of  forming  the 


Introduction.  5 

statistical  tables  and  applying  these,  so  to  ascertain  whether 
the  army  can  be  supplied  from  the  resources  of  a  country. 
It,  of  course,  discusses  the  problem  of  supply  only  as  relates 
to  the  particular  method  described  in  the  title.  If  it  was 
the  author's  purpose  to  treat  the  problem  in  its  entirety,  the 
work  would  necessarily  have  been  greatly  extended  in 
order  to  include  all  the  various  methods  of  supplying  an 
army  in  the  field,  during  the  different  periods  of  a  campaign. 
This  work  is,  however,  considered  as  being  specially  ap- 
plicable for  our  army,  as  it  clearly  shows  the  great  improve- 
ments which, have  been  introduced  into  the  art  of  supply- 
ing troops  in  the  field,  due  to  the  numerous  innovations 
in  the  methods  and  means  of  land  transportation  in  the  last 
thirty-five  years,  and  particularly  to  the  development  of  the 
Science  of  Statistics.  It  also  clearly  shows  the  necessity 
for  the  establishment  of  a  Staff  School,  whereat  officers  of 
our  Supply  Departments  could  be  given  a  thorough  course 
of  instruction  in  the  various  methods  of  supplying  an  army 
in  the  field,  and  would  be  made  familiar  with  the  literature 
of  the  special  branch  of  their  profession.  If  su'ch  a  school 
had  been  established,  we  would  long  ere  this  have  drawn 
useful  lessons  from  the  methods  employed  in  supplying  the 
armies  during  our  Civil  War,  and  would  certainly  have  pre- 
pared Regulations  setting  forth  the  precise  duties  of  th" 
various  supply  officers  for  an  army  in  the  field.  If  we  had 
had,  at  the  outbreak  of  the  Spanish-American  War,  a  set  of 
Eegulations,  carefully  drawn,  describing  in  most  minute 
detail  the  functions  and  duties  of  supply  officers,  and  such 
officers  had  been  familiar  with  the  same,  they  would  have 
known  that  in  the  field  a  commander  of  an  army,  or  a 
smaller  body  acting  separately,  had  full  control  over  all 
matters  of  supply;  and  under  such  circumstances  it  is  im- 
probable that  the  correspondent  of  the  London  Times  would 


6  Introduction. 

have  been  justified  in  writing  to  his  paper  that  (using  the 
word  "commissariat"  as  applied  in  the  British  Army)  "the 
commissariat  is  a  huge  joke."  During  and  immediately 
subsequent  to  the  Crimean  War,  correspondents  and  mili- 
tary critics  could  have  made,  and  did  justly  make,  similar 
remarks  concerning  the  commissariat  in  the  British  Army. 
The  fruitful  lesson  England  culled  from  that  war  was  the 
necessity  for  the  establishment  of  a  Staff  School.  The  re- 
sult being  that  British  officers  have  contributed  largely  to 
the  literature  of  the  Art  of  Military  Administration,  and 
their  treatises  embrace  all  methods  of  supplying  an  army 
under  every  possible  condition  or  phase  of  a  campaign. 
Familiarity  with  the  English  treatises  on  this  subject  might 
have  precluded,  during  our  late  war,  the  commission  of 
many  blunders,  and  spared  our  troops  unnecessary  hard- 
ships and  discomforts. 

A  short  account  of  the  "Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the 
Field,  as  Exemplified  during  the  Civil  War,'1  is  subjoined,  the 
purpose  being  to  illustrate  the  manner  in  which  the  prin- 
ciples were  applied  by  our  armies  during  active  campaigns. 
The  command  of  the  sea,  and  the  peculiar  formation  of  the 
country,  intersected  as  it  was  by  numerous  and  deep  rivers, 
which  rendered  it  possible  to  move  large  fleets  of  transports 
to  within  easy  distances  of  most  of  the  ai  mies,  made  the  prob- 
lem of  supply  a  comparatively  easy  one,  and  rendered  the 
formation  of  large  and  numerous  wagon  trains  unnecessary ; 
the  facility  with  which  railroads  were  constructed  or  re- 
paired also  assisted  in  dispensing  with  such  trains.  Gen- 
eral Baratier,  one  of  the  ablest  writers  on  the  subject  of 
Military  Administration,  has  expressed  most  emphatically 
his  admiration  of  the  manner  in  which  the  art  of  supplying 
armies  in  the  field  was  applied  during  our  Civil  War.  Is  it 
probable  that  foreign  military  students  will  express  similar 


Introduction.  7 

encomiums  regarding  the  art  of  supplying  troops  in  the 
field  as  exemplified  during  the  Spanish-American  War,  and 
is  it  probable  that  the  useful  lesson  they  will  draw  from 
that  war  is  that  we  have  demonstrated  to  foreign  countries 
the  fact  that  they  can  now  abolish,  because  no  longer 
needed,  their  Staff'  Schools? 

Henry  G.  Sharpe, 
Lieut-Col.,  A.  C.  G.  S.,  U.  S.  A. 


PREFACE. 

"The  country  will  be  drawn  upon  as  if  nothing  can  be  forwarded 
from  the  rear,  but  at  the  same  time  the  trains  and  supplies  will  be 
organized  at  the  rear  as  if  nothing  can  be  obtained  from  the  country 
by  the  Army." — Order  dated  January  11,  1893,  Art.  49. 

The  Regulations  of  November  20,  1889,  and  of  January 
11,  1893,  prescribe  the  rules  to  be  adopted  for  the  service  of 
subsistence  and  the  method  of  supply.  However,  in  ad- 
ministration, more  than  in  any  other  part  of  the  military  art, 
theory  is  not  sufficient,  arid  it  is  necessary  to  be  acquainted 
with  the  practical  application  of  the  Regulations.  Lacking 
opportunities  to  make  actual  trials  of  the  theories,  it  is  neces- 
sary to  train  one's  self  by  means  of  fictitious  operations  and 
by  study;  this  work  is  devoted  to  a  study  of  that  sort. 

But  instead  of  considering  a  scheme  of  fictitious  opera- 
tions in  order  to  apply  the  Regulations,  I  have  endeavored  to 
reduce  to  a  limited  number  of  examples  the  formations  and 
situations  which  it  is  possible  to  consider  for  an  army,  and  to 
observe  how  the  general  rules  can  adapt  themselves  to  them. 
It  is  a  general  study,  midway  between  the  extremes,  which 
are,  on  the  one  hand,  the  Regulations,  and,  on  the  other,  an 
ordinary  discussion  of  a  particular  subject. 

From  the  tactical  or  strategical  point  of  view,  the 
number  of  situations  is  unlimited,  but  it  appears,  from  the 
consideration  of  the  supply  and  subsistence,  that  the  number 
of  formations  to  examine  is,  on  the  contrary,  very  limited. 
From  the  tactical  and  strategical  consideration,  the  exte- 
rior circumstances  and  moral  factors  constantly  intervene 
to  change  the  situation,  and  are  of  the  greatest  importance; 
but  they  do  not  affect,  to  the  same  extent,  the  problem  of 


10  Preface. 

supply,  of  which  the  elements  are  almost  entirely  geomet- 
rical, and  result  principally  from  the  relations  of  position 
of  the  army  corps,  and  from  the  degree  of  concentration. 

It  is  possible,  then,  to  reduce  to  a  small  number  of  types 
the  formations  and  positions  of  the  army;  to  consider  and 
also  to  consolidate,  as  it  were  in  a  single  study,  all  those  that 
it  would  be  possible  to  make  on  the  different  subjects. 

We  should  logically  commence  this  work  by  a  short  ac- 
count of  the  principal  tactical  or  strategical  dispositions, 
from  the  point  of  view  of  an  examination  of  the  formation 
types.  This  examination  is  contained  in  Chapter  I.;  in  the 
following  chapters  we  will  examine  how  the  methods  of  sup- 
ply, either  by  utilization  of  the  local  resources  or  by  trains 
from  the  rear,  should  be  applied  to  these  formations,  and 
which  of  these  methods  can  to  the  best  advantage  be  used 
in  each  case. 


CHAPTER   I. 

I. 

Disregarding  the  periods  of  mobilization  and  of  concen- 
tration, during  which  the  subsistence  is  provided  by  special 
means,  we  will  confine  our  discussion  to  the  period  of  active 
operations,  and  more  especially  to  the  marches. 

For  the  present  discussion,  every  operation  may  be  re- 
duced to  the  following: 


The  army  being  assembled  at  a  point,  S,  to  transport 
it  to  another  point,  O,  where  it  is  to  operate.  In  strategical 
language  S  and  O  are  termed  the  subjective  and  objective 
points,  and  S  O  the  line  of  operaation.  But  S  and  O  and 
the  line  S  O  are  not  mathematical  points  and  lines.  These 
points  and  lines  represent,  on  the  contrary,  zones  of  country 
more  or  less  extensive,  the  configuration  and  area  of  which 
are  of  great  importance,  not  only  as  concerns  military  opera- 
tions solely,  but  more  particularly  as  concerns  the  adminis- 
tration; as  these  determine  the  extent  of  the  zones  available 
for  the  subsistence,  and  also  affect  the  length  of  the  marches 
for  the  trains  bearing  supplies. 

The  extent  of  these  zones  varies  according  to  circum- 
stances; in  general,  it  may  be  said  at  once  that  the  army, 
dispersed  at  the  beginning  of  the  campaign  and  when  far 
from  the  enemy,  closes  up  more  and  more  as  it  approaches 


12  Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 

its  objective  and  attains  its  maximum  concentration  on  con- 
tact with  the  enemy.  But  this  extreme  concentration  is  a 
critical  state  from  which  the  army  should  be  relieved  as  soon 
as  possible;  it  is  thus  seen  that  the  successive  operations 
which  constitute  a  campaign  present  a  series  of  concentra- 
tions and  expansions  executed  in  conformity  w7ith  this  princi- 
ple, w7hich  sums  up  nearly  all  strategy,  ''that  it  is  necessary 
to  know  when  to  concentrate  to  fight  and  to  disperse  in  order 
to  obtain  subsistence.'7 

This  first  point  show's  us  that  if  the  administrative  ne- 
cessities should  never  be  permitted  to  supersede  the  military 
considerations,  they  have  nevertheless  an  important  role  in 
the  preparation  and  conduct  of  the  war.  We  will  find,  in  the 
course  of  this  discussion,  more  than  one  opportunity  to  point 
out  the  necessary  harmony  between  the  military  considera- 
tions and  the  administrative  requirements  that  it  is  neces- 
sary for  a  general  to  weigh  and  to  give  each  its  proper  place, 
depending  upon  circumstances. 

Although  administration  and  strategy  may  conflict  in 
more  than  one  point,  it  would  be  foreign  to  our  subject  to 
discuss  the  matter  here,  or  even  briefly  to  state  the  principles 
which  govern  the  conduct  of  war;  but  it  is  necessary,  in  order 
to  understand  the  workings  of  the  service  of  supply,  to  know 
the  general  formations  which  an  army  may  assume. 

It  is  necessary  at  first  to  define  the  meaning  of  this  word 
"army,"  which,  in  ordinary  language,  has  very  different  ac- 
ceptations. Hereafter,  unless  stated  otherwise,  we  will 
always  designate  by  this  word  the  union  of  a  particular 
number  of  army  corps.  Two  principal  types  appear  to  have 
been  adopted  for  the  composition  of  armies.  The  first  is 
the  army  formed  of  five  army  corps  with  an  average  effect- 
ive strength  of  30,000  men,  of  which  the  total  effective 
strength  is  150,000.  The  second  type  is  the  army  of  four 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army.  13 

army  corps  with  increased  effective  strength,  each  corps 
generally  divided  into  three  divisions.  The  average  effective 
strength  of  the  army  corps  in  this  case  is  45,000  men,  which 
gives  this  type  of  army  a  total  effective  of  180,000  men.  It 
will  often  be  necessary  to  state  which  one  of  these  two  types 
of  an  army  is  considered,  particularly  for  the  discussion  of 
the  marching  formations  which  is  the  chief  purpose  of  this 
chapter. 

In  the  general  order  of  march  of  an  army  three  principal 
elements  concern  the  administration,  considered  in  connec- 
tion with  supply;  these  are: 

1.  The  general  order  of  march. 

2.  The  location  and  extent  of  the  halting  stations. 

3.  The  length  and  order  of  succession  of  the  marches. 
We  will  discuss  successively  each  of  these  elements  in  their 
relation  with  the  service  of  supply. 

77.      General  Order  of  March  of  an  Army. 

In  the  general  order  of  march  it  is  necessary  to  consider 
the  form  itself  and  the  extent  of  the  formation. 

The  order  of  march  is  dependent  upon:  the  relative  po- 
sition of  the  army  corps  in  line  or  in  echelon;  the  assignment 
to  each  corps  of  one  road  or  of  several  roads ;  the  assignment 
of  the  same  road  to  troops  of  ore  or  of  several  army  corps. 
It  is  evident  at  a  glance  that  all  these  corditions  will  have 
some  effect  upon  the  question  of  supply,  which  will  be  much 
more  readily  accomplished  for  one  army  corps  established 
upon  several  roads  than  if  only  one  road  is  assigned  to  each 
corps,  and  especially  so  if  two  corps  are  compelled  to  march 
in  a  single  column. 

The  number  of  combinations  and  possible  forms  is 
without  limit;  the  choice  of  these  depends  upon  circum- 
stances, upon  the  terrain  and  the  object  to  be  obtained;  at  a 


14 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 


distance  from  the  enemy,  if  there  is  no  reason  to  fear  sur- 
prises, it  is  possible  to  spread  out  more,  to  take  advantage 
of  a  greater  number  of  roads,  to  march  in  column  of  divi- 
sions, and,  if  it  comes  to  the  worst,  to  march  by  army  corps. 
Upon  approaching  the  enemy  it  will  be  necessary  to  close  in, 
and  then,  either  for  tactical  reasons  or  simply  by  the  insuf- 
ficiency of  the  road  system,  not  only  wTill  the  inarch  have  to 
be  by  army  corps,  but  it  will,  in  addition,  be  necessary  to 
assign  several  army  corps  to  the  same  road.  In  certain 
cases  the  e'cheloning  of  the  army  corps,  instead  of  taking 
place  in  deptli,  will  be  made  laterally;  in  this  case  an  army 
corps  marching  upon  two  or  more  roads  to  the  front  is 
followed  by  the  troops  belonging  to  another  army  corps,  and 
even  by  the  troops  of  several  different  army  corps. 

We  will  give  some  examples  of  these  various  formations. 

The  most  simple  type  is  the  lineal  formation,  in  which 
all  the  army  corps  march  to  the  front,  either  in  columns  of 
divisions,  or  in  columns  of  army  corps : 


Fig,  2. 


Although  very  often  in  Europe  there  are  a  sufficient 
number  of  roads  to  enable  an  army  to  march  thus,  "experi- 
ence shows  that  it  can  only  be  done  in  rare  instances  .  .  ; 
nearly  always  it  will  be  forced  to  form  two  Echelons  distant 
half  a  march  from  each  other,  with  three  corps  in  first  line 
and  two  in  second."* 


*Derrecagaix,  "La  Guerre  moderne,"  Vol.  I.,  page  592. 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 


15 


Fig.  3. 

This  was  the  formation  of  the  3d  German  Army  in  Au- 
gust, 1870,  in  its  march  upon  Nancy. 

A  similar  formation  would  be  the  arrangement  in  a 
square  of  an  army  of  four  corps,  with  two  corps  in  the  first 
line  and  two  in  the  second. 


Fig.  4. 

As  a  last  example,  we  will  give  the  order  of  march  of  a:i 
army  described  in  the  treatise  on  strategy  and  tactics  of 
Colonel  Bonneau  of  the  Ecole  superieure  de  Guerre.  This 
order  of  march,  which  appears  to  be  rather  complicated,  and 
of  which  we  fail  to  see  the  practical  value,  is,  however,  inter- 
esting because  it  embraces  a  combination  of  nearly  all  the 
possible  orders  of  march  for  Echeloning  the  corps  of  an  army. 
In  this  order  of  march,  represented  in  Figure  5  shown  below, 
we  find: 


16  Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 

1.  An  army  corps,  G,  in  column  on  a  single  road; 

2.  A  corps,  I),  marching  in  column  of  divisions  on  two 
roads ; 

3.  An  army  corps,  A,  forming  the  principal  advance 
guard,  and  disposed  on  three  roads,  but  followed  on  each 
road  by  troops  of   different  army  corps :   on  road   II.,   by  a 
division  belonging  to  corps  D;  on  road  IV.,  by  a  division  be- 
longing  to  corps  C;   on  the   central  road,  by    a  division    of 
corps  C  and  by  the  entire  reserve  corps  K;  on  this  road  III. 
we  have,  then,  a  column  of  the  strength  of  two  army  corps, 
but  comprising  troops  belonging  to  three  different  corps: 

///.     Dimensions   of  the  Order  of  March. 

In  addition  to  the  form  of  the  order  of  march,  we  are 
interested  in  knowing  its  length;  as  this  length  will  in  reality 
govern  the  degree  of  concentration  of  the  army,  and  conse 
quently  the  greater  or  less  difficulty  that  wTill  be  encountered 
in  providing  the  supplies. 

March  Front. — The  extent  of  the  order  of  march  in  width 
is  called  the  "march  front."  The  limitation  of  the  inarch 
front  is  one  of  the  most  difficult  problems  in  strategy,  of 
which  we  will  not  enter  into  a  discussion;  it  is  sufficient  for 
our  purpose  to  state  the  general  results. 

The  extent  of  the  march  front  is  calculated  in  accord- 
ance with  this  principle:  that  the  army  may  always  te  con- 
centrated before  it  is  possible  to  be  surprised  by  the  enemy, 
which  is  equivalent  to  saying  that  the  march  front  should 
always  be  less  than  the  distance  which  separates  the  army 
from  the  enemy.* 

From  the  foregoing  it  is  evident  that  at  a  distance  from 
the  enemy  the  march  front  can  attain  a  great  development. 

*G6neral  Berthaut,  "Principes  de  Strategic,"  page  220. 


D 

R 

1 

\ 

1 

\ 

C 

1 

l 

I 

I 

I 

\ 

~*7? 

i 

! 

I 

V 

A 
I 

F 

III 

IG.5 

18  Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 

History*  gives  us  examples  of  armies  marching  under  such 
conditions  on  a  front  of  100,  200,  and  even  250  kilometres; 
but,  strictly  speaking,  these  marches  at  great  dispersion 
were  only  marches  of  concentration,  and  undoubtedly  will 
not  illustrate  anything  more.  Actually,  the  concentration 
of  armies  being  effected  by  means  of  railroads,  the  hostile 
armies  will  te  opposed  to  each  other  from  the  commence- 
ment of  hostilities  on  a  limited  front,  the  extent  of  which 
depends  principally  on  the  capacity  of  the  railroad  system. 

In  the  period  of  active  operations,  when  surprises  are 
always  possible,  the  army  must  be  able  to  be  concentrated 
in  a  day.  General  Derre'cagaixf  estimates  that  for  thi^ 
reason,  even  at  a  distance  from  the  enemy,  the  front  should 
not  exceed  64  kilometres,  and  that  it  should  average  from 
40  to  45  kilometres.  But  on  approaching  the  enemy  the 
front  contracts  and  tends  to  approach,  as  to  a  lower  limit, 
the  front  of  battle,!  which  averages  from  25  to  30  kilo- 
metres, depending  upon  the  effective  strength. 

We  have  already  had  occasion  in  several  instances  to 
make  use  of  the  expressions,  "at  a  distance  from  the  enemy," 
"in  contact";  they  explain  themselves.  However,  it  will  be 
of  service,  in  order  to  be  explicit,  to  understand  the  average 
value  of  these  expressions,  and  we  will  admit,  with  Colonel 
Maillard,§  that  it  is  necessary  to  adopt  the  following- 
averages  : 

*March  of  the  Grand  Army  from  the  Rhine  to  the  Danube  in  1805; 
march  of  concentration  of  the  French  Army  in  1806,  etc. 

fDerrecagaix,  "  La  Guerre  moderne,"  Vol.  I.,  pp.  89  and  90. 

JThe  front  of  battle  is  determined  by  the  requirement  of  6  men 
to  the  running  metre;  the  front  of  battle  of  an  army  of  150  000  men  will 
be  150,000=25  kilometers;  that  of  an  army  of  180,000  men  would  be 

~6~ 
180,000  =  30  kilometers.    (Commandant  Bouneau,  "Cours  de  1'Ecole  de 

6 
Guerre.") 

^Colonel  Maillard,  "  Elements  de  Guerre,"  1st  Part,  page  65. 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army.  19 

At  a  distance  from  the  enemy,  under  80  kilometres; 

Near  the  enemy,  from  80  to  20  kilometres; 

In  contact,  under  20  kilometres. 
From  the  above  we  will  add  in  summing  up: 

At  a  distance  from  the  enemy — that  is  to  say,  up  to  80 
kilometres  from  him — the  march  front  may  be  extensive,  but 
it  is  best  not  to  exceed  54  kilometres.  Near  the  enemy, 
between  80  and  20  kilometres,  the  march  front  should  not 
exceed  40  to  45  kilometres,  and  narrows  as  much  as  possible 
as  the  contact  with  the  enemy  draws  nearer.  In  contact  the 
march  front  is  equal  to  the  front  of  battle — 25  to  30  kilo- 
metres. 

Space  "between  the  Columns;  Breadth  of  the  Zones  of  Supply. 
—Knowing  the  march  front,  the  space  between  the  columns 
of  the  lines  of  march  follows:  if  the  army  is  formed  in  five 
columns  (Figs.  3  and  5),  the  space  between  the  columns  of 
the  line  of  march  varies  from  6  to  10  kilometres  when  the 
front  varies  from  25  to  40  kilometres.  If  the  army  is  formed 
in  only  three  columns  (Fig.  4),  the  space  between  the 
columns  of  the  lines  of  march  under  the  same  conditions 
would  be  from  12  to  20  kilometres. 

Fpon  the  march  the  zones  assigned  to  each  column  for 
the  utilization  of  the  local  resources  generally  extend  to  the 
middle  of  the  interval  which  separates  one  column  from  the 
neighboring  column;  it  is  thus  seen  that  the  figures  above 
given  for  the  distance  between  columns  of  the  lines  of  march 
likewise  measure  the  width  of  the  zones  of  supply  that  may 
be  assigned  to  each  column,  and  that  this  width  should  be 
estimated  on  the  average  from  8  to  10  kilometres  (Fig.  6). 
Depth  of  the  Order  of  March. — The  depth  of  the  order  of 
march  depends  upon  the  manner  of  Echeloning  the  army 
corps,  upon  the  strength  and  length  of  the  various  columns. 
But  the  length  of  the  columns  as  affecting  the  march  is  only 


20 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 


10  Kilom. 

10 

Kil 

10    Kil. 

- 

- 

w 

- 

- 

pq 

- 

en 

DH 

A 

Ul 

CO 

B 

0 
O 

C 

OJ 

n 

Q 

o 

** 

N 

Fig.  6. 

of  secondary  importance  in  the  present  discussion,  because 
it  has  no  influence  whatever  upon  the  workings  of  the  service 
of  subsistence  and  upon  the  supply;  it  is  not  the  same  thing 
as  the  space  occupied  in  the  formation  each  evening  for  the 
halt.  The  army  is  not  subsisted  by  the  country  it  traverses, 
but  from  the  places  in  which  it  halts;  it  is  therefore  the  ex- 
tent of  the  zone  in  which  the  halt  is  made  which  affects  this 
discussion.  This  question  wTill  be  considered  in  the  follow- 
ing paragraph. 

TV.     Disposition  and  Extent  of  tlie  Cantonments. 

In  general,  the  order  of  the  halt  has  the  same  form  as 
the  order  of  march;  the  e'cheloning  of  the  army  corps  is  the 
same;  but  each  column  is  more  or  less  closed  up,  or  dis- 
persed to  the  right  and  left  of  the  principal  road,  depending 
upon  circumstances  and  the  topography  of  the  country. 

"In  general/'  as  Clause witz*  says,  "the  most  favorable 

*Clausewitz,  "Theorie  de  la  grande  Guerre,"  Vol.  I.,  page  334. 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army.  21 

form  to  give  to  the  cantonments  will  be  that  of  an  oval,  not 
well  defined,  which  approaches  to  some  extent  the  form  of  a 
rectangle." 

The  shorter  axis  of  this  oval  is  perpendicular  to  the  line 
of  march;  it  is  limited  by  this  consideration,  that  the  troops 
cannot  stretch  out  too  far  to  the  right  and  left,  either  to 
avoid  exposing  them  to  useless  fatigues  or  to  prevent  en- 
croaching upon  ground  of  the  side  columns.  The  longer 
axis,  or  depth  of  the  cantonments,  depends  upon  the  circum- 
stances under  which  the  march  is  made,  and  is  determined 
in  accordance  with  the  following  considerations,  which  lead 
to  three  principal"  types  for  the  formation  during  a  halt. 

Cantonment  in  order  of  march  and  on  a  depth  equal  to  the 
total  length  of  the  marching  column.  At  a  distance  from  the 
enemy  it  is  of  primary  importance  to  avoid  exposing  the 
troops  to  useless  fatigues  and  to  accelerate  the  rapidity  of 
the  movements;*  for  this  purpose  the  lateral  movements 
and  those  for  closing  up  the  column  are  checked;  the  column 
is  cantoned  in  the  order  of  march  and  in  depth,  even  upon 
the  road  or  without  wandering  more  than  2  or  3  kilo- 
metres. In  such  a  case  the  zone  of  cantonments  has  the 
form  of  a  very  narrow  band,  being  from  4  to  0  kilometres  in 
width,  and  in  length  equal  to  that  of  the  column,  or,  for  an 
army  corps,  20  to  22  kilometres.  This  zone  has  an  area  of 
from  80  to  120  square  kilometres;  in  round  numbers,  100 
square  kilometres. 

'Cantonment  reduced  in  depth,  on  an  average,  equal  to  the 
last  length  of  the  marching  column.  Even  at  a  distance  from 
the  enemy,  it  will  not  always  be  possible  to  give  the  forma- 
tion for  the  halt  so  great  a  depth:  "the  necessity  of  having 
the  regimental  trains  belonging  to  the  cantonments  of  the 

'^General  Berthaut,  "Prtncipes  de  Strategic,"  page  229  et  sequitur. 


22  Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 

head  of  the  column  sufficiently  near  the  means  of  supply,  in 
order  that  the  resupply  of  these  trains  can  be  accomplished 
before  the  march  is  commenced  the  following  day,"  will  ne- 
cessitate a  reduction  in  the  depth  of  the  cantonments,  and 
it  may  be  stated  "that  the  practical  depth  best  suited  to  the 
interior  economy  of  the  army  corps  is  about  equal  to  half 
the  depth  of  the  corresponding  column.''* 

"In  the  vicinity  of  the  enemy  it  is  much  more  important 
to  insure  the  safety  of  the  army  than  the  rapidity  of  the 
march;  it  is  necessary  to  take  up  each  night  positions  afford- 
ing advantages  for  engaging  in  battle,  upon  a  water-course1, 
a  chain  of  hills;  all  the  troops  of  each  of  the  columns  must 
then  be  brought  up  to  the  end  of  the  etape ;  it  results  therefore 
that  the  marches  are  necessarily  shorter."f 

It  might  appear,  from  the  foregoing,  that  each  evening 
the  troops  would  form  in  line,  and  this  construction  has  been 
put  into  practice;  but  it  is  admitted,  and  such  appears  to  me 
to  be  the  principle  as  enunciated  at  the  Ecole  de  Guerre,  that 
cantonments  will  continue  to  be  formed  in  depth,  even  in 
the  vicinity  of  the  enemy,  and  almost  until  the  evening  pre- 
ceding the  tattle;  "it  is  only  the  evening  before  the  buttle 
that  the  necessity  for  concentration  ....  requires 
the  abandonment  of  the  custom  of  cantonment  in  depth. "£ 

Upon  the  whole,  under  the  most  ordinary  circum- 
stances, at  a  safe  distance  from  the  enemy  or  from  possible 
contact  with  him,  cantonments  will  be  made  in  the  order  of 
march;  with  a  depth  equal  to  half  the  length  of  the  column, 
and  thus  the  following  formation  will  result: 

"Generally  the  head  of  the  cantonments  of  the  main  body 
of  the  army  corps  of  the  first  line,  having  marched  on  a 

*Commaudant  Cherfils,  "Cours  de  Tactique  de  Cavalerie  al'Ecole 
de  Guerre,"  page  375 

tGeneral  Berthaut,  "Principes  de  Strategic,"  page  229. 
^Commandant  Cherfils,  "Cours  de  1'Ecole  de  Guerre," 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army.  23 

single  road,  will  be  situated  at  from  6  to  8  kilometres  from 
the  cantonments  occupied  by  the  main  body  of  the  advance 
guard.  The  rear  will  stretch  out  from  10  to  12  kilometres 
behind  the  head.  A  corps  in  the  second  line  will  halt  its 
head  from  10  to  12  kilometres  from  the  rear  of  the  canton- 
ments of  the  corps  which  precedes  it,  and  will  go  into  can- 
tonment with  a  depth  of  from  10  to  12  kilometres;  the 
trains  will  park  at  their  proper  distance  in  line  of  march.  '* 
In  this  formation,  which  is  applicable  to  the  ordinary 
•occasion  when  near  the  enemy,  but  before  contact,  the  'zone 
of  the  cantonments  for  an  army  corps  has  an  average  extent 
of  4  X  12  =  48.  or,  in  round  numbers,  45  square  kilometres. 

3d,  Bivouac.  On  contact,  the  concentration  increases 
still  more;  "the  evening  before  the  battle,  marches  'at  ease' 
are  not  possible,  the  cantonments  close  up  still  more  on  the 
front,  in  order  to  increase  the  concentration  of  the  troops 
and  their  proximity  to  the  field  of  battle." 

"The  bivouac  represents  the  maximum  state  of  concen- 
tration possible  for  an  army."f 

E clielonment  of  the  Cantonments. — In  the  formation  of  the 
cantonment,  in  addition  to  the  extent  of  the  zone  occupied, 
it  is  important  to  consider  the  Echeloning  of  the  different 
elements;  the  corps  may  be  left  in  the  same  order  which 
they  occupy  on  the  march,  which  avoids  useless  movements 
and  expedites  the  formation  of  the  column.  (It  is  the  ar- 
rangement which  seems  to  be  most  favorably  considered  by 
the  ablest  authority.)  It  would  be  possible,  on  the  other 
hand,  to  place  the  two  divisions  of  each  army  corps  in  line, 
one  to  the  right  and  the  other  to  the  left  of  the  road.  This 
arrangement  appeared  to  be  advocated  in  the  provisional 
instructions  concerning  the  marches  in  1877,  of  which 

*Maillard, ' 'Elements  de  la  Guerre,"  1st  Part,  page  152. 
TCommandant  Cherfils,  "Cours  de  1'Ecole  de  Guerre." 


24  Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 

General  Berthaut  was,  I  believe,  the  author.  The  method 
of  echelons  adopted  will  have  its  greatest  advantage  .when 
the  work  of  the  trains  is  cone-erred,  as  we  will  see  in  the  dis- 
cussion of  this  question. 

In  all  this  analysis  we  will  infer  that,  according  to  the 
development  of  the  operation,  it  will  be  possible  to  bring  the 
formation  of  the  army  to  three  principal  types  having  the 
following  characteristics : 

1st.  At  a  distance  from  the  enemy:  front  extended  on 
the  average  from  40  to  45  kilometres;  cantonment  in  order 
of  march  and  on  a  depth  equal  to  the  length  of  march  of  each 
column;  the  extent  of  the  front  will  generally  permit  the  as- 
signment of  one  road  to  each  army  corps,  and  sometimes  of 
marching  in  columns  of  divisions.  As  we  will  show  later, 
during  this  period  the  length  of  the  marches  reaches  its 
maximum. 

2d.  Nearer  the  enemy:  front  less  extended,  approach- 
ing the  front  of  battle;  the  depth  of  the  cantonments  in  each 
column  is  generally  equal  to  half  the  length  of  the  march,  or 
from  10  to  12  kilometres.  The  march  in  column  of  army 
corps,  and  frequently  by  two  corps  on  the  same  road,  will  be 
the  general  rule;  the  length  of  the  marches  is  diminished. 

3d.  The  third  formation  is  that  which  the  army  as- 
sumes when  a  battle  is  imminent;  it  is  distinguished  by  its 
extreme  concentration. 

These  are  the  three  principal  types  of  formation  that 
we  will  consider  most  frequently  in  the  course  of  this  dis- 
cussion, and  chiefly  the  second,  which  corresponds  to  the 
usual  conditions  of  concentration  and  to  the  most  custom- 
ary circumstances.  The  drawings  in  Plate  I.  have  reference 
to  this  type. 

In  Figure  1  of  this  plate  there  is  a  graphical  repre- 
sentation of  the  cantonments  of  an  army  corps  marchirg 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army.  25 

upon  a  single  road,  the  depth  of  the  cantonment  being  equal 
to  half  the  length  of  the  marching  column  and  the  subdi- 
visions retaining  in  cantonment  the  same  order  as  when  on 
the  march. 

According  to  a  system  that  will  be  adopted  throughout 
this  discussion,  at  the  side  of  the  drawing,  Figure  1J  shows 
a  practical  application  of  the  same  formation. 

Figure  2  represents  graphically  the  cantonments  of  an 
army  corps  with  a  depth  equal  also  to  half  the  length  of  the 
marching  column,  but  on  the  supposition  that  the  divisions, 
instead  of  being  Echeloned  in  the  order  of  march,  are  in  line, 
one  to  the  right  and  the  other  to  the  left  of  the  road.  There 
is  an  applied  example  of  this  formation  in  the  plate  annexed 
to  the  provisional  regulation  relating  to  the  marches  of  1877. 

Figure  3  shows  a  graphical  representation  of  the  canton- 
ments of  an  army,  showing  the  extent  of  the  cantonments 
and  of  the  zones  of  supply  of  each  corps.  The  general  form 
of  the  order  of  march  adopted  in  this  figure  is  that  which  the 
III.  German  Army  had  the  2()th  of  August,  1870.  Figure 
3-J  is  the  representation  of  this  formation. 

Measure  of  the  Concentration  of  the  Army. — Knowing  the 
extent  of  the  zones  occupied  by  the  cantonments,  the  dens- 
ity of  the  army  is  readily  inferred ;  this  densitjr  may  be  meas- 
ured by  the  number  of  men  and  horses  stationed  in  a  square 
kilometre. 

For  this  estimate  we  will  consider  30,000  men  and  10,000 
horses  as  the  average  effective  strength  of  an  army  corps. 
If  we  consider  this  effective  with  the  extent  of  the  zone  of 
occupation,  wThich  we  have  estimated  at  100  square  kilo- 
metres in  the  first  type  of  formation  and  at  45  in  the  secondy 
we  will  find  that: 


26  Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 

In  the  first  case  the  density  corresponds : 

300  men     | 

to  and  to  a  square  kilometre. 

I   100  horses 

And  in  the  second  case : 

680  men     | 

to  and         |     to  a  square  kilometre. 

|  225  horses  | 

It  is  also  possible  to  measure  the  concentration  of  the 
army  by  comparing  the  number  of  men  and  horses  with  the 
number  of  the  inhabitants.  This  comparison  is  readily 
made  by  comparing  the  effective  force  occupy  in  g  a  square 
kilometre  with  the  number  of  inhabitants  per  square  kilo- 
metre given  in  the  statistical  tables.  In  Fiance  the  popula- 
tion per  square  kilometre  being  70  people,  this  comparison 
will  give  a  ratio  of  4  to  5  men  and  1  to  2  horses  to  each  in- 
habitant in  the  first  type,  and  of  8  to  9  men  and  4  to  5  horses 
per  inhabitant  in  the  second  type. 

If,  instead  of  taking  for  comparison  the  average  of  the 
total  population  (70  inhabitants),  the  rural  population  wrere 
taken,  which  is  only  45  inhabitants  (60  per  cent  of  the  total 
population),  the  comparison  would  give  different  ratios  as 
follows:  in  the  first  case,  8  to  9  men  and  2  to  3  horses  per 
inhabitant;  in  the  second  case,  15  men  and  5  hoises  per 
inhabitant. 

We  have  made  the  comparison  by  considering  a  single 
army  corps,  and  the  ratio  thus  obtained  corresponds,  prop- 
erly speaking. to  the  density  of  the  cantonments; if  the  entire 
*one  occupied  by  an  army  were  considered,  different  figures 
would  be  obtained.  By  referring  to  Figure  3,  Plate  I.,  and 
assuming  40  kilometres  for  the  front  and  50  for  the  depth  of 
the  army,  the  entire  zone  occupied  would  have  an  area  of 
2,000  square  kilometres.  The  population  of  this  zone  is 
70  X  2,000=140,000  people,  nearly  equal  to  the  effective 
strength  of  the  army;  from  which  it  may  be  stated  that  the 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army.  27 

presence  of  an  army  in  a  country,  under  ordinary  circum- 
stances, doubles  the  number  of  the  inhabitants,  a  fact  which 
must  be  considered  in  connection  with  the  exhaustion  of  the 
resources.  But  this  concentration  of  the  army,  at  the  rate 
of  one  soldier  for  each  inhabitant,  is  not  uniform  in  the  oc- 
cupied zone;  the  army,  on  the  contrary,  forms  there  in  sep- 
arated groups,  of  which  the  density  is  for  each  group  that 
previously  obtained.  Figure  3  shows  very  clearly  the  repre- 
sentation of  this  grouping.  All  these  points  will  be  of  im- 
portance in  connection  with  the  methods  of  utilizing  the 
local  resources. 

V.     Length  of  the  Marches. 

As  we  will  see  later  on,  the  distance  to  be  covered  by 
the  trains  bearing  supplies  (for  instance,  the  administrative 
trains),  in  order  to  reach  the  cantonments  of  the  head  of  the 
column,  is  equal  to  the  distance  in  rear  these  trains  were 
parked  the  night  before,  increased  by  the  depth  of  the  can- 
tonments and  by  the  length  of  the  march  made  by  the 
column.  The  length  of  the  march  is  therefore  an  important 
factor  in  the  problem  under  discussion,  and  we  must  con- 
sider this  question,  so  as  to  obtain  all  its  factors. 

The  average  length  of  the  marches  is  estimated  at  from 
22  to  24  kilometres,  but  this  average  will  often  be  surpassed. 
In  reality  this  figure,  22  kilometres,  represents  the  length  of 
the  etape  which  it  will  be  possible  for  an  army  corps  to  make 
under  ordinary  circumstances  marching  on  a  single  road 
when,  being  concentrated  at  the  commencement,  it  must 
still  be  so  at  the  termination  of  the  march.  The  etape  which 
a  column  can  cover  under  such  circumstances — that  is,  when 
starting  out  and  arriving  in  a  state  of  concentration — de- 
pends upon  the  strength  of  the  column.  In  reality,  the 
stronger  the  column,  the  more  time  is  required  for  the  move- 


28  Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 

ment,  time  lost  as  far  as  the  general  advance  is  concerned. 
We  agree  with  Colonel  Maillard,  that  the  normal  etape  that 
a  column  can  thus  cover  and  under  the  usual  conditions  is: 

For  a  regimental  column.  .42  kilometres. 

For  a  brigade  column.  . .  .40  kilometres. 

For  a  division  column.  .  .  .33  kilometres. 

For  a  corps  column 22  to  24  kilometres. 

The  custom  of  cantoning  in  depth  makes  it  possible  t  > 
increase  the  length  of  the  marches,  by  decreasing  the  tirm1 
necessary  for  moving  off;  if  the  depth  of  the  cantonments  is 
equal  to  the  length  of  the  marching  column,  the  column  halt- 
ing as  a  whole  and  starting  out  in  the  same  manner  the 
following  day,  there  is  no  time  lost  and  it  is  possible  to  re- 
quire each  unit  to  cover  the  maximum  etape,  or  about  forty 
kilometres.  When  the  depth  of  the  cantonment  is  not  equal 
to  the  length  of  the  marching  column,  the  actual  advance, 
measured  by  the  etape  covered  by  the  rear  subdivision,  is 
equal  to  the  ordinary  etape,  above  pointed  out,  increased  by 
the  depth  of  the  cantonments,  since  the  time  required  in 
moving  off  is  diminished  by  the  time  corresponding  to  that 
depth  of  the  cantonments.*  For  an  army  corps  cantoned, 

*  When  the  column  is  cantoned  in  depth  and  in  the  order  of  marc  h , 
each  subdivision  can  take  the  road  when  the  head  has  advanced  a  suf- 
ficient distance  to  allow  between  them  a  space  equal  to  the  distance 
that  it  should  have  on  starting  out  from  the  head  of  the  column.  The 
rear  subdivision,  for  instance  take-*  the  road  when  the  head  has  ad- 
vanced a  distance  A  D,  so  that  B  D  will  be  equal  to  the  total  length  of 
the  column  (Fig.  7:  A  is  the  cantonment  of  the  head,  B  that  of  the 
rear;  A  B  is  the  depth  of  the  cantonments)  The  hour  at  which  the 
rear  leaves  its  cantonments  is  equal  to  the  hour  fixed  for  the  departure 
of  the  subdivision  cantoned  at  A  increased  by  the  time  necessary  to 
cover  the  distance  A  D.  If  we  represent  the  length  of  the  column  by 
L,  and  the  depth  of  the  cantonments  by  /,  A  D  will  be  equal  to  L  —  / ; 
if,  to  simplifv,  we  assume  that  the  r*te  of  march  is  4  kilometres  an 
hour,  the  time  necessary  for  the  head  to  cover  the  distance  A  D,  the 
time  which  exactly  measures  that  required  for  moving  out  the  column, 
is  equal  to  L  —  /. 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 


29 


on  a  depth  of  10  kilometres,  an  etape  will  be  obtained  of 
22  -j-  10,  or  32  kilometres. 

It  will  be  possible  to  increase  the  rapidity  of  the  move- 
ments by  making  a  rapid  or  forced  march;  but  the  means  of 
increasing-  the  rapidity  by  the  practice  of  cantoning  in  depth 
will  be  most  frequently  employed. 

Generally,  the  marches  are  not  made  without  interrup- 
tions and  are  broken  up  by  halts  every  three  or  four  days. 
These  halts,  necessary  to  husband  the  strength  of  the  men, 
are  likewise  important  from  our  point  of  view.  In  fact,  de- 
spite the  theoretical  skill  shown  in  the  arrangement  of  the 
order  of  marches  designed  to  provide  the  supplies,  it  will 

For  an  army  corps,  if  we  assume  that  L  =  22  K,  and  /  =  10  K,  the  above 
formula  will  give  as  the  time  required  for  the  moving  out  of  the  column, 

22—10 

—  ,  or  3  hours. 


Bj— Vb 

8  o'Clock 


FIG.7 


AB,  old  cantonment. 
A'B\  new  cantonment. 


AB=1,  depth  of  cantonments. 
AD=L,  length  of  column. 


30  Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Armi/. 

often  happen  that  only  during  these  halts  will  it  be  possible 
to  establish  contact  between  the  troops  and  the  trains. 

However,  the  necessities  of  a  campaign  sometimes 
compel  these  halts  to  be  omitted,  thus  rendering  more  diffi- 
cult the  task  of  the  administration.  History  gives  more 
than  one  example  of  marches  continued  from  8  to  10  and 
even  15  days;  these  instances  are  well  known:  we  will  not 
quote  them  here. 

If  H  is  the  number  of  hours  a  day  available  for  the  march  (that  is. 
the  interval  comprised  between  the  departure  of  the  head  of  the  column 
and  the  hour  at  which  it  is  desired  the  rear  bodies  of  troops  should 
arrive  at  the  cantonment),  the  number  of  hours  required  for  the  move- 
ment of  the  rear  subdivision  is  equal  to  H  less  the  time  required  for 
the  moving  out  of  the  column  ;  that  is,  to 


H 


4     ' 
and  the  distance  covered  by  this  sudivision  will  be  equal  to 

4  (H  --  ^-r-i)  ;  that  is,  to  4  H  -  I,  +  /. 
4 

If  the  depth  of  the  cantonments  was  nothing,  or  /  =  0,  this  form- 
ula would  give  the  normal  length  of  march  obtained  by  supposing  the 
column  concentrated  on  departure  and  upon  arrival.  This  formula 
also  shows  very  well  that  the  possible  length  of  march,  when  the  depth 
of  the  cantonments  is  /,  is  equal  to  this  normal  march  (4  H  —  Iy)  in- 
creased by  the  depth  (/)  of  the  cantonments. 

By  giving  to  L,  in  the  formula  4  H  —  L,,  values  equal  to  the  length 
of  march  of  a  regiment,  brigade,  division,  and  corps,  and  by  assuming 
11  hours  as  an  average  value  for  H,  we  would  find  for  the  normal  march 
the  figures  given  above.  For  an  army  corps,  for  example,  with  L,  — 
22  K,  we  find: 

4  H  -  L,  =  44  -  22  =  22  kilometres. 

We  will  have  occasion  to  apply  these  different  formulas  to  calculate 
the  hour  of  departure  and  arrival  of  the  various  trains,  and  to  ascertain 
also  the  time  available  for  supplying  the  different  subdivisions. 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army.  31 


CHAPTER   II. 

/.     General  Methods  of  Subsistence. 

There  are  two  general  methods  of  subsisting  an  army: 
to  live  upon  the  country  by  making  use  of  the  local  resources, 
or  to  obtain  the  supplies  from  a  distance,  when  it  is  impos- 
sible to  obtain  them  in  the  country  occupied. 

The  question  has  sometimes  been  discussed  as  to  which 
of  these  two  methods  should  be  given  the  preference,  but  all 
discussion  on  this  subject  is  idle.  The  Regulations  of  Jan- 
uary 11,  1803,  have  closed  the  discussion,  for  Article  49  of 
these  regulations  has  wisely  decided  the  conditions  for  ap- 
plying these  two  methods  in  these  words:  "The  country 
will  be  turned  to  account  as  if  nothing  can  be  expected  from 
the  rear,  but  at  the  same  time  the  trains  and  the  supply 
from  the  rear  will  be  organized  as  if  nothing  can  be  ob- 
tained from  the  country  traversed." 

The  order  for  supply  establishes  for  each  day  the  method 
of  subsistence.  The  general  decides  this  by  considering  at 
the  same  time  the  reasons  for  the  military  formation  and  the 
administrative  necessities,  which  are  at  times  antagonistic. 
This  is  an  example  that  we  have  already  encountered  of  the 
possible  opposition  between  the  military  requirements  and 
the  administrative  necessities.  To  increase  the  rapidity  of 
the  movements  it  is  necessary  to  make,  whenever  possible, 
the  cantonments  in  order  of  march  and  on  a  depth  equal  to 
the  length  of  the  marching  columns;  whereas,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  depth  of  the  cantonments  must  be  reduced  to  make 
it  possible  for  the  supply-trains  to  arrive  at  the  proper  time. 
When  the  military  requirements  and  administrative  ner-essi- 


32  Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 

ties  are  thus  opposed,  it  is  the  province  of  the  general  to  de- 
cide the  matter  and  give  to  each  its  proper  place.  The  ad- 
ministrative considerations  should  never  take  precedence 
over  the  military  considerations,  but  it  is  not  possible  to  get 
rid  of  the  necessity  of  living;  it  is  not  possible  to  go  beyond 
this  without  imposing  increased  privations  upon  the  troops, 
and  the  commander  alone  is  able  to  decide  whether  the  sue 
cess  of  the  operations  and  the  importance  of  the  end  to  be 
attained  require  it.  But  the  duty  of  intendance  service,  and 
what  the  commander  should  require  of  it,  is  a  complete  and 
true  exposition  of  the  administrative  possibilities,  principal- 
ly of  the  state  of  the  resources  and  the  facility  of  utilizing 
them;  in  a  word,  only  the  actual  necessities  should  be  shown. 
Thus,  in  the  preceding  example,  the  obligation  of  closing  up 
the  cantonments  to  facilitate  the  workings  of  the  trains  of 
supply  constitutes  an  administrative  necessity  only  wrhen  it 
is  absolutely  impossible  to  live  upon  the  country. 

II.     Preliminary  Study  of  the  Resources. 

The  selection  of  the  method  of  subsistence  will  always 
depend  upon  the  information  concerning  the  local  resources, 
since,  in  accordance  with  the  principle  above  enunciated,  one 
should  always  live  upon  the  country  when  it  will  afford  suf 
ficient  resources.  Every  operation  should  then  be  preceded 
by  a  complete  study  of  the  resources  of  the  country,  of  the 
facility  of  using  them  to  the  best  advantage,  and  of  a  com 
parison  of  the  resources  with  the  necessities  to  be  provided 
for.  Such  an  investigation  is  of  practical  interest  only  if  it 
relates  to  a  particular  hypothesis;  it  could  be  made  in  a  work 
on  an  especial  subject. 

In  this  work,  which  does  not  permit  us  to  enter  upon  the 
discussion  of  a  definite  subject  and  of  a  particular  theatre  of 
operations,  we  cannot  make  this  preliminary  investigation. 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army.  33 

We  will  substitute  for  it  the  comparison  of  the  wants  of  an 
army,  in  each  of  the  formation  types  described  in  the  preced- 
ing chapter,  with  the  resources  of  any  region  whose  resour- 
ces are  equal  to  the  average  resources  of  France.  We  can  in 
this  way  apply  the  methods  and  obtain  a  general  idea  of  the 
matter,  enabling  us  to  appreciate  some  of  the  difficulties 
which  will  be  encountered  in  the  subsistence  of  an  army,  de- 
pending upon  its  degree  of  concentration,  in  a  country  of 
average  richness. 

"Averages,"  says  a  military  writer,*  "by  eliminating 
the  extremes,  destroy  the  notion  of  reality  and  ruin  the 
sentiment  of  things." 

It  will  be  advisable,  then,  not  to  put  much  depBndence 
upon  a  work  based  on  averages;  but,  with  these  reservations, 
averages  form  an  excellent  basis.  It  is  necessary  to  know 
liow  to  make  use  of  them  as  a  tailor  uses  a  pattern,  the  lines 
of  which  he  does  not  follow  exactly,  but  which  he  adapts  to 
all  figures,  enlarging  one  side,  shortening  the  other,  accord- 
ing to  measures. 

Knowing  the  effective  strength  and  the  weight  of  the 
daily  ration  of  provisions  and  forage,  it  is  easy  to  calculate 
the  quantity  of  stores  required  at  a  given  point.  When  it  is 
a  question  of  drawing  from  a  given  point  the  provisions  for 
a  known  effective  strength,  and  of  having  them  transported, 
the  total  only  need  be  considered;  but,  if  the  question  is 
simply  to  estimate  the  possibility  of  providing  the  subsist- 
ence in  a  particular  section  of  country,  the  comparison  can 
be  made  in  a  convenient  way,  by  reducing  the  wants  and  the 
resources  to  the  superficial  unit.  In  paragraph  II.  of  the 
preceding  chapter  we  have  expressed  the  degree  of  concen- 
tration of  the  army  by  the  number  of  men  and  horses  sta- 
tioned in  a  square  kilometre;  we  will  also  express  the  wants 

*Colonel  Maillard,  "Elements  de  la  Guerre." 
3 


34  Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 

by  the  quantity  of  precisions  and  forage  required  for  the 
sustenance  of  the  men  and  horses  in  a  square  kilometre,  and 
we  will  likewise  express  the  resources  by  the  averages  in  a 
square  kilometre.  By  bringing  down  the  coefficients  thus 
obtained,  it  is  at  once  known  whether  the  resources  are  or 
are  not  sufficient. 

The  purpose  of  the  following  two  tables  is  the  determi- 
nation of  these  coefficients. 

Table  No.  1  is  formed  by  taking  as  a  basis  the  normal 
army  corps  with  an  average  effective  strength  of  .°>0,000 
men  and  10,000  horses.  The  coefficients  for  the  wants  per 
square  kilometre  are  calculated  for  the  two  degrees  of  con- 
centration, one  corresponding  to  a  superficial  area  of  can- 
tonment of  100  square  kilometres,  and  the  other  to  a  super- 
ficial area  of  cantonment  of  45  square  kilometres;  these  are, 
it  will  be  remembered,  the  cantonments  of  an  army  corps  on 
a  depth  equal  to  the  length  of  the  column  of  march  in  the 
first  case,  on  a  depth  equal  to  half  this  length  in  the  second; 
the  basis  for  the  provisions  is  the  large  field  ration,  and 
for  the  forage  the  average  weights  of  4  kilos  of  hay,  4  kilos 
of  straw7,  and  5  kilos  of  oats. 

The  figures  in  Table  No.  2  are  those  of  the  average  pro- 
duction for  1801,  taken  from  the  results  of  the  inquiry  relat- 
ing to  agricultural  matters  published  by  the  Minister  of 
Agriculture.  By  dividing  the  totals  by  the  total  superficial 
area  of  France  (536,408  kilometres),  the  average  coefficient 
per  square  kilometre  is  obtaired. 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  A  nuy. 


35 


TABLE  No.  1. 


PROVISIONS. 

Number  of 
Rations. 

II 

fa 

3  0> 

££ 

REQUIRED. 

1 

Reduced  to  Square 
Kilometres. 

For  100  Kil- 
ometres. 

For  45  Kil- 
ometres. 

Bread  

30,000 
30,000 
30,000 
30,000 
30,000 
30,000 
30,000 
30,000 

30,000 

Kil. 
750 
600 
700 
540 
6975 
500 
300 
250 

100 
020 
31 
024 
030 
Lit. 
25 
Kil. 
4 
4 
5 

Qx. 

225 
180 
210 
162 
210 
150 
90 
75 
Head 
90-100 
1132 
Qx. 
30 
6 
9.30 
7.20 
9 
Lit. 
75 
Qx, 
400 
400 
500 

Qx. 

2.25 

1.80 
210 
1.62 
210 
1.50 
.90 
.75 

1  head 
12 
Qx. 
.30 
.06 
.10 
.08 
.09 
Lit. 
75 
Qx. 
4. 
4. 
5. 

Qx. 
5 
4 
4.66 
3.60 
466 
3.33 
2 
1.66 
*- 

2  head 

25t 
Qx. 
.661 

.14 
.21 
.16 
.20 
Lit. 
166 
Qx. 
8.88 
8.88 
11.11 

Or  Biscuit  

Or  Pain  Biscuite 
Equivalent  in  Flour.  .  .  . 
Or  Wheat.             

Fresh  Meat.. 

Or  Salt  Bacon  
Or  Canned  Meats..  
Equivalent  in  Beef  on 
hoof  

Ewes  or  Sheep  . 

30  000 

Rice  nr  Dried  Veget- 
ables . 

30,000 
30,000 
30,000 
30,000 
30,000 

30,000 

10,000 
10,000 
10,000 

Salt                           ..... 

Sugar  

Roasted  Coffee  
Lard 

Wine  

Hay 

Straw  

Oats  

The  transportation  will  require  about  150  carts  and  15  wagons,  at 
the  rate  of  6  quintals  to  a  cart  and  6  tons  to  a  wagon. 

Instead  of  canned  meats,  the  cattle  must  be  transported  ;  about 
8  to  10  more  wagons  will  be  required. 

^Calculated  on  an  average  weight  of  300  kilogrammes  and  yield 
of  58  per  cent 

t Average  weight,  25  kilogrammes;  yield,  53  per  cent. 

%Note. — The  provisions  entered  in  italics  are  those  usually  in- 
cluded in  the  load  of  the  trains  to  form  a  day's  ration.  Their  total 
weight  is : 

Bread 225 

Meat 75 

Small  Articles 61 

361 
Oats 500 

Total....    .  ..861 


36 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 


TABLE  No.  2. 


PRODUCTS. 

Production 
(Stocks  in 
hand  for  the 
Cattle). 

Coefficient 
per  Square 
Kilometre 

REMARKS. 

Wheat 

Qx. 

58,792,693 

Q* 

109 

This  coefficient  is   ob- 

Meslin   
Rye  
Barley  
Oats.  

2,710,993 
15,397,583 
16,261,097 
4b',669,925 

5 
29 
30 
93 

tained    by   dividing    the 
pt  eduction     by    536,408, 
the   superficial   area  in 
square  kilometres. 
If,  instead  of  taking  the 

Total  for  all  Cereals.  . 
Artificial  Meadows. 
Clover 

142  832,291 
43,340,869 

268 

production  of  1891  as  a 
basis,    the    calculation 
were  made  on  the  Average 
production    during   the 

Lucerne  
Sainfoin     

36,217,493 
22,006,060 

ten  years    from    1882   to 
1891,  somewhat  different 
coefficients    would    be 

Forages 

101,564,422 

190 

obtained. 

Natural  Meadows. 
Hay 

158,843,128 

277 

Average  Produc-       Coef    in 
tion,  Qx.              Sq.  Kil. 

Wheat,  82,205  662  153  qx 
Meslin     3818391       7  qx 

Second  Crop  

31,043,404 

58 

Rye,       17,:i29,S46     32  qx. 

Total  of  Forages.  .  .    . 
Straw  

291,450,954 

525 
532 

rsariey,  11  yui.oJl     2  '  qx. 
Oats,      40  .323,220     75  qx  . 
Calculated  at  the  rate 
of  two  quintals  of  straw 

Working  Cattle  
Beef  Cattle  
Cows  . 

1,408,836 
504,139 
6,557  632 

•£- 

o   one   of  grain,  532  = 
266  X  2. 

Total  of  Horned  Cattle 
Ewes. 

8,470,607 
3,990,865 

15  head 

Sheep.  . 

8,903,864 

t 

Total  

12,894,729 

24  head 

Hogs. 

6,096,232 

11  head 

Goats  

1.480,229 

*Not  including  the  bulls,  bullocks,  heifers,  breeders,  and  calves. 

tNot  including  the  rams,  lambs,  and  ewe  lambs. 

i  Representing  the  equivalent  in  rations  of  two  beeves. 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army.  37 

Comparison  of  the  Wants  and  the  Resources. 

The  figures  in  Table  No.  2,  being  those  of  the  annual  pro- 
duction, represent  only  the  actual  resources  on  hand  at  the 
time  of  harvest,  before  exportation  or  consumption  have 
used  up  a  portion  of  the  products;  consequently  only  at  that 
time  is  it  possible  to  directly  compare  the  coefficients  in  the 
two  tables,  in  order  to  ascertain  if  the  wants  expressed  by 
the  coefficients  in  Table  No.  1  can  be  satisfied.  To  make  an 
analogous  comparison,  relating  to  another  period  of  the  year, 
it  would  be  necessary  to  make  a  correction  of  the  coefficients 
in  Table  No.  2,  taking  into  account  the  exportations,  the 
amounts  consumed,  and  in  general  all  the  causes  of  variation 
which  may  have  occurred  since  the  harvest.  The  studies 
entered  upon  in  connection  w7ith  this  subject  have  not  yet 
embraced  a  sufficiently  long  period  of  time,  and  are  not  alto- 
gether conclusive,  to  make  it  possible  to  give  accurate  con- 
clusions to  bring  about  these  corrections.  But  if  it  intended 
to  establish  in  a  general  way  the  probabilities  as  to  whether 
or  not  it  would  be  possible  to  provide  the  subsistence  of  the 
army  from  the  local  resources,  these  coefficients  are  suffi- 
cient, as  we  are  about  to  show7,  when  considering  the  princi- 
pal foods,  such  as  meat,  forage,  bread,  etc. 

III.     Possibility  of  Directly  Securing  the  Supply. 

Meat. — The  wants  in  the  way  of  cattle  are  expressed  in 
accordance  with  Table  No.  1,  by  1  animal  in  the  case  of  the 
large  cantonments  (100  square  kilometres),  and  by  2  anima's 
when  the  cantonments  are  of  the  average  size  (45  square 
kilometres).  Table  No.  2  shows,  as  the  resources  per  square 
kilometre,  15  steers  or  cows,  to  wyhich  it  would  be  necessary 
to  add  the  number  of  the  other  animals  given  by  the  table. 
These  figures  are  those  of  the  resources  on  the  31st  of  De- 
cember, 1891,  but  they  vary  very  little  in  a  year;  we  can  use 


38  Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 

the  coefficients  without  making  any  corrections  in  them, 
and  the  comparison  of  these  coefficients  with  that  of  the 
wants  shows  that  in  general  it  will  not  only  be  possible,  but 
very  easy,  to  find  in  the  country  the  cattle  necessary  to  pro- 
vide the  meat. 

This  conclusion  should  not  be  considered  as  absolute; 
we  have  already  said  so,  but  it  is  worth  while  to  repeat  it; 
our  deductions,  precisely  because  they  are  based  upon  aver- 
ages, are  not  exact  for  any  particular  section;  it  is  evident 
that  if,  for  example,  the  foregoing  conclusions  were  applied 
to  certain  sections  of  Provence  where  there  are  no  cattle,  a 
grave  error  would  be  committed.  But  it  would  be  enough 
to  make  sure,  which  can  be  readily  done,  that  a  section  is  an 
average  one,  permitting  us  to  apply  our  conclusions  to  it. 

We  will  say,  then,  in  short,  with  the  foregoing  excep- 
tions, that  in  general  the  supply  of  beef  will  be  provided 
from  the  local  resources,  unless  for  expedient  reasons  or  by 
military  order  it  should  be  otherwise  arranged.* 

Forage. — Regarding  hay  and  oats,  the  coefficients  in 
Table  No.  2  can  no  longer  be  used  without  correction.  The 
comparison  of  these  coefficients  with  those  in  Table  Xo.  1 
would  only  prove  what  is  evident  at  a  glance,  that  at  the 
time  of  harvest,  or  a  short  time  afterwards,  the  resources  are 
greatly  in  excess  of  the  wants,  and  consequently  it  will  be 
an  easy  matter  to  obtain  supplies  from  the  country.  As 
regards  the  oats,  the  coefficient  of  production  (93  q-m.)  is 
equal  to  more  than  8  times  the  wants  in  closed-up  canton- 
ments ill  q-m.),  and  to  18  times  that  of  the  requirements  in 
the  extended  cantonments  (5  q-m.). 

As  far  as  forage  is  concerned,  the  proportion  between 
the  production  and  the  wants  is  even  more  favorable,  since, 

*We  have  not  included  in  our  calculations  the  stores  and  com- 
mercial stocks,  because  we  have  more  especially  in  view  the  exploita- 
tion of  the  local  resources  in  the  cantonments  and  in  agricultural 
sections. 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Aimy. 


39 


the  wants  being  expressed  by  the  coefficients  4  q-m.  and  8.88 
q-m.,  the  production  is  represented  by  the  number  277  q-m. 
for  hay  alone,  and  by  that  of  525  q-m.  if  the  second  crop  and 
the  artificial  forage  are  included. 

Agricultural  statistics  do  not  furnish  direct  data  con- 
cerning straw,  but  an  estimate  of  the  production  of  this 
article  can  be  made,  if  we  admit  as  an  average  that  the  yield 
in  straw  is  about  200  kilos  for  each  100  kilos  of  grain.  The 
total  of  the  coefficients  in  Table  No.  2  for  cereals  being  266 
q-m.,  the  coefficient  for  straw  would  be  about  double,  or  532; 
that  is,  nearly  the  same  as  the  natural  and  artificial  forage 
taken  together.  The  inference  for  straw  should  then  be 
identical  with  that  which  relates  to  the  facility  of  supplying 
the  wants  at  the  time  of  harvest. 

This  favorable  situation  changes  in  proportion  as  the 
time  of  harvest  becomes  more  remote;  for  want  of  more 
exact  data  and  to  have,  however,  an  approximate  idea  of  the 
facts,  we  will  admit  that  the  greater  part  of  the  oats  and 
forage  is  consumed  on  the  spot*  to  provide  for  the  wants  of 

*As  far  as  the  whole  of  France  is  concerned,  this  fact  is  established 
by  the  figures  of  the  imports  and  exports,  which  are  insignificant,  as 
the  following  list  shows : 


1889. 

1890. 

1891. 

OATS. 

Imports                           

QUINTALS. 

2,046.846 

QUINTALS. 

1,493,210 

QUINTALS. 

978,735 

Exports                            

26,322 

30,243 

185,502 

Difference  in  Imports.  
Proportion  of  the  Harvest.  .  . 

FORAGE. 

Imports             

2,020,514 

•h 

18,620,155 

1,462,967 
A 

16,550,058 

793,233 

*v 

17,321,442 

Exports                     

66,254,527 

71,711,375 

60.209,568 

Difference  in  Exports  
Proportion  of  Harvest  

47,634,372 

54,269,707 

42,888,126 
i 

7 

40  Notes  on  tlie  Supply  of  an  Army. 

the  country,  that  they  are  almost  entirely  consumed  in  the 
interval  between  two  harvests,  and  that  the  consumption 
takes  place  in  a  continuous  and  regular  manner  during  this 
same  interval.  This  would  amount  to  saying  that  the 
monthly  consumption  is  about  one-twelfth  of  the  produc- 
tion, or,  again,  that  this  one-twelfth  may  be  considered  as 
the  maximum  amount  that  could  at  all  times  be  found. 

The  coefficient  of  production  for  forage  being  525  q-m,, 
one-twelfth  of  this  is  44  q-m.,  which  would  represent  the 
minimum  amount  which  may  be  relied  upon  to  insure  the 
supply  by  the  exploitation  of  the  local  resources.  If  this 
number,  44  q-m.,  is  compared  wyith  the  number  of  animals  in 
a  square  kilometre,  which  is  20  (15  steers  or  cows  and  5 
horses  or  mules),  it  is  seen  that  it  represents  the  daily 
nourishment  of  these  animals  for  a  month,  at  the  rate  of  7 
kilos  a  day  (20  X  7  kg.  X  30  =42  q-m.).  This  remark  con- 
firms our  deductions  and  showrs  that  the  production  of 
forage  is  just  about  equal  to  the  requirements  for  the  supply 
of  the  animals  in  France. 

A  similar  calculation  enables  us  to  take  the  number  7 
q-in.  (=y-f)  for  the  oats,  as  the  coefficient  for  the  minimum 
amount  probably  existing  at  the  most  unfavorable  time  of 
the  year. 

The  comparison  of  these  corrected  coefficients  with  the 
wants  shown  in  Table  No.  1  brings  us  to  the  following 
conclusions: 

1st.  As  relates  to  forage, this  minimum  amount  is  equal 
to  about  ten  times  the  requirements  in  extended  canton- 
ments, and  to  only  four  times  the  requirements  in  average 
cantonments  closed  up. 

The  conclusion  will  be  the  same  regarding  straw. 

2d.     Regarding  oats,  this  minimum  amount  is  a  little 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 


41 


in  excess  of  the  requirements  in  the  extended  cantonments, 
but  is  below  it  in  the  closed-up  cantonments. 

In  short,  it  can  be  said,  as  the  conclusion  of  this  entire 
analysis,  that  the  supply  of  hay  and  straw  will  probably 
nearly  always  be  assured  by  the  local  resources,  but  that  re- 
garding oats  this  supply  will  be  very  different  if  the  number 
of  horses  is  jrreat  and  they  are  crowded  together  and  at  a 
time  just  preceding  the  new  harvest. 

Wheat,  Flour,  Bread. — It  is  not  possible  to  argue  concern; 
ing  wheat  as  we  have  done  regarding  forage,  for  it  is  a  mis- 
take to  say  that  the  resources  vary  each  month  by  a  quantity 
equal  to  one-twelfth  of  the  harvest.  It  is  necessary,  indeed, 
as  far  as  concerns  wheat,  to  take  into  account  the  shipments, 
the  industrial  occupations,  and  especially  the  fact  that  the 
production  is  below  the  necessary  amount  required  for  con- 
sumption. At  a  given  time,  the  resources  should  include  a 
large  proportion  of  wheat  obtained  by  importation,*  of 
which  it  will  be  necessary  to  take  account. 

The  deficit  of  the  production  compared  with  the  total 
consumption  is  considerable;  if  in  good  years  it  may  only  be 
from  one-eighth  to  one-tenth,  it  may  likewise  rise  very  much 
above  this  in  bad  years,  as  the  preceding  table  showrs.  The 

*The  figures  below  give  an  idea  of  the  magnitude  of  the  importa- 
tions of  wheat  and  similar  products  : 


1889. 

1890. 

1891. 

Imports 

QUINTALS. 

11,417  592 

QUINTALS. 

10,552,014 

QUINTALS. 

19,605,084 

Kxports 

11,048 

5,874 

6,793 

Difference  in  Imports. 

11,406,544 

10,546,140 

19,598,291 

Yearly  Production  
The  Imports  compared  with  the 
Harvest  represent  

83,230,671 
| 

89,733,991 
i 

8 

58,508,807 
i 

42  Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 

commercial  stocks  which  we  did  not  consider  in  our  calcula- 
tions regarding  forage  and  oats  are  very  important  con- 
siderations in  those  relating  to  wheat. 

But  it  is  necessary  to  state  that  wheat,  not  being  in 
general  directly  used  by  the  corps,  will  only  very  rarely  be 
the  object  of  requisitions  in  the  cantonments;  there  is,  conse- 
quently, no  reason  to  make  for  this  commodity  a  comparison 
between  the  coefficients  given  in  Tables  Nos.  1  and  2.  The 
supply  of  wheat  will  be  provided  by  the  administrative 
services,  by  extending  the  field  of  exploitation  as  much  as 
will  be  necessary,  and  by  sending,  undoubtedly,  to  the  rear 
and  to  the  general  trade  for  a  large  portion.  The  question 
of  the  supply  of  wheat  is,  then,  especially  a  question  of 
general  economics,  a  little  beyond  our  discussion,  and  with 
which  wre  will  not  further  concern  ourselves,  notwithstand- 
ing its  great  importance. 

Rut,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  pertinent  to  this  subject  to 
ascertain  if  it  will  be  possible  to  find  in  the  cantonment 
either  bread,  directly  to  provide  this  component  of  the  ra- 
tion, or  flour;  wThich  w7ould  render  it  possible  to  bake  in  the 
local  ovens  all  or  a  part  of  the  bread  required. 

It  is  well  to  observe  the  sections  of  country  where  the 
custom  is  retained  of  baking  the  bread  in  the  households, 
either  in  a  domestic  oven  or  in  a  common  oven,  and  the 
sections  where  this  practice  is  lost  and  in  which  the  bread 
is  furnished  by  bakers.  In  this  last  class  belong  the  cities 
and  large  towns. 

In  places  wThere  the  bread  is  furnished  by  bakers  the 
latter  make  it  evidently  each  day;  a  troop  arriving  in  the 
place  unawrares  would  not  find  there  any  bread,  or,  at  all 
events,  wrould  only  find  a  very  inconsiderable  amount.  How 
much  bread  would  it  be  possible  to  obtain  from  these  bakers 
in  the  time  usually  available — that  is,  between  the  arrival 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army.  43 

at  the  cantonment  and  the  departure  of  the  trains  the 
following  day?  If  we  consider  the  difficulties  of  organiza- 
tion, the  disturbance  that  war  causes  everywhere,  it  appears 
difficult  to  obtain  from  each  baker  a  yield  exceeding  double 
the  amount  which  he  furnishes  daily.  The  population  being 
70  inhabitants  to  the  square  kilometre,  the  average  produc- 
tion being  undoubtedly  sufficient  for  the  requirements  of 
this  population,  it  would  be  possible  to  obtain,  from  a  square 
kilometre,  in  accordance  with  this  rule,  twice  as  many  ra- 
tions, or  140,  or,  in  round  numbers,  150.  But,  if  we  refer 
to  the  averages  given  on  page  26,  we  ascertain  that  the 
number  of  men  to  be  supplied  per  square  kilometre  is  300 
or  680,  depending  upon  the  degree  of  concentration;  it  would 
then  be  possible  to  obtain  bread  for  only  one-half  or  one- 
fifth,  depending  on  the  circumstances,  of  the  effective 
strength.  The  same  conclusion  is  reached  by  considering 
that  the  capacity  of  places,  as  far  as  cantonment  is  con- 
cerned, varies  from  4  to  10  men  to  each  inhabitant;*  if  it  is 
only  possible  to  obtain  a  number  of  rations  equal  to  double 
the  number  of  the  inhabitants,  that  is  equivalent  to  2  rations 
for  4  to  10  men,  or  to  one-half  or  one-fifth  the  effective 
strength. 

In  places  where  the  custom  of  household  baking  is  re- 
tained the  inhabitants  bake  usually  each  week,  sometimes 
even  only  even'  fortnight;  it  may  be  assumed  in  general 
that  each  family  has  its  week's  supply  of  bread.  Therefore, 
if  it  is  considered  that  women,  children,  and  old  men  con- 
sume less  bread,  we  may  estimate  the  daily  consumption 
per  inhabitant  at  500  grammes,  and  consequently  at  4  kilo- 
grammes, as  the  supply  of  bread  per  inhabitant  that  we  can 
expect  to  find  in  the  cantonments.  For  a  population  of  70 

#  «  Aide-memoire  1'Officier  d'Etat-major,"  page  192,  and  Colonel 
Maillard,  "Elements  de  la  Guerre,"  page  158. 


44  Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 

inhabitants  per  square  kilometre,  the  resources  of  bread 
\vould  be  2.8  q-in.  for  the  square  kilometre.  This  coefficient, 
compared  with  the  wants  indicated  in  Table  No.  1,  shows 
that  the  resources  are  in  excess  of  the  wants  for  the  extended 
cantonments  and  are  only  about  half  of  those  necessary  in 
cantonments  closed  up  to  an  average  degree.  As  the  bread 
disseminated  in  the  various  households  can  evidently  only 
be  used  for  the  supply  of  the  troops  billeted  upon  the  in- 
habitants, it  is  possible  to  state  the  foregoing  conclusions  by 
saying,  that  the  supply  of  bread  by  the  inhabitants  can  gen- 
erally be  ordered  only  in  the  case  of  extended  cantonments, 
and  that  in  the  case  of  closed-up  cantonments,  if  the  sub- 
sistence is  ordered  to  be  furnished  by  the  inhabitants,  this 
will  be,  for  at  least  a  considerable  part  of  the  troops,  sub- 
sistence without  the  bread,  the  latter  being  supplied  by  the 
regular  issues. 

Each  baker  or  each  household  possessing,  no  doubt,  flour 
sufficient  for  several  bakings,  the  deficiency  in  the  case  of 
the  bread  above  ascertained  certainly  does  not  exist  for  the 
flour,  but  here  the  difficulty  will  be  of  another  kind,  and  will 
consist  especially  in  collecting  and  working  up  the  flour; 
this  question  will  be  discussed  later. 

Forage,  meat,  and  bread  forming  the  principal  feature 
of  the  supply,  we  can,  by  wThat  precedes,  ascertain  how  scat- 
tered these  supplies  are  and  to  what  extent  it  will  be  pos- 
sible to  procure  them  directly.  As  to  the  other  provisions 
—that  is,  those  comprised  under  the  designation  "small  ar- 
ticles of  the  ration,"  and  which  are  imported  products,  it  will 
be  possible  to  procure  them  only  from  the  merchants  and 
in  rather  important  localities;  as  to  the  household  supplies 
which  exist  only  in  small  quantities  and  which  are  easily 
hidden,  it  is  useless  to  think  of  obtaining  them  by  requisi- 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army.  45 

tion;  they  can  only  be  made  use  of  when   meals  are  de- 
manded from  the  inhabitants. 

IV.     Administrative  Reconnaissances. 

The  preceding  analyses  prove  that  the  knowledge  of  the 
production  of  the  last  harvest  is  an  important  fact,  which 
suffices  generally  to  aid  in  estimating  the  resources  of  a 
country  and  the  possibility  of  living  there.  This  knowledge 
may  be  obtained  by  means  of  the  official  statistics,  which 
may  generally  be  a  most  sure  and  easy  means.  It  is  of 
interest,  however,  to  ascertain  by  what  other  means  it  would 
be  possible  to  supply  the  place  of  the  statistical  information, 
and  to  make  in  some  way,  without  losing  a  moment,  admin- 
istrative reconnaissance  of  the  country.  The  problem  con- 
sists in  calculating  the  production  of  a  given  country,  or,  if 
it  is  desired  to  keep  the  same  terms,  the  production  of  this 
country  with  reference  to  a  superficial  unit — a  square  kilo- 
metre, for  instance.  It  evidently  would  be  enough  for  that 
purpose  to  know  the  portion  of  lands  under  cultivation  of 
which  it  is  desired  to  estimate  the  production  and  also  the 
yield. 

Jt  may  be  admitted  that  the  proportion  of  lands  under 
cultivation  with  different  crops  varies  little  from  one  year 
to  another.  A  portion  of  these  lands  are  devoted  to  the 
cultivation  of  vines,  prairies,  woods,  etc.,  which  are  perma- 
nent; it  will  thus  be  possible  to  determine  approximately, 
by  information  or  by  the  examination  of  the  country,  what 
proportion  of  the  general  superficial  area  these  permanent 
cultivations  include.  It  will  thus  be  possible,  it  seems,  to 
establish  the  fact  that  all  these  fixed  cultivations  and  the 
wild  (uncultivated)  portions  represent  a  quarter,  for  instance, 
or  one-half  or  one-third  of  the  country;  it  naturally  will 
follow  that  the  tilled  grounds  are  three-fourths,  one-half,  or 


46  Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 

two-thirds  of  the  total  area.  It  remains  to  be  determined 
how  the  various  crops  are  distributed  over  the  tilled 
grounds;  it  can  be  admitted,  as  we  have  already  said,  that 
this  distribution  varies  little  from  one  year  to  another;  for 
it  depends  above  all  upon  the  customs  of  the  local  cultiva- 
tion, and  principally  upon  the  rotation  of  the  crops  prac- 
ticed; it  is  then  chiefly  by  informing  one's  self  concerning 
these  customs  that  it  will  be  possible  to  arrive  at  a  solution 
of  the  question;  the  knowledge  of  the  rotation  of  the  crops 
is  particularly  very  important,  and  this  information  will 
nearly  always  enable  the  proportion  of  the  crops  to  be  deter- 
mined. The  following  examples  will  make  this  more  clear: 
1st.  Let  us  suppose  that  in  the  country  under  con- 
sideration the  customary  rotation  of  the  crops  would  be  the 
following: 

1st  year,  wheat; 

2d  year,  barley; 

3d  year,  oats ; 

4th  year,  fallow  ground  or  different  crops. 
It  is  easy  to  conclude  from  this  that  the  tilled  grounds 
are  sown  one-fourth  in  wheat,  one-fourth  in  barley,  and  one- 
fourth  in  oats. 

If,  on  the  other  hand,  we  have  ascertained  that  the 
tilled  ground  represents  only  half  the  country  for  example, 
it  will  be  easy  to  conclude  that  in  a  square  kilometre  or  a 
hundred  hectares  there  are  fifty  hectares  of  tilled  ground,  of 
which 

12^  hectares  are  in  wheat; 

12J  hectares  are  in  barley; 

12J  hectares  are  in  oats;  and 

12J  hectares  fallow  ground  or  different  crops. 
It  will  be  sufficient,  finally,  to  know  the  average  yield 
of  a  hectare  in  order  to  know  the  production  of  a  square  kilo- 


Notes  on  tlu  Supply  of  an  Army.  47 

metre — that  is  to  say,  the  coefficient  analogous  to  that  of 
Table  No.  1  above;  for  example,  an  average  yield  per  hectare 
of  11  q-m.  for  oats  would  give  to  the  square  kilometre  a  pro- 
duction of  11  X  12|,  or  1371  q.m. 

2d.  In  another  country  the  following  rotation  of  the 
crops  is  generally  observed: 

1st  year,  wheat; 

2d  year,  barley ; 

3d  year,  artificial  forage; 

4th  year,  wheat ; 

5th  year,  oats. 

From  this  it  is  deduced  that  the  proportions  of  the  crops 
on  the  tilled  grounds  are  the  following: 

Wheat,  two-fifths; 

Barley,  one-fifth ; 

Oats,  one-fifth ; 

Forage,  one-fifth. 

If,  for  example,  the  tilled  grounds  are- three-fourths  the 
total  surface  (one-fourth  being  in  vines,  prairies,  meadows, 
moors,  etc.),  there  will  be,  per  square  kilometre,  or  100 
hectares: 

I  x  75  =  30  hectares  in  wheat; 

|  X  75  =15  hectares  in  barley; 

l  x  75  =  15  hectares  in  oats; 

|  X  75  =  15  hectares  in  forage. 

By  applying  to  this  surface  the  average  yield  per  hec- 
tare in  wheat,  barley,  oats,  etc.,  we  obtain  for  these  supplies 
the  coefficient  for  the  square  kilometre. 

Without  information  relating  to  the  distribution  of  the 
crops  and  the  rotation  of  the  same,  it  will  be  necessary  to 
endeavor  to  obtain  this  by  an  inspection  of  the  country.  It 
is  sufficient  to  examine  the  country  from  an  elevation,  for 
example,  to  see  the  proportion  of  vines,  woods,  moors,  etc., 


48  Notes  on  Hie  Supply  of  an  Army. 

and  also  that  of  the  tilled  grounds;  that  is  to  say,  the  first 
element  of  the  calculation;  attention  will,  finally  be  given 
to  the  tilled  grounds  to  estimate  the  distribution  of  the 
different  crops,  such  as  wheat,  oats,  barley,  etc.  This  second 
investigation  is  undoubtedly  more  difficult. 

If  at  the  time  of  harvest  it  is  easy  to  recognize  a  field 
of  wheat  from  that  of  oats  or  from  a  field  of  barley,  the 
determination  of  the  question  presents  some  difficulty  when 
it  is  desired  to  distinguish  one  of  these  cereals  from  the 
other  while  green;  it  is  possible,  however,  to  determine  this 
after  a  little  experience,  and  thus  obtain  an  approximate 
idea  of  the  proportion  of  the  crops. 

One  of  the  officials  of  the  Intendance  in  crossing  the 
section  where  the  troops  are  being  cantoned  in  the  evening 
would  thus  be  able,  quite  approximately  it  seems  to  me, 
upon  the  march  each  day,  to  estimate  the  production,  and 
consequently  the  resources  of  the  country ;  he  would  thus  be 
able,  without  more  precise  information,  to  have  the  neces 
sary  elements  for  the  preparation  of  the  order,  which  should, 
whenever  possible,  be  given  before  the  arrival;  that  is  to 
say,  before  it  was  possible  to  procure  the  information  from 
the  local  authorities  near  at  hand. 

The  yield,  the  knowledge  of  which  is  equally  necessary, 
is  more  easy  to  determine,  as  it  varies  in  small  limits.  It 
will  not  be  going  far  wrong  to  make  use  of  an  average  yield; 
it  can,  moreover,  be  corrected,  somewhat  depending  upon 
whether  the  country  appears  fertile  or  arid,  or  whether  the 
season  has  been  propitious,  average,  or  bad. 

Table  No.  3  gives  the  averages  and  extreme  yields,  from 
information  which  can  fix  the  ideas  and  serve  the  terms  of 
comparison  of  the  kind  of  reconnaissance  that  we  have  just 
been  discussing.  This  table  contains  also  other  information 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army.  49 

which  may  be  useful,  especially  on  the  proportion  of  the 
surface  devoted  to  each  crop  in  the  whole  of  France. 

As  a  verification,  and  as  an  example  of  the  method,  it 
may  be  remarked  that  the  figures  in  column  3  represent  the 
number  of  hectares  cultivated  with  each  food  supply  on  the 
basis  of  100;  that  is  to  say,  by  a  square  kilometre.  By  multi- 
plying these  by  the  yield  given  in  column  5  we  obtain  the 
coefficients  given  in  Table  No.  2;  that  is  to  say,  the  produc- 
tion for  each  year  per  square  kilometre.  Oats,  for  example, 
by  multiplying  the  number  of  7.9  hectares  by  the  yield  per 
hectare,  11.71  q-x.,  we  obtain  for  the  production  of  100  hec- 
tares, or  1  square  kilometre,  92.6  q-x.,  or,  in  round  numbers, 
93  q-x.,  which  is  the  coefficient  for  this  supply. 


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Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army.  51 


CHAPTER  III. 

/.      Application  of  tlie  Different  Methods  of  Subsistence  by  the 
Local  Resources. 

We  have  studied  in  the  preceding  chapter  the  distribu- 
tion of  the  resources  and  their  relation  with  the  necessities 
for  the  subsistence  of  the  army  depending  upon  its  degree 
of  concentration.  We  must  now  concern  ourselves  with  the 
means  of  utilizing  these  resources;  that  is,  with  the  general 
methods  to  be  employed  to  turn  them  to  advantage.  The 
methods  of  profiting  by  the  local  resources  and  of  living 
upon  the  country  may  be  classed  in  the  following  manner: 

1st.  To  have  the  subsistence  provided  directly  by  the 
inhabitants;* 

2d.  To  entrust  to  the  troops  themselves  the  duty  of 
procuring  the  provisions  by  turning  to  account  the  canton- 
ments occupied  or  the  surrounding  zones  ;f 

3d.  To  turn  the  country  to  account  by  means  of  general 
requisitions;  the  work  in  connection  therewith  will  fall  more 
especially  upon  the  administrative  services.! 

//.     Billeting  upon  the  Inhabitants. 

The  simplest  and  most  convenient  method  of  providing 
the  subsistence  of  the  troops  is  to  billet  them  upon  the  in- 
habitants; by  such  means  the  details  for  the  distribution  are 
done  away  with;  the  trouble  of  preparing  the  meals  is  avoid- 

*This  method  is  usually  termed  "billeting  upon  the  inhabitants." 

tThe  term  "foraging  upon  the  country"  expresses  this  more 
correctly. 

JThis  method  is  succinctly  expressed  as  making  "requisition  upon 
the  country."—//.  G.  S. 


52  Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 

ed;  it  is  the  best  method,  or,  to  speak  more  accurately,  the 
only  one,  of  profiting  by  the  small  provisions  scattered  in 
the  households.  The  method  is  the  one  which  distributes 
more  uniformly,  if  not  in  the  best  way,  the  burden  of  the 
subsistence  among  all  the  inhabitants;  it  is  consequently  the 
method  of  supply  which  should  yield  the  best  results  and 
make  it  possible  to  subsist  the  greatest  number  of  men  in  a 
given  section  of  the  country. 

We  do  not  have  to  explain  here  the  detailed  arrange- 
ments and  administrative  order  peculiar  to  this  method  of 
operation.  The  Regulations  of  January  11, 1893,  and  the  In- 
structions of  April  12,  1889,  to  subsistence  officers,  contain 
all  necessary  information  on  this  subject.  We  will  inquire 
only  in  what  limits  it  is  possible  to  make  use  of  billeting 
upon  the  inhabitants  as  a  general  method  of  subsistence. 

Billeting  upon  the  inhabitants  can  only  be  ordered  for 
troops  in  cantonments,  and  consequently  its  employment  is 
limited  by  the  impossibility  even  of  cantoning  the  troops 
when  the  concentration  is  too  great. 

As  we  have  seen  in  the  first  chapter,  the  two  formation 
types  to  which  we  are  limited  in  order  to  represent  the  con- 
centration of  the  army,  far  from  the  enemy  and  during  the 
ordinary  period  of  operations,  correspond,  as  far  as  density 
is  concerned,  to  the  following  figures: 

1st  Type. — 4  men  to  each  inhabitant,  if  we  assume  a 
population  of  70  inhabitants  to  the  square  kilometre;  8  to  9 
men  to  each  inhabitant  in  agricultural  sections  where  the 
population  is  only  45  inhabitants  to  the  square  kilometre. 

2d  Type. — 8  to  9  men  to  each  inhabitant  in  the  first  case, 
and  15  men  to  each  inhabitant  in  the  second. 

In  accordance  with  the  Regulations,  the  capacity  of  the 
cantonments  should  be  estimated  at  6  or  7  men  in  agri- 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army.  53 

cultural  countries,  and  4  to  5  only  in  towns  and  manufactur- 
ing districts.  From  this  it  appears  that  even  in  the  first 
formation  it  would  not  always  be  possible  to  quarter  the 
entire  column;  but  this  conclusion  should  not  be  regarded 
as  absolute:  it  may  be  possible  in  reality,  especially  in  the 
country,  to  increase  the  number  of  men  quartered  to  10  men 
to  each  inhabitant.  It  is  necessary  also  to  take  into  con- 
sideration the  fact  that  the  distribution  of  the  inhabitants 
is  not  uniform  throughout  the  country,  and  that  the  roads 
and  their  approaches  show  a  population  higher  than  the 
average.  For  these  reasons  we  can  admit  that  it  will  always 
be  possible  to  quarter  all  the  troops  in  the  first  case — that 
is,  when  the  depth  of  the  cantonments  is  equal  to  the  length 
of  the  column. 

But  such  wTill  not  be  the  case  when  the  depth  of  the 
zone  of  the  cantonments  is  diminished.  In  fixing  the  ca- 
pacity of  the  cantonments  as  6  men  to  each  inhabitant  for 
the  towns,  and  10  men  to  each  inhabitant  in  the  country, 
which  is  the  maximum,  it  can  be  seen  that  it  would  be  pos- 
sible to  quarter  only  two-thirds,  at  most,  of  the  column, 
when  the  depth  of  the  cantonments  is  not  equal  to  more 
than  half  the  length  of  the  column — that  is  to  say,  in  our 
second  formation  type. 

Although,  as  certain  authors  maintain,  it  may  be  possi- 
ble to  still  further  close  up  the  cantonments,  it  is  an  opinion 
which  can  be  supported.,  for  the  worst  cantonment  would 
frequently  be  much  better  than  the  bivouac;  but,  however 
that  may  be,  it  would  not  then  be  possible  to  have  the  men 
subsisted  by  the  inhabitants  in  a  cantonment  so  much  closed 
up.  We  will  stop,  then,  at  this  conclusion,  that  the  sub- 
sistence by  the  inhabitants  can  be  employed  as  a  general 
method  of  subsistence  only  in  the  case  of  extended  canton- 
ments, and  will  rarely  ever  be  applicable  except  to  the 


54  Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 

period  of  marches  at  a  distance  from  the  enemy,  when  it  is 
possible  to  give  to  the  cantonments  a  depth  equal,  or  little 
inferior,  to  the  length  of  the  marching  columns. 

It  is,  moreover,  during  this  period  that  this  method  of 
subsistence  offers  the  greatest  advantage  and  that  it  is  even 
made  almost  obligatory,  on  account  of  the  difficulty  of  em- 
ploying the  others. 

During  this  period  the  marches  are  longer,  the  start 
made  early  in  the  morning,  the  arrival  at  the  place  of  canton- 
ment often  does  not  take  place  until  very  late;  time  would 
be  lacking  to  proceed  to  turn  the  local  resources  to  account 
by  means  of  purchases  or  requisitions.  It  would  also  be  im- 
possible to  make  use  of  the  trains  for  the  supply;  if  reference 
is  made  to  our  former  remark,  that  the  march  to  be  made  by 
the  supply  trains  is  equal  to  the  march  made  by  the  column 
increased  by  the  depth  of  the  cantonments,  one  will  be  con- 
vinced that  it  will  be  out  of  the  question  to  use  the  trains 
in  the  period  of  the  long  marches  during  which  these  two 
factors  attain  their  maximum. 

If  billeting  upon  the  inhabitants  is  not  always  practi- 
cable in  so  far  as  the  general  method  of  subsistence  is  con- 
cerned, its  employment  is  always  advantageous  to  provide 
the  subsistence  of  detachments,  advance  guards,  and  sep- 
arate commands. 

We  will  close  this  brief  account  with  a  few  remarks 
concerning  the  application  of  this  method  of  subsistence. 

The  subsistence  is  exacted  from  the  inhabitants  under 
the  form  of  a  half -day's  ration,  or  meal,  writh  or  without 
bread.  It  will  be  necessary  to  recall  the  remarks  we  have 
made  in  the  preceding  chapter,  regarding  the  possibility  of 
exacting  the  supply  of  bread  from  the  inhabitants;  bear  in 
mind  that  our  conclusions  were  that  the  supply  of  bread 
can  be  easilv  exacted,  in  case  of  extended  cantonments,  from 


Notes  on  tlie  Supply  of  an  Army.  55 

the  inhabitants  of  agricultural  sections  where  the  custom  of 
domestic  baking  is  retained,  but  that  this  supply  would  be 
difficult  to  provide  in  all  other  cases. 

Billeting  upon  the  inhabitants  will  generally  be  pre- 
scribed for  several  days;  when  it  should  cease,  the  necessity 
of  making  an  issue  of  rations  the  evening  before  the  day  on 
which  the  new  method  of  subsistence  is  to  begin  must  not 
be  overlooked.  Let  us  suppose,  for  instance,  that  billeting 
upon  the  inhabitants  has  been  ordered  from  the  first  to  the 
eighth  day;  the  evening  of  the  seventh  day,  although  the 
subsistence  for  that  day  is  provided  for,  it  will  be  necessary 
to  make  an  issue  of  rations  for  the  eighth  day,  to  conform 
with  the  requirements  of  Article  41  of  the  Regulations  of 
January  11, 1893.  Conversely,  when,  after  a  period  in  which 
the  subsistence  has  been  assured  by  regular  issues,  there  is 
a  return  to  billeting  upon  the  inhabitants,  the  issues  will  be 
discontinued  the  evening  preceding  the  day  on  which  billet- 
ing on  the  inhabitants  will  be  enforced;  otherwise  the 
rations  issued  with  the  meal  furnished  in  quarters  would 
make  a  double  supply  of  rations  for  that  day. 

Billeting  upon  the  inhabitants  will  especially  be  ap- 
plied, in  addition  to  the  detachments,  to  the  period  of  rapid 
marches  generally  arranged  several  days  in  advance;  it  w7ill 
then  be  possible,  and  should  be  done,  to  give  notice  in  ad- 
vance to  the  municipalities,  informing  them  of  the  number 
of  men  to  be  quartered  and  subsisted;  this  notice  will  be 
sent  to  them  by  the  cavalry  preceding  the  columns,  or  at 
least  by  the  advance  guard.  This  precaution  is  absolutely 
indispensable  to  assure  the  success  of  the  operation.* 

*It  does  not  seem  to  me  that  this  suggestion  concerning  the  notice 
to  be  sent  to  the  municipalities  in  advance  is  one  which  should  ever 
be  adopted;  for  the  reason  that  the  information  regarding  the  strength 
of  an  advancing  column  and  the  time  it  is  expected  to  arrive  at  certain 
places  may  very  easily  be  communicated  to  the  enemy  by  some  one 
who  is  able  to  pass  through  the  cavalry  screen;  and  may  thus  render 
the  particular  operation  abortive. — H.  G.  S. 


56  Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 

III.     Utilization  of  the  Local  Resources  ly  the  Corps;  Supply 
from  the  Regimental  Trains. 

The  second  method  of  providing  the  subsistence,  by 
turning  to  account  the  local  resources,  consists  in  entrusting 
to  the  troops  themselves  the  duty  of  procuring  the  necessary 
provisions  in  the  cantonments  which  they  occupy  or  in  the 
neighboring  country.  It  is  to  the  application  of  this  method 
that  the  appointment  of  the  supply  officers  corresponds  more 
particularly. 

This  system,  by  confiding  to  the  troops  themselves  an 
operation  in  which  they  are  greatly  concerned,  both  gives 
more  guarantees  for  its  success  and  at  the  same  time  divides 
the  work.  But  the  return  is  less  than  that  by  the  first 
method  of  billeting  upon  the  inhabitants. 

Clausewitz  says:*  "It  can  be  readily  understood  that 
this  method  of  proceeding  would  not  be  able  to  provide  for 
the  support  of  a  body  of  troops  of  considerable  size;  by 
operating  in  this  way,  that  which  will  be  possible  to  obtain 
from  a  country  will  always  be  less  than  that  which  the 
troops  when  quartered  on  the  inhabitants  would  obtain;  for 
in  the  latter  case,  where  30  to  40  men  will  impose  upon  a 
peasant  by  their  presence  in  his  house,  they  will  certainly 
know  how  to  obtain  everything  which  will  be  necessary  to 
them,  while  an  officer  sent  with  some  men  into  a  section  of 
country  to  demand  the  provisions  has  neither  the  time  nor 
the  means  to  search  for  all  the  supplies." 

"This  method  of  procedure  causes  the  greatest  waste;  a 
large  proportion  of  the  resources  are  lost  without  being  of 
use  to  anyone." 

In  accordance  with  the  foregoing,  if  the  zone  of  ex- 
ploitation should  not  extend  beyond  the  zone  of  the  canton- 

*Clausewitz,  "  The'orie  de  la  grande  Guerre,"  Vol.  I.,  page  352. 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army.  57 

merits,  there  would  be  no  reason  for  resorting  to  this  second 
method.    . 

Then,  in  fact,  where  it  would  not  be  possible  to  provide 
the  subsistence  by  billeting  upon  the  inhabitants,  there 
would  be  still  less  opportunity  of  employing  the  second 
method,  which  is  much  less  productive;  and  wherever  it 
would  be  possible  to  purchase  or  requisition  the  provisions 
it  would  be  possible  to  require  the  inhabitants  to  prepare 
the  meals  themselves,  and  it  would  be  to  their  advantage  to 
do  so.  Thus  in  the  period  of  marches  at  a  distance  from  the 
enemy,  when  the  cantonments  are  separated,  it  would  gener- 
ally be  possible  to  find  by  the  second  method  the  necessary 
supplies  in  the  cantonments;  but  as  it  is  also  possible,  as  we 
have  just  seen,  to  demand  the  supply  by  the  inhabitants, 
this  method  will  be  preferred.  In  the  same  way,  in  the  case 
of  the  cantonments  reduced  to  half  the  length  of  the  march, 
where  generally  it  will  no  longer  be  possible  to  provide  the 
subsistence  by  billeting  upon  the  inhabitants,  it  would  like- 
wise be  impossible  to  find  provisions  in  sufficient  quantity 
in  the  cantonments  even  to  buy  or  requisition. 

What  then  makes  it  possible  to  provide  the  subsistence 
is  that  the  exploitation  can  be  extended,  outside  of  the  can- 
tonments, in  the  localities  which  have  been  excluded  from 
the  zone  of  occupation  for  military  reasons,  but  where  it  is 
possible  to  send  detachments  to  requisition  provisions.  The 
possibility  of  thus  providing  the  subsistence  will  depend 
upon  the  extent  of  the  zone  of  exploitation  and  also  upon  the 
time  available. 

Zones  of  Supply. — In  the  period  of  marches  at  a  distance 
from  the  enemy  the  halting-places  are  generally  farther 
apart;  they  may  reach  40  kilometres  if  the  column  is  can- 
toned on  a  depth  equal  to  that  of  the  marching  column.  The 
length  of  the  march  and  the  short  time  available,  on  account 


58  Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 

of  the  early  hour  of  departure  and  the  late  hour  of  arrival  at 
the  cantonment,  will  hardly  admit  of  extending  the  exploit- 
ation beyond  the  zone  of  the  cantonments.  In  this  case  the 
zone  of  supply  which  coincides  with  the  zone  of  cantonment 
would  have  an  area  of  100  square  kilometres  for  the  main 
column  of  an  army  corps.  We  have  seen  in  Chapter  II.  that 
the  same  area  generally  makes  it  possible  to  find  all  of  the 
necessary  supplies  for  the  subsistence;  it  wrould  then  be  pos- 
sible to  provide  the  subsistence  there  by  means  of  purchases 
or  of  requisitions  enforced  by  the  corps  themselves,  if  it 
would  not  be  preferable  to  subsist  the  men  there  by  billeting 
on  the  inhabitants  as  has  been  said. 

When  the  column  closes  up  in  the  average  formation 
corresponding  to  the  cantonments  with  a  depth  equal  to  half 
the  length  of  march,  the  zone  of  the  cantonments  is  only 
from  40  to  45  square  kilometres  in  area.  But  the  exploita- 
tion may  extend  over  a  much  greater  area.  During  the 
period  to  which  this  formation  corresponds  the  marches  are 
necessarily  shorter;  it  would  then  be  possible,  if  absolutely 
necessary,  to  push  the  cantonments  further  to  the  right  and 
left  of  the  road;  besides,  if  the  possibility  of  thus  extending 
laterally  is  limited  to  a  distance  of  3  kilometres  at  most,  so 
as  not  to  impose  upon  the  majority  of  the  men  too  great 
fatigue,  the  same  reasons  do  not  prevent  sending  small  de- 
tachments to  a  greater  distance  to  turn  the  resources  to  ac- 
count; but  in  reality  the  distance  to  which  the  exploitation 
can  be  extended  laterally  is  limited  by  the  presence  on  the 
flanks  of  troops  belonging  to  other  columns;  it  depends  con- 
sequently upon  the  extent  of  the  march  front.  The  distance 
apart  of  the  lines  of  march  is,  on  the  average,  from  8  to  10 
kilometres;  each  corps  being  able  naturally  to  extend  to 
the  middle  of  the  interval  which  separates  it  from  the  neigh- 
boring corps,  its  zone  of  supply  will  extend  then  to  4  or  5 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army.  59 

kilometres  from  each  side  to  its  main  road,  having  thus  a 
total  length  of  8  to  10  kilometres.  This  distance  of  4  to  5 
kilometres,  which  represents  a  journey  of  10 kilometres  going 
and  coming,  is,  moreover,  a  limit  beyond  which  the  exploit- 
ation can  rarely  be  pushed  without  imposing  too  great  fa- 
tigue upon  the  men  and  teams,  and  also  on  account  of  the 
short  time  at  disposal.  It  is  consequently  also  the  limit  to 
which  it  would  be  possible  to  extend  the  zone  of  supply  in 
advance  of  the  front  or  in  rear  of  the  column,  although  the 
space  should  be  open  on  these  two  sides. 

We  have  represented  in  accordance  with  these  princi- 
ples, in  Plate  I.,  the  extent  of  the  zones  of  supply  of  the 
different  columns,  the  cantonments  of  which  are  there  rep- 
resented. For  an  army  corps  in  single  column  cantoned 
with  a  depth  equal  to  half  the  length  of  the  march,  the  zone 
of  supply  forms  a  rectangle  from  8  to  10  kilometres  in  width, 
with  a  length  of  20  to  25  kilometres  from  the  point  where 
the  advance  guard  is  located  to  5  kilometres  beyond  the 
cantonments  of  the  rear  of  the  column.  The  area  of  this 
zone  is  from  200  to  250  square  kilometres. 

From  our  conclusions  in  Chapter  II.,  a  zone  of  this  ex- 
tent generally  contains  more  resources  than  are  necessary; 
it  seems  then  at  first  that  the  subsistence  can  always  be 
provided  by  foraging,  if  it  is  possible  to  obtain  all  the 
resources,  but  this  is  not  always  so.  Clausewitz*  says: 
"How  can  it  be  admitted  that  a  corps  of  30,000  men  camped 
in  a  circle  of  1  mile  [1600  metres]  radius  can  be  able  to  find 
its  daily  subsistence  in  an  area  of  3  or  4  miles  square  [about 
200  kilometres]?  It  may  be  concluded  that  it  is  possible 
to  derive  fair  results  from  this  method  of  supply  only  when 
the  body  of  troops  is  not  large  (for  example,  for  a  division 
of  8,000  to  12,000  men  at  the  maximum),  and  that,  in  this 

*Clausewitz,  "  Theorie  de  la  grande  Guerre,"  Vol.  I.,  page  353. 


60  Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 

ease  even,  recourse  should  be  had  to  it  only  as  a  necessary 
evil." 

It  is  necessary,  however,  to  note  whether  the  unfavor- 
able conclusions  of  Clausewitz  will  be  always  true  as  far  as 
concerns  the  provisions,  properly  so  called,  and  the  oats;  it 
seems  to  us  that,  on  the  contrary,  it  will  very  often  be  pos- 
sible to  obtain,  without  great  difficulty,  cattle  and  forage, 
hay  and  straw. 

Moreover  the  success  of  the  operation  does  not  depend 
entirely  upon  the  resources  of  provisions  in  the  zone  of  sup- 
ply; it  depends  particularly  on  the  manner  in  which  the 
operation  is  conducted  and  the  time  available. 

Time  Available  for  Collection  of  the  Local  Resources. — There 
is  not  the  same  urgency  for  all  the  kinds  of  provisions  which 
are  to  be  provided  from  the  local  resources  to  satisfy  the 
necessities. 

Regarding  bread,  the  small  articles  of  the  ration,  and 
oats,  the  evening  meal  is  provided  by  means  of  the  day's 
ration  carried  in  the  haversack  or  nose-bag;  the  issue  to  be 
made  for  the  following  day  is  provided  by  drawing  upon  the 
load  of  the  regimental  trains.  The  proceeds  obtained  by 
turning  to  account  the  local  resources  are  then  necessary 
only  to  provide  for  the  reloading  of  the  regimental  trains, 
and  to  accomplish  this  all  the  time  is  available  until  the 
moment  when  the  train  should  begin  its  march. 

The  cattle  should  be  slaughtered,  distributed,  and 
loaded  on  the  special  wagons,  which  start  out  at  the  same 
time  as  the  troops;  it  is  necessary  then  to  find  the  cattle 
readily,  in  order  to  have  time  to  do  all  these  things.  The 
time  available  is  then  more  limited  than  in  the  case  of  the 
provisions  and  oats;  it  seems  necessary,  as  far  as  the  cattle 
are  concerned,  that  the  searches  should  be  terminated  before 
evening. 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 

8  to  10  Kilom. 


01 


2  Kil.  T 

*  »«» 


6  do  Kil. 


10  do  Kil. 


Advance  Guard 


Total 


5  do  Kil.  | 
20  to  25  Kil. 


. Convoy 


8  to  10 


FIG.  8 


Kilom. 


62  Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 

It  is  the  same  as  far  as  hay  and  straw  are  concerned;  if 
the  oats  carried  in  the  bag  are  sufficient  to  give  the  horses 
the  first  feed,  it  is  necessary  to  expedite  the  collection  of 
hay  and  straw,  which  should  serve  to  complete  the  evening 
feed  and  should  be  consumed  before  starting. 

The  collection  of  fuel  is  still  more  urgent,  since  it  is 
necessary  immediately  upon  arrival  to  prepare  the  soup. 

The  order  of  urgency  for  the  collections  to  be  made  is 
then  the  following:  fuel,  hay  and  straw,  cattle,  and  then  the 
provisions  for  the  regimental  train,  bread,  small  articles  of 
the  ration,  and  oats. 

As  regards  the  first  of  these  supplies,  fuel,  hay,  straw, 
and  cattle,  the  collections  should  be  made  by  evening;  as  re- 
gards the  supplies  for  the  regimental  train,  which  are,  more- 
over, the  most  difficult  to  find,  a  longer  time  is  available, 
until  the  moment  the  train  begins  to  march. 

The  time  available  for  these  different  operations  will 
depend  upon  the  hour  of  the  arrival  at  the  cantonment  and 
the  hours  of  departure  the  following  morning,  which  are  an- 
nounced in  the  order  for  the  movement;  under  ordinary  and 
usual  conditions,  these  hours  will  approach  the  following: 

1st.  When  the  cantonment  is  made  in  the  order  of 
march  and  when  the  depth  of  the  cantonments  is  equal  to 
the  length  of  the  column,  all  the  subdivisions  begin  the 
march  at  the  same  hour  and  halt  in  the  evening  at  the  same 
time.  If  the  departure  is  set  for  5  o'clock  in  the  morning, 
to  make  the  maximum  march  of  40  kilometres  with  a  long 
halt  of  one  hour,  about  eleven  hours  wTould  be  necessary  and 
the  cantonment  w7ould  be  reached  between  4  and  5  o'clock 
in  the  evening.  Early  departure,  late  arrival,  consequently 
but  a  short  time  is  available  in  which  to  turn  to  account 
the  local  resources;  thus  during  this  period  it  is  preferable- 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army.  63 

to  billet  the  troops  upon  the  inhabitants,  following  the  con- 
clusions of  the  preceding  sections. 

It  is  well  to  remark  that  during  this  period  of  long 
marches,  if  it  is  desired  to  assemble  the  regimental  trains  at 
the  rear  of  the  column,  they  would  be  able  to  join  their  re- 
spective corps  only  at  a  very  late  hour;  thus  it  is  necessary 
to  have  each  corps  followed  by  its  regimental  train.* 

2d.  If  the  depth  of  the  cantonments  is  reduced,  the 
hour  of  departure  and  arrival  is  not  the  same  for  the  differ- 
ent subdivisions. 

For  a  column  of  an  army  corps  in  cantonment  with  a 
depth  of  12  kilometres  and  making  the  maximum  march  of 
32  kilometres,  if  the  hour  of  departure  of  the  advance  sub- 
division is  fixed  at  5  o'clock  in  the  morning,  it  will  be  able  to 
complete  its  march  between  1  and  2  o'clock  in  the  afternoon. 
The  rear  subdivision  B  should  leave  its  cantonment  at  8 
o'clock,!  and  would  arrive  at  its  new  cantonment  at  4 
o'clock  in  the  afternoon.  The  hours  of  departure  and  arrival 
of  the  intervening  subdivisions  are  between  these  extremes. 
The  train  of  the  rear  subdivision  B  can  start  out  on  the 
march  almost  at  the  same  time  as  that  subdivision;  it  is 
necessary  for  it  to  leave  the  necessary  space  in  which  to 
insert  the  trains  of  the  other  subdivisions,  which  should 
precede  it  in  the  column  of  the  regimental  trains. 

The  train  of  the  rear  subdivision  should  then  start  out 
About  8  o'clock  and  arrive  at  the  cantonment  B'  about  the 


"Colonel  Maillard,  "Elements  de  Guerre,"  1st  Part,  page  66. 

t  These  figures  are  readily  obtained  by  referring  to  the  first  note 
on  page  28.  The  rear  subdivision  starts  out  after  an  interval  of  time, 
elapsing  from  the  departure  of  the  advance  subdivision,  equal  to 

^ 2  24 12 

— ,  or  in  this  case  —  =3  hours;  consequently,  if  the  advance 

starts  at  5,  the  rear  subdivision  starts  at  8  o'clock.  The  same  con- 
clusions can  readily  be  arrived  at  by  an  inspection  of  the  figure  in 
Plate  II. 


64 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 


/ 

/ 

/ 
/ 

1 

I 

Av 
Bv 

/       / 

A 

1 

/ 
/ 

/ 

B 

/ 

F\G.\0 

same  time  as  the  corps,  or  about  3  or  4  o'clock  at  the  latest. 
As  for  the  train  of  the  advance  subdivision,  it  cannot  leave 
A  until  the  entire  column  has  passed  that  point — that  is, 
about  11  o'clock,  and  it  will  not  arrive  at  its  new  canton- 
ment A'  until  about  5  or  6  o'clock  in  the  afternoon.  The 
hours  of  arrival  and  departure  of  the  intervening  trains  are 
between  these  extremes. 

We  have  considered  a  maximum  march  of  32  kilo- 
metres, but  if  it  is  less,  the  hours  of  arrival  at  the  canton- 
ment will  be  earlier,  and  consequently  the  time  available  for 
turning  to  account  the  local  resources  will  be  increased. 

However  that  may  be,  it  is  evident  that  for  the  forward 
subdivision  all  the  afternoon  is  available  for  making  requi- 
sitions for  cattle,  hay,  and  straw,  and  until  10  or  11  o'clock 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army.  65 

in  the  morning  of  the  following  day  for  the  resupply  of  the 
regimental  train.  For  the  rear  subdivision  this  time  is 
somewhat  diminished  in  the  evening  and  morning,  but  it 
has  all  the  night  and  a  part  of  the  morning  to  complete  the 
resupply  of  the  regimental  train. 

Order  for  the  Operations. — The  remarks  which  precede 
should  serve  as  a  guide  to  the  supply  officers  to  regulate  the 
order  of  their  operations  so  as  to  provide  for  the  wants  in 
their  order  of  urgency.  They  generally  will  not  have  to  con- 
cern themselves  with  the  fuel,  the  supply  of  which  is  re- 
stricted to  the  cantonment,  but  they  will  hasten  to  com- 
mence the  search  for  hay  and  straw.  They  indicate  then 
without  delay  the  grain  dealers;  if  none  are  known,  it  will 
be  sufficient  to  find  out  two  or  three  large  farms  in  order  to 
obtain  there  the  necessary  supplies.  The  supply  officer, 
after  having  placed  a  value  upon  these  supplies,  will  remove 
them  and  have  them  carried  to  the  place  appointed  for  the 
issues,  by  even  making  use  of  the  farm  wagons,  if  his  train 
has  not  yet  arrived.  It  will  generally  be  quite  an  easy 
matter  to  find  the  necessary  cattle  on  one  or  two  farms.  For 
all  these  foods  the  resources  are  generally  in  excess  of  what 
is  required.  The  quantity  of  these  supplies  is  very  large; 
the  importance  of  a  farm  is  indicated  at  once  by  the  size  of 
the  ricks  of  straw  which  surround  it,  by  the  extent  of  its 
buildings,  and  if  the  civil  authorities  have  not  taken  the 
initiative  of  collecting  the  supplies,  it  is  easy  to  relieve  the 
possessors  of  their  supplies. 

The  operation  is  more  difficult  as  far  as  provisions  and 
oats  are  concerned,  the  resources  of  which  are  sometimes 
insufficient,  and  for  which  it  will  be  necessary  to  resort  to  a 
larger  number  of  holders.  As,  moreover,  that  requires  more 
time,  it  is  better  to  apply  to  the  civil  authorities.  The  sup- 
ply officer  will  then  forward  to  them  as  soon  as  possible  the 


66  Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 

orders  for  the  requisition,  indicating  the  place  where  the 
supplies  should  be  collected  and  the  hour  at  which  they 
should  be  ready. 

While  leaving  to  the  local  authorities  the  care  of  regu- 
lating the  distribution  of  the  requisition,  the  supply  officer 
should  superintend  the  operation;  in  case  of  bad  faith  or 
of  want  of  success,  he  should  act  himself  with  all  needful 
energy.  The  desire  for  an  equitable  distribution  of  the 
burden  among  the  inhabitants  concerns  the  army  only  by 
the  fact  that  it  increases  the  number  of  the  sources  from 
wrhich  the  supplies  are  derived  and  consequently  affects  the 
yield.  But  this  is,  however,  of  secondary  importance;  this 
idea  should  not  be  an  obstacle  to  the  rapidity  and  success  of 
the  operation,  nor  a  pretext  for  hesitation.  As  soon  as  a 
number  are  known,  even  a  limited  one,  of  holders  to  provide 
the  amount  demanded,  the  matter  will  rest  there  without  in 
any  way  considering  if  the  portion  they  will  have  to  furnish 
is  too  large;  in  case  of  resistance  and  of  ba,d  faith,  force 
would  be  used;  but  this,  however,  is  an  extreme  meas- 
ure, which  is  useful  only  on  account  of  the  moral  effect  it 
produces. 

Operations  of  the  Intendance. — We  have  supposed  that  all 
these  operations  were  performed  by  the  supply  officers,  but 
nothing  wrould  be  modified  of  what  we  have  said  if  the  opera- 
tion should  be  directed  or  executed,  in  whole  or  in  part,  by 
the  divisional  administrative  services.  The  regulation  enu- 
merates the  cases  where  the  Intendance  service  should  itself 
assume  the  work  of  turning  the  local  lesources  to  account; 
the  fact  of  the  intervention  of  the  administrative  services  in 
this  case  does  not  constitute  a  new  method,  but  only  a  means 
for  the  execution  of  the  same  method.  The  operation  always 
has  as  its  object  the  exploitation  of  the  same  halting  zone, 
and  differs  entirelv,  as  well  in  the  results  as  in  the  means  of 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army.  67 

operating,  from  the  method  of  exploitation  by  general  requi- 
sitions that  we  will  study  in  the  third  part. 

It  is  only  necessary  to  glance  over  Plate  I.,  in  which  are 
represented  the  cantonments  of  an  army  corps  in  various 
formations,  to  see  that  the  zones  set  apart  for  the  different 
portions  of  the  column  are  too  extensive  to  be  turned  to  ac- 
count by  the  divisional  sous-intendants.  How,  for  example, 
would  the  sous-intendant  militaire  of  the  advance  division, 
divided  into  the  advance  guard  and  main  body,  be  able  to 
direct  at  the  same  time  the  service  in  these  two  subdivisions? 
The  2d  division  is  more  closed  up,  but  it  has  a  depth,  how- 
ever, of  4  to  5  kilometres,  and  its  zone  of  supply  is  from  40  to 
60  square  kilometres  in  extent.  The  subdivisions  under  the 
charge  of  the  headquarters  staff  are  scattered:  the  head- 
quarters properly  so  called  at  the  head  of  the  column,  the 
corps  artillery  in  the  center,  the  sections  and  parks  in  rear, 
forming  the  column  of  the  fighting  train,  which  includes 
also  the  subdivisions  belonging  to  the  two  divisions.  It  is 
then  necessary  to  entrust  to  the  corps  the  duty  of  turning 
the  resources  to  account,  as  the  sous-intendant  militaire 
rannot  be  every  where. 

The  role  of  the  sous-intendant  militaire  will  be  more  one 
of  preparation,  direction,  and  regulation  than  of  execution. 
As  regards  preparation,  the  sous-intendant  will  at  first  have 
to  study  the  resources;  this  will  enable  a  decision  to  be  made 
as  to  which  mode  of  supply  preference  should  be  given. 
TVhen  this  study  shows  the  possibility  of  living  upon  the 
country,  the  sous-intendant  will  have  to  distribute  the  zones 
of  supply  among  the  various  units.  At  all  times  when  the 
march  is  regulated  for  several  days  and  when  the  canton- 
ments are  assigned  in  advance,  he  should  prepare  the  in- 
structions informing  the  municipalities  of  the  requisitions 
which  will  be  imposed  upon  them.  It  would  not  be  possible 


68  Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 

to  assign  to  the  corps  and  to  the  supply  officers  the  duty  of 
preparing  these  instructions.  If  the  division  of  the  work  is 
advisable  as  far  as  the  execution  is  concerned,  it  only  causes 
disorder  in  the  preparation  and  conception;  moreover,  the 
supply  officers  are  too  far  from  the  staff  to  assist  effectively 
in  the  work  of  preparation,  which  requires  a  constant  ex 
change  of  views  with  the  general  commanding. 

The  sous-intendant  will  intervene  as  a  moderator  by  plac- 
ing the  means  he  has  at  command  at  the  disposal  of  the 
corps,  if  unforeseen  circumstances  create  special  difficulties 
for  them;  it  is  well  understood  that  the  military  require 
ments  will  not  always  permit  of  assigning  the  cantonments 
in  the  most  advantageous  manner  as  far  as  the  supply  is 
concerned;  tactical  necessities  will  require  that  the  troops 
be  taken  to  the  district  where  the  resources  are  very  small, 
and  it  will  happen  that  one  locality  without  resources  will 
be  invaded  by  a  considerable  force,  while  another  locality 
which  is  very  rich  will  be  scarcely  occupied.  It  can  thus  b  - 
seen,  as  in  Plate  I.  (Fig.  1),  that  the  zones  for  the  various 
subdivisions  are  not  necessarily  proportional  to  their  effect- 
ive strength:  for  example,  the  corps  artillery  occupies  a 
zone  only  1500  metres  in  depth  for  an  effective  of  1450 
horses,  while  the  second  division,  with  just  about  the  same 
number  of  horses,  occupies  a  zone  of  4000  metres  in  depth : 
thus,  also,  the  leading  division  is  divided  into  twro  columns 
having  a  depth  of  10  kilometres.  Under  such  conditions  the 
resources  will  be  insufficient  in  one  zone,  and  in  another  I  e 
in  excess  of  the  requirements.  In  such  case  it  will  be  the 
duty  of  the  Intendance  itself  to  turn  to  account  all  or  part 
of  the  zones  where  the  resources  exceed  the  wants  in  order 
to  issue  the  products  to  the  subdivisions  not  so  well  pro- 
vided for.  Under  such  circumstances  the  regulation  pre- 
scribes that  the  Intendance  will  turn  to  account  the  districts 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army.  69 

occupied  by  several  corps  and  also  the  localities  afford- 
ing considerable  resources.  In  this  last  case,  however,  the 
intervention  of  the  Intendance  would  be  useless,  if  the  re- 
sources, although  in  excess  of  the  wants,  were  not  necessary 
elsewhere,  for,  as  it  has  already  been  said,  the  direct  exploit- 
ation made  by  the  first  line  should  not,  nor  would  not,  have 
for  its  object  the  collection  of  all  the  resources  of  the  zone 
to  form  a  large  stock  of  supplies,  but  only  to  find  what  is 
necessary  for  the  immediate  wants. 

IV.    General  Requisitions  Imposed  by  the  Administrative  Services. 

The  advance  movement  of  the  army  causes  the  passage 
through  the  same  section  of  country  by  troops  belonging  to 
the  successive  Echelons  of  the  formation;  first  the  cavalry 
scouts,  the  cavalry  of  the  army  corps,  then  come  the  advance 
guards,  the  main  columns,  succeeded  the  next  day  or  the 
day  after  that  by  the  parks  and  trains ;  each  of  these  columns 
during  its  passage  has  provided  for  its  immediate  wants  by 
making  use  of  the  local  resources,  and  taken  away  a  part  of 
the  resources  of  the  country;  but  this  exploitation  can  only 
be  superficial ;  notwithstanding  the  theoretical  possibility  of 
extending  the  researches  further,  only  in  the  cantonments 
will  the  corps  be  able  to  turn  the  resources  to  account — that 
is  to  say,  on  the  main  road  and  its  approaches,  leaving  in 
the  centre  of  the  interval  between  the  lines  of  march  of 
the  columns  a  large  zone  which  has  hardly  been  drawn  upon. 

It  is  the  duty  of  the  administrative  services  to  complete 
this  exploitation  and  to  collect  the  resources  not  made  use 
of  for  the  immediate  wants  of  the  column,  by  thorough 
searches  and  by  general  requisitions  regularly  and  method- 
ically imposed.  Clausewitz  says:  "That  is  the  simplest 
and  most  productive  method  of  supply;  it  has  also  served 


70  Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 

as  the  basis  in  all  modern  wars."*  But  since  Clausewitz's 
time,  the  development  of  railroads  has  modified  the  condi- 
tions under  which  the  supply  can  be  provided.  If  the  em- 
ployment of  general  requisitions  even  in  the  theatre  of  opera- 
tions was  formerly  the  easiest  method  of  supplying  an  army, 
on  account  of  the  length  and  the  difficulty  of  cartage  on  the 
wagon  roads,  it  seems  that  at  the  present  time  it  will  be 
just  as  easy  by  means  of  railroads  to  supply  the  depots  by 
consignments  from  the  national  territory,  where  can  be 
brought  into  operation  to  procure  the  supplies  all  the  ad- 
ministrative methods  that  far-seeing  organization  has  ere 
ated  in  time  of  peace  and  all  the  resources  of  commerce.  It 
will  be  advantageous  from  an  economical  standpoint,  and 
it  is  probable  that  all  the  supplies  will  be  obtained  at  much 
lower  prices,  which  will  offset  the  excess  of  cost  resulting 
from  the  transportation  from  a  greater  distance.  It  would 
not  be  the  same,  however,  if  the  supplies,  instead  of  being- 
supplied  directly  by  the  administration,  were  entrusted  to 
contractors,  as  has  been  and  still  will  be  done.  As,  for 
instance,  regarding  the  fresh  meat.  In  this  case,  in  fact, 
the  contractor,  not  possessing  the  same  advantages  as  the 
Government  in  its  relations  with  the  railroad  companies,  is 
concerned  in  having  his  theatres  of  supply  near  the  points  of 
delivery.  The  exploitation  of  the  zone  occupied  by  the  army 
may  then  in  certain  cases  be  more  advantageous,  and  it 
would  become  a  necessity  if  the  railroads  were  cut.  It  is 
well  known  to  what  extent  the  supply  of  the  Germans  in 
1870  was  hindered  by  the  obstruction  of  the  Saverne  tunnel, 
which  was  not  cleared  until  the  18th  of  August;  then  by  the 
resistance  offered  by  the  Toul  fortifications,  which  blocked 
the  railway  line  from  Nancy  to  Chalons.  The  same  embar- 
rassment would  have  resulted  from  the  destruction  of  the 


*Clausewitz,  "Theorie  de  la  grande  Guerre,"  Vol.  I.,  page  354. 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army.  71 

Fontenov  bridge  if  it  had  taken  place  later.  Similar  cir- 
cumstances may  arise  which  will  render  it  necessary  to  re- 
sort even  to  the  theatre  of  operations  to  procure  the  neces- 
sary supplies. 

It  must  also  be  considered  that,  as  the  railroads  do  not 
extend  to  the  interior  of  the  cantonments,  it  wrill  be  neces- 
sary, in  order  to  carry  the  provisions  from  the  terminal 
station  of  the  railroad  to  the  centers  of  distribution,  to  or- 
ganize a  scries  of  trains:  administrative  trains,  auxiliary 
trains,  contingent  trains  connected  with  the  service  of  the 
line  of  communication.  The  working  of  these  trains  is 
rather  a  complicated  matter.  If  it  wrere  possible  to  resupply 
one  of  these  trains  by  turning  to  account  the  local  resources, 
the  necessity  of  drawing  upon  the  following  Echelon  would 
be  avoided;  if,  for  instance,  the  direct  resupply  of  the  regi- 
mental train  cannot  be  provided,  it  will  be  necessary  to  send 
forward  a  section  of  the  administrative  train,  the  supplies 
in  which  will  be  turned  over  to  the  regimental  train.  If 
this  section  of  the  administrative  train  can  be  resupplied 
from  the  country,  recourse  will  not  be  had  to  the  auxiliary 
train;  unless  this  is  possible,  it  will  be  necessary  to  send  for- 
ward a  section  of  this  latter  train.  The  auxiliary  train 
should  in  its  turn  be  resupplied  from  the  local  resources, 
if  possible,  in  order  to  avoid  drawing  upon  the  contin- 
gent trains  carrying  the  provisions  taken  from  the  station 
magazines. 

It  can  be  seen  from  the  foregoing  that  the  turning  to  ac- 
count of  the  local  resources  by  the  administrative  services 
may  be  for  the  purpose  of  providing  successively,  either  the 
resupply  of  the  administrative  trains,  or  that  of  the  auxiliary 
trains,  as  well  as  stocking  the  station  magazines  when  they 
are  not  supplied  by  consignments  from  the  rear. 


72  Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 

Resupply  of  the  Administrative  Trains  from  the  Local  Re- 
sources.— Let  A,  B,  and  C  designate  the  successive  points 
where  the  column  halts  the  first,  second,  and  third  days.  If 
the  second  day  at  B,  for  instance,  it  has  not  been  possible 
to  directly  provide  from  the  local  resources  the  resupply  of 
the  regimental  train,  a  forced  march  will  have  to  be  made 
by  the  section  of  the  administrative  train  which  will  come 
to  resupply  the  regimental  trains. 

The  meeting  of  these  trains  with  the  administrative 
trains  will  take  place  at  a  designated  place,  which  is  in  the 
zone  of  the  cantonment  B.  It  follows  that,  if  it  is  desired 
to  attempt  to  resupply  in  its  turn  the  administrative  trains 
from  the  local  resources,  it  will  be  by  turning  to  account  the 
resources  of  zone  B,  where,  according  to  the  supposition  we 
have  made,  it  has  been  impossible  to  effect  the  resupply  of 
the  regimental  trains;  if  it  was  on  account  of  the  lack  of  re- 
sources that  the  operation  had  failed  as  far  as  relates  to  the 
regimental  trains,  it  would  be  impossible  to  succeed  any 
better  as  far  as  the  administrative  train  is  concerned:  it 
will  be  necessary  then  to  abandon  this  idea  and  to  have  the 
latter  resupplied  in  turn  by  the  auxiliary  train.  But  the 
failure  of  the  first  operation  may  be  for  other  reasons  than 
the  lack  of  resources:  to  want  of  time,  for  example. 

We  know,  in  fact,  that  the  only  time  available  for  re- 
supplying  the  regimental  train  is  the  evening  of  the  second 
day  and  part  of  the  morning  of  the  third  day.  The  time 
available,  as  far  as  the  administrative  train  is  concerned, 
can  be  prolonged  until  the  evening  of  the  third  day;  it  is 
sufficient,  in  fact,  to  start  out  the  section  of  the  train  on  the 
evening  of  that  day,  so  as  to  take  its  place  in  the  rear  of  the 
column  with  a  view  to  the  resupply  in  which  it  would  have 
to  cooperate  on  the  fourth  day.  These  additional  hours  will 
often  make  it  possible  to  manage  the  operation  well,  for. 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 


73 


/      / 

/       / 


/     / 
,'    / 


1st  Day 


2d  Day 

FIG.  I  I 


3d  Day 


Clausewitz  says,  "here  the  question  of  time  is  important: 
the  greater  the  number  of  hours  available,  the  greater  the 
number  of  inhabitants  who  will  be  able  to  participate  in  the 
deliveries,  the  contributions  thus  distributed  will  be  less  of 
a  burden  for  them,  and  the  results  will  be  more  satisfactory." 
The  duty  of  providing  for  the  collection  of  the  local 
resources  in  order  to  resupply  the  administrative  trains  falls 
upon  the  administrative  services  of  the  army  corps;  this 


74  Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 

operation  will  be  directed  by  the  sous-intendant  of  each  divi- 
sion or  of  headquarters  for  his  own  train,  if  the  administra- 
tive trains  are  not  grouped  together  in  units  of  army  corps, 
and  in  this  latter  case  by  the  sous-intendant  assigned  to  the 
administrative  trains.  (January  11,  1803,  Art.  37.) 

Article  65  of  the  "Regulations  of  January  11,  1893,  in- 
deed says,  that  the  resupply  of  each  train  is  provided 
through  the  instrumentality  of  the  administrative  staff 
which  is  attached  to  it.  But  this  evidently  does  not  mean 
to  say  that,  on  his  arrival  in  the  cantonments,  the  sous- 
intendant  militaire  should  not  arrange,  without  delay,  for 
turning  to  account  the  resources  of  the  zone,  even  if  he  fore- 
sees that  the  regimental  trains  will  not  have  time  to  collect 
the  resources,  and  that  these  will  serve  only  for  the  resupply 
of  the  administrative  train.  On  the  contrary,  it  would  seem 
that,  on  his  arrival  in  the  cantonment,  and  without  waiting 
until  the  administrative  train  has  come  up,  the  sous-intendant 
militaire  should  proceed  to  ascertain  the  resources,  to  learn 
if  it  is  possible  to  obtain  the  supplies  by  amicable  means, 
or  else  make  the  distribution  for  the  supplies  among  the 
inhabitants  and  send  out  the  order  for  requisitions.  As 
the  length  of  time  available  is  rather  limited,  the  radius  of 
the  circle  of  exploitation  cannot  be  very  great,  but  we  will 
show  later  on  that  a  zone  having  a  radius  of  4  to  5  kilo- 
metres should  be  sufficient  in  most  cases  to  assure  the  requi- 
sition for  a  day's  complete  ration  for  the  resupply  of  the 
trains  of  an  entire  army  corps.  When  the  train  has  arrived, 
its  staff  is  employed  in  receiving  the  provisions  and  in  load- 
ing them ;  it  continues  in  all  cases  the  operation  that  the  sous- 
intendant  cannot  superintend  until  completed,  being  obliged 
to  start  out  in  the  morning  to  follow  the  column.  If  neces- 
sary, the  sons-intendant  will  leave  one  of  his  assistants  near 
the  administrative  train,  who  will  be  able  to  rejoin  the 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army.  75 

column  in  the  evening,  when  he  will  be  convinced  that  the 
resupply  of  the  train  is  completed. 

liesupply  of  the  Auxiliary  Trains  by  the  Collection  of  the 
Local  Resources. — If  the  section  of  the  administrative  train 
has  not  been  resnpplied  at  B,  by  the  collection  of  the  local 
resources,  it  will  be  necessary  to  resupply  it  by  a  section  of 
the  auxiliary  train.  The  meeting  of  these  two  trains  takes 
place  at  a  designated  place,  but  which  is,  however,  in  the 
zone  B,  and  it  is  also  in  this  zone  B  that  the  resupply  of  the 
auxiliary  train,  by  the  collection  of  the  local  resources, 
should  be  attempted.  As  we  have  already  remarked  in  the 
preceding  paragraph,  it  is  only  when  the  particular  circum- 
stances, and  principally  the  lack  of  time,  have  caused  the 
failure  of  the  operation  as  regards  the  regimental  and  ad- 
ministrative trains,  that  it  will  there  be  attempted  for  the 
auxiliary  trains;  if  the  first  two  operations  have  failed  on 
account  of  the  lack  of  resources  in  the  country,  the  same 
thing  would  eventually  happen  in  the  third  case;  but,  in 
this  case,  a  much  longer  time  is  available  and  the  conditions 
are  very  much  more  favorable.  The  resupply  of  the  regi- 
mental trains  should,  in  fact,  be  concluded  the  morning  of 
the  third  day;  that  of  the  administrative  trains,  before  the 
evening  of  the  same  day.  For  the  resupply  of  the  auxiliary 
trains  there  will  be  available  the  whole  of  the  fourth  and  a 
part  of  the  fifth  day;  it  is  sufficient,  in  fact,  if  the  auxiliary 
train  leaves  B  at  such  a  time  on  the  fifth  day  as  permits  it 
to  march  to  C  to  take  its  place  in  the  train,  at  a  distance  of 
two  marches  in  rear  of  the  column.  Moreover,  the  work  is 
performed  under  more  favorable  conditions,  since  it  is  exe- 
cuted after  the  columns  have  moved  entirely  away,  when 
quiet  has  been  restored  among  the  inhabitants,  who  are 
always  somewhat  disturbed  and  alarmed  by  the  first  arrival 
of  the  troops. 


76  Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 

The  duty  of  turning  to  account  the  resources  of  zone  B, 
to  provide  for  the  resupply  of  the  section  of  the  auxiliary 
train,  falls  upon  the  administrative  services  of  the  line  of 
communication.  The  advance  de'pot  is  not  formed  at  B 
until  the  fourth  day,  but  as  B  has  been  entirely  unoccupied 
since  the  third  day,  the  sous-intendant  of  the  advance  depot 
can  have  the  work  commenced  there,  or  at  least  arrange  for 
it,  from  the  evening  of  the  third  day.  These  arrangements 
are  in  accord  with  the  instructions  contained  in  the  3d  para- 
graph of  Article  51  of  the  Kegulations  of  November  20,  1889, 
expressed  thus:  "The  official  belonging  to  the  Intendance 
connected  with  the  advance  de'pot  turns  to  account  as  soon 
as  possible  the  resources  of  the  zone;  he  replenishes  the 
auxiliary  trains  either  from  the  country  or  by  means  of  the 
supplies  in  the  de'pot."  The  foregoing  considerations  deter- 
mine the  meaning  of  this  requirement  of  the  Regulations  and 
the  conditions  of  time  and  place  in  which  the  resupply  of 
the  auxiliary  trains  is  provided  by  the  administrative  ser- 
vices of  the  advance  de'pot. 

Finally,  whenever  it  will  be  impossible  to  resupply  the 
auxiliary  trains  at  B  by  turning  to  account  the  local  re- 
sources, it  will  be  necessary  to  resupply  them  by  means  of 
requisitioned  trains  carrying  supplies  drawn  from  a  de'pot  in 
rear. 

The  only  thing  which  remains  in  order  to  conclude  this 
study  of  the  successive  exploitation,  regular  and  methodical, 
of  the  country,  is  to  see  in  what  way  it  can  be  made  use  of  in 
the  formation  of  the  depots  on  the  line  of  communication. 

Employment  of  the  Local  Resources  for  the  Formation  of  the 
Depots  on  the  Line  of  Communication. — Without  entering  into 
the  details  of  the  organization  of  the  service  in  rear  and  the 
employment  of  the  supply-trains,  which  will  be  studied  in 
the  following  chapter,  it  is  necessary  to  refer  here  to  the 


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78  Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 

general  conditions  under  which  the  depots  of  supply  are 
established  along  the  line  of  communication.  These  depots 
are  echeloned  in  rear  of  the  army  at  distances  of  about  four 
marches  apart.  The  farthest  advanced  of  these  depots, 
advanced  or  principal  de'pot,  should  send  out  the  necessary 
requisitioned  trains  to  form  a  junction  with  the  auxiliary 
trains,  when  the  resupply  of  the  auxiliary  trains  has  not 
been  provided  for  by  turning  to  account  the  local  resources. 
If  we  refer  to  Figure  12  above,  we  see  from  it  that  the  sec- 
tion of  the  auxiliary  train  to  be  supplied  should  advance  the 
fifth  day  only  to  C;  wre  then  have  the  morning,  or  even  some 
hours  of  the  afternoon,  in  order  to  await  at  B  the  requisi- 
tioned train,  which  should  make  a  junction  with  the  auxil- 
iary train.  In  order  that  the  movement  of  the  requisitioned 
trains  should  not  give  rise  to  too  many  complications,  it  is 
important  that  the  de'pot  from  wrhich  they  start  should  not 
be  more  than  four  stations  from  the  point  B;  this  de'pot  wrill 
therefore  be  in  one  of  the  points  A,  M,  N,  or  P.  If  the  point 
is  at  A,  the  requisitioned  train  will  be  able  to  start  out  even 
on  the  fifth  day  very  early  in  the  morning,  and  overtake  at 
B  the  section  of  the  auxiliary  trains  in  time  to  enable  the 
latter  to  make  by  evening  the  march  from  B  to  C;  if  the 
de'pot  is  at  one  of  the  points  M,  N,  or  P,  the  requisitioned 
train  should  start  out  on  the  fourth  day ;  it  arrives  at  B  the 
fourth  day  in  the  evening  or  during  the  night  of  the  fourth 
and  fifth,  and  the  auxiliary  train  can  still  set  out  on  the  fifth 
day  to  retake  its  place;  it  is  evident  from  the  foregoing  that 
if  a  d£p6t  has  been  organized  at  A,  it  will  be  used  in  sending 
forwrard  requisitioned  trains  to  resupply  the  auxiliary  trains. 

At  B,  the  5th  day:     The  requisitioned  train  being  in  this 

case  started  the  morning  of  the  fifth 
dav. 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army.  79 

At  C,  the  Oth  day:  The  requisitioned  train  is  able  in  this 

case  to  start  very  early  in  the  morn- 
ing of  the  sixth  day,  or  the  evening 
of  the  fifth  day. 

At  D,  the  7th  day:  The  requisitioned  train  starting  out  on 

the  sixth  day. 

At  B,  the  8th  day:  The  requisitioned  train  starting  out  on 

the  seventh  day. 

To  provide  for  the  resupply  beyond  that  point,  it  would 
be  necessary  to  organize  a  new  advance  depot  (at  E,  for  ex- 
ample), which  would  be  able  on  the  ninth  day  to  send  forward 
requisitioned  trains  as  far  as  F;  the  d£pot  to  be  formed  at  A 
should  then  furnish  four  trains,  each  loaded  with  a  day's 
ration,  and  these  trains  should  be  collected,  that  for  the  first 
train  before  the  evening  of  the  fourth  day,  and  for  the  others 
by  the  fifth,  sixth,  and  seventh  day,  respectively.  If  we  ob- 
serve that  the  service  of  the  line  of  communication  is  in- 
stalled at  A  the  third  day,  we  will  infer  the  third  and  fourth 
day  is  the  only  time  available  to  collect  the  supplies  for  the 
first  train — that  is,  within  the  same  length  of  time  that  is 
available  to  resupply  the  auxiliary  train  at  B  by  turning  to 
account  the  local  resources  at  that  point.  It  may  then  be 
asked  if  it  will  ever  be  advisable  to  depend  thus  upon  turn- 
ing to  account  the  local  resources  in  rear,  instead  of  doing 
so  directly  at  B,  for  the  resupply  of  the  auxiliary  train,  thus 
dispensing  with  the  requisitioned  trains.  It  is  evident  that 
if  the  country  traversed  was  uniformly  rich,  at  B  and  at  A, 
there  would  be  no  reason  for  proceeding  in  that  way.  But 
it  may  indeed  happen  that  there  are  no  supplies  at  B,  and 
that  they  can  be  found  at  A.  It  is  easy  to  see  that  the  thing 
is  possible  and  it  is  not  a  mere  supposition. 

Suppose,  for  example,  that  A  is  the  bottom  of  a  rich 
and  fertile  valley,  beyond  wThich  the  army  will  have  to  cross 
a  plateau  or  a  range  of  barren  mountains  and  without  re- 


80 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 


IG.I3 


sources,  by  making  halts  at  B,  C,  and  D,  and  that  then  it 
redescends  into  another  valley,  where  again  supplies  can  be 
found;  is  it  not  evident  in  this  case  that  the  idea  of  providing 
subsistence  by  turning  to  account  the  local  resources  at  B, 
C,  and  D  will  have  to  be  abandoned,  and  that  supplies  must 
be  drawn  from  A,  where  consequently  it  will  be  necessary 
to  form  a  de'pot? 

This  necessity  of  depending  upon  the  local  resources  in 
rear  would  also  occur  w7hen,  instead  of  being  constantly  on 
the  march,  as  wre  have  supposed  to  be  the  case  until  now,  the 
army  will  remain  stationary  and  when  its  stay  in  the  same 
zone  is  prolonged  for  several  days.  In  this  case,  the  re- 
sources of  the  zone  occupied  by  the  army  being  rapidly  ex- 
hausted, it  will  be  compelled  to  resort  to  the  exploitation 
of  the  zone  in  rear.  The  formation  of  these  depots,  when 
they  are  not  intended  to  provide  for  immediate  necessities, 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army.  81 

is,  nevertheless,  obligatory  for  prudential  reasons,  to  provide 
for  unforeseen  emergencies,  and.  for  instance,  to  assure  sub- 
sistence in  case  of  reverses  or  of  precipitate  retreat. 

The  formation  and  supply  of  these  depots  will  be  ac- 
complished in  various  ways,  according  as  it  is  effected  from 
the  advance  depots  or,  on  the  other  hand,  from  the  other 
depots  Echeloned  in  rear.  As  regards  the  latter,  plenty  of 
time  is  available  and  the  ordinary  commercial  methods  will 
be  resorted  to.  But  for  the  advance  de'pot,  in  order  to  ob- 
tain the  supplies  required  for  the  first  consignment  to  be 
made  to  the  army,  it  will  be  almost  always  necessary  to  re- 
sort to  requisitions.  We  will  now  discuss  the  method  to  be 
employed  to  supply  one  of  these  depots;  we  will  suppose, 
in  conformity  with  what  we  stated  at  the  beginning  of  this 
section,  that  it  is  necessary  to  provide  immediately  at  M 
the  supplies  required  to  make  four  consignments,  of  which 
the  first  should  be  made  the  day  following,  or,  at  the  latest, 
the  morning  of  the  second  day  after,  that  on  which  the 
service  of  the  line  of  communication  is  installed  at  M. 
Theoretically,  the  most  rational  manner  of  organizing  the 
work  of  turning  to  account  the  local  resources  in  the  vicinity 
of  the  de'pot  for  this  purpose  will  be  to  form  around  it  four 
concentric  zones,  the  area  of  which  should  be  calculated  so 
that  each  zone  can  supply  the  provisions  necessary  for  one 
of  the  consignments.  The  first  zone  furnishes  the  necessary 
rations  to  the  first  train,  the  second  zone  relates  to  the  for- 
mation of  the  second  train,  and  so  on,  in  such  manner  that 
the  time  available  to  cause  the  provisions  to  flow  into  .the 
d£pot  may  be  proportionately  longer  as  the  distances  from 
which  they  are  drawn  are  greater. 

Immediately  upon  arriving  at  M,  the  service  entrusted 
with  the  duty  of  turning  the  resources  to  account  proceeds 
to  make  a  rapid  investigation  of  these  resources. 

6 


82 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 


FIG.I4 


The  principles  laid  down  in  Chapter  II.  will  still  be 
applied  here. 

The  distribution  of  the  requisitions  among  the  inhab- 
itants of  each  zone  is  made  then  proportionately  to  the  re- 
sources of  those  inhabitants;  the  orders  for  the  requisition, 
as  soon  as  drawn  up,  are  addressed  to  the  local  authorities, 
beginning  with  those  in  the  first  zone;  to  this  is  added  a 
notice  indicating  the  hour  and  place  where  the  provisions 
should  be  delivered.  Each  inhabitant  must  provide  him- 
self with  the  means  of  transporting  the  provisions  to  the 
point  of  delivery.  It  will  be  possible  to  retain  the  wagons 
and  drivers  who  have  brought  the  stores  to  the  depot  and 
to  make  use  of  them  for  the  formation  of  the  requisitioned 
trains  to  be  sent  towards  the  army.  It  is  evident  that  the 
district  M  would  not  be  able  alone  to  provide  all  the  wagons 
required  to  form  these  trains;  it  is  consequently  indispens- 


Xolr*  on  Hi?  Supply  of  an  Army.  83 

able  to  collect  them  and  to  demand  them  from  the  neighbor- 
ing inhabitants.  BY  proceeding  in  the  manner  indicated, 
the  provisions  and  the  wagons  to  transport  them  to  the 
troops  are  procured  at  the  same  time. 

The  notice  addressed  to  the  local  authorities  should  in- 
form them  of  the  number  of  wagons  which  will  be  held  and 
the  probable  length  of  time  during  which  they  will  be  re- 
tained; instructions  will  be  given  to  select  only  well-horsed 
wagons  and  those  capable  of  doing  good  service.  If  it  was 
intended  to  organize  alternate  or  successive  relays  of 
wagons,  as  this  method  of  transport  necessitates  the  employ- 
ment of  wagons  of  the  same  pattern,  it  would  be  necessary 
to  specify  in  the  notice  to  the  inhabitants  of  what  pattern 
the  wagons  should  be,  taking  into  consideration  the  customs 
of  the  country. 

The  concentric  form  of  the  zones  around  M  has  the 
.advantage  of  multiplying  the  roads  by  which  the  trains  will 
gain  access.  A  hurried  reconnoissance  of  the  country 
should  be  made  for  that  purpose;  arrangements  will  be 
made  to  regulate  the  route  by  which  the  teams  belonging  to 
the  inhabitants  will  enter  into  the  district  and  go  to  the 
place  designated  for  the  delivery  of  the  provisions,  or,  at  all 
events,  sentinels  will  be  posted  at  the  entrance  of  the  main 
roads  to  preserve  order  and  to  provide  guides  for  the  wagon- 
trains  which  come  along. 

It  is  not  enough  to  draw  up  and  send  out  the  orders  for 
the  requisitions;  it  is  still  necessary  to  assure  the  execution 
of  them; for  that  purpose,  the  staff  charged  with  the  exploit- 
ation will  be  scattered  throughout  the  zone  to  be  turned  to 
account:  this  staff  will  be  distributed  in  detachments,  each 
one  having  the  super  in  ten  deuce  of  the  work  in  a  portion  of 
the  district.  The  best  way  of  making  this  assignment,  it 
•seems  to  me,  is  to  assign  to  each  detachment  a  section,  A  M 


84  Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 

B.  The  first  day  the  detachment  turns  to  account  the  re- 
sources in  the  part  G  M  H  of  its  section  included  in  the  first 
zone;  it  then  turns  to  account  the  resources  in  the  part  G  E 
H  F,  forming  the  second  zone;  then  successively  E  C  F  D 
and  C  D  A  B;  this  arrangement  prevents  losing  tfme  in 
making  useless  incursions. 

This  method  of  executing  the  exploitation,  by  going 
from  the  interior  to-  the  exterior,  is  made  under  the  suppo- 
sition that  it  is  undertaken  in  a  friendly  country  and  that 
the  good-will  of  the  inhabitants  and  the  assistance  of  the 
local  authorities  can  be  relied  upon.  In  a  hostile  country, 
by  proceeding  in  this  way  it  may  be  feared  that  time  is 
allowed  the  inhabitants  to  hide,  carry  off,  and  make  way 
with  the  supplies.  During  the  time  the  resources  of  the 
inner  zone  are  being  collected,  the  inhabitants  of  the  outer 
zone  being  warned  of  the  operation  will  be  able  to  avoid  the 
requisition. 

Sous-intendant  Dufour  has  made  known,  from  the 
translation  of  a  German  work,  a  method  of  collecting  the 
local  resources  by  force  which  does  awray  with  this  objection. 

In  that  method,  in  order  to  collect  the  resources  of  the 
section  M  A  B,  the  staff,  instead  of  dispersing  at  first  in  the 
inner  zone,  would  go  rapidly  by  a  central  road  to  the  farther 
boundary  of  the  district  to  be  turned  to  account,  then  would 
disperse  along  the  boundary  line  and  would  fall  back  toward 
the  center,  driving  back  before  it  the  supplies.  At  the  same 
time  military  arrangements  would  be  made  and  cavalry 
patrols  would  be  formed  around  the  zone  to  stop  all  escape 
and  all  carrying  away  of  provisions.  A  more  detailed 
description  of  this  method  can  be  read  in  the  Revue  dc 
VIntendance* 


*"  Theories  allemandes  surl'Exploitatioa  des  Ressources  locales 
a  main  Armee  en'campagne." 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 


85 


We  have  only  stated  the  fundamental  principle,  which 
is,  as  can  be  seen,  to  begin  the  exploitation  in  the  most 
distant  zone  and  to  continue  it  by  going  from  the  circumfer- 
ence to  the  center. 


4th.  Day 


3d.  Day 


2d.  Day 


Hequisiti 
1st.  Day 


FIG.I5 


But  it  is  necessary  to  observe  that  in  this  second  method 
the  requisitioned  supplies  are  not  collected  at  M  until  the 
end  of  the  operation — that  is,  on  the  fourth  day ;  admitting 
that  the  first  supplies  collected  would  be  forwarded  immedi- 
ately to  M,  as  these  come  from  the  most  distant  localities,  it 
is  feared  that  these  supplies  would  not  reach  M  in  sufficient 
time  to  provide  for  the  formation  of  the  first  train,  which 
should  be  formed  the  day  after,  or  at  latest  the  second  day 
after,  that  on  which  the  service  of  the  line  of  communica- 
tion has  established  itself  at  M. 

It  seems  that  it  will  be  necessary  to  adopt  the  method 
which  was  first  explained,  except  to  take  the  necessary  pre- 
cautions to  prevent  the  carrying  off  of  the  provisions;  it  will 
be  possible,  for  instance,  to  have  the  extreme  circumference 


86  Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 

of  the  theatre  of  exploitation  surrounded  and  watched  by 
the  cavalry.  It  is  necessary,  moreover,  to  consider  that  to 
obtain  the  necessary  return  and  to  furnish  four  days'  com- 
plete rations,  a  forced  requisition  would  prove  insufficient. 
It  will  be  necessary  to  have  the  assistance  of  the  local  au- 
thorities. The  surest  means  is,  however,  to  inspire  in  these 
a  salutary  fear  by  suppressing  with  the  utmost  promptness 
all  resistance.  It  was  in  this  way  that  the  Germans 
operated  in  1870,  and  their  orders  for  requisitions  were  exe- 
cuted .with  an  exactness  that  we  have  never  been  able  to 
obtain. 

It  remains  for  us  to  consider  the  extent  of  the  zones  the 
resources  of  which  are  to  be  utilized.  This  extent  evidently 
depends  upon  the  numbers  to  be  provided  for  and  the  rich- 
ness of  the  country.  The  coefficient  of  the  resources  is  not 
the  same  for  all  the  supplies,  and  it  will  be  possible,  for  in- 
stance, to  find  cattle  in  a  much  smaller  circle  than  it  wTill  be 
to  find  oats.  We  will  calculate1  what  radius  the  zone  of 
supply  should  have  in  order  to  furnish  a  day's  forage  of  oats 
for  an  army  composed  of  five  corps,  the  total  number  of 
horses  in  which  is  about  50,000.  The  quantity  of  oats  neces- 
sary being  in  that  case  2500  quintals,  the  problem  consists 
in  finding  the  area  of  a  zone  of  which  the  resources  of  oats 
will  be  the  above  named  amount.  At  the  time  of  harvest 
it  would  be  possible  to  consider  1)0  q-m.  as  about  the  re- 
sources of  a  square  kilometre  (Table  No.  2),  and  the  area  of 
the  zone  of  supply  would  then  be  only  from  28  to  30  square 
kilometres;  a  circle  with  a  radius  of  3  to  4  kilometres  would 
be  sufficient. 

If  we  were  at  the  most  unfavorable  time  of  tin*  year, 
and  if  we  take  7  q-m.  as  the  resources  per  square  kilometre, 
the  area  of  the  zone  of  supply  would  then  be  M^  or  357 
square  kilometres.  The  radius  of  a  circle  of  this  area  is,  in 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  At  my. 


87 


round  numbers,  10  kilometres;*  which  is  that  of  the  circum- 
ference of  the  first  zone  in  Figure  10.  The  radii  of  the  cir- 
cumferences of  the  outer  boundaries  of  the  other  zones 
would  then  be: 

For  the  2d  zone,  14  kilometres; 

For  the  3d  zone,  17  kilometres; 

For  the  4th  zone,  20  kilometres. 

The  extreme  distance  to  which  the  zone  of  supply  would 
be  extended  would  be,  in  the  case  we  have  considered,  20 
kilometres.  If,  considering  it  would  never  be  possible  to 
collect  all  the  resources  of  this  zone  of  supply,  it  were 
desired  to  cover  double  the  area  which  is  theoretically 
sufficient,  the  radius  of  the  zone  of  supply  would  be  28 
kilometres;  or,  in  round  numbers,  about  30  kilometres 


"The  radius  M  G  of  this  zone  is  obtained  by  the  formula: 

7rMG2  =  357. 

The  radii  of  the  other  circles  are  obtained  by  considering  that  they 
bound  surfaces  respectively  equal  to 2,  3,  and  4  times  that  of  the  inner 
circle;  the  following  therefore  results: 

ME2  =  7TMG2  X  2,  or  ME  =  MG  \T=  10  V T=  14. 

MG2  <=  7TMG2  x  3,  or  MG  =  MG  \  3  =  10  V  3  —  17. 

MA2  ==  7TMG2  X  4,  or  MA  =  2MG  =  10  X  2  =  20. 
In  making  the  calculations  as  above,  and  considering  a  total  of 
1000  horses  to  each  army  corps  and  a  coefficient  of  7  q-m.  of  oats  to 
the  square  kilometre,  we  find: 


For 
1  Corps. 

For 
2  Corps. 

For 
3  Corps. 

For 
4  Corps. 

For 
5  Corps. 

Extreme  radius  of  the 

zone  of  supply  in  ki- 

lometres   

7 

9 

12 

14 

20 

Radius  when  the  zone 

of  supply    is     made 

double  the  area  in  or 

derto  provide  for  the 

case  when  theyieldis 

below  the  resources  . 

9 

11 

14 

18 

28 

88  Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 

It  would  then  be  possible  without  extending  the  zone 
of  supply  over  a  circle  of  too  great  area,  to  provide  in  a 
single  depot  for  the  collection  of  rations  required  for  four 
days ;  that  is  to  say,  to  form  the  four  trains  which  that  d£pot 
should  forward  to  the  army.  But  in  practice  several 
centers  of  supply  will  be  established  for  an  army;  one  depot 
will  then  have  to  supply  not  more  than  two  or  three  army 
corps.  This  limit  is  made  necessary  not  so  much  to  diminish 
the  extent  of  the  zone  of  supply  as  to  facilitate  the  work  by 
dividing  it,  and  particularly  for  the  purpose  of  decreasing 
the  crowding  in  the  centers  of  supply.  We  will  also  see  in 
the  following  chapter  that  the  establishment  of  several  lines 
of  communication  has  the  effect  of  shortening  the  length  of 
haul  which  the  trains  will  have  to  make  to  reach  the  points 
of  supply;  under  these  circumstances  the  extreme  radius  of 
the  zone  of  supply  around  the  advance  depots  which  pro- 
vides for  the  first  four  consignments  to  be  made  by  them 
would  be  on  the  average  12  kilometres  if  the  d£p6t  is  to  sup- 
ply two  corps,  and  20  kilometres  if  it  is  to  supply  three  corps. 

We  have  considered  the  case  as  if  all  the  supplies  can 
only  be  obtained  by  requisition.  But  it  is  evident  that  other 
advantageous  circumstances  wrill  occur  which  will  permit 
of  simplifying  the  operation;  there  will  always  be  found  in 
the  zone  important  places  containing  commercial  stocks 
which  will  do  away  with  the  necessity  of  extending  the 
requisitions  as  far  as  the  foregoing  theoretical  discussion 
seems  to  require. 

V.     Comparison  of  the  Different  Methods  of  Utilizing  the  Local 

Resources. 

In  short,  the  exploitation  of  the  country  for  the  supply 
of  the  army  can  be  made,  according  to  circumstances,  in  the 
following  manner: 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army.  89 

1st.  The  exploitation  can  be  made  in  the  cantonments, 
and,  in  most  cases,  by  the  corps.  There  are  then  established, 
in  order  to  facilitate  the  search  for  provisions,  as  many 
central  stations  as  there  are  units;  in  other  words,  one  for 
each  supply  officer.  It  is  readily  seen  that  in  this  way  the 
search  extends  over  the  entire  area  of  the  zone  of  occupa- 
tion, and  that  this  method  makes  the  greatest  division  of 
the  work.  The  time  available  for  the  operation  extends 
from  the  evening  after  the  arrival  in  the  cantonments  until 
the  hour  the  following  morning  which  has  been  set  for  the 
departure  of  the  regular  trains. 

2d.  The  exploitation,  instead  of  being  made  by  the 
corps  in  order  to  provide  the  resupply  of  the  regimental 
trains,  can  be  employed  to  provide  the  resupply  of  the  admin- 
istrative train.  The  exploitation  is  then  extended  to  the  next 
day,  and  the  time  available  runs  to  the  evening  of  that  day, 
the  administrative  train  being  able  to  delay  starting  to 
assume  its  place  in  the  column  until  a  later  hour.  The 
exploitation  is  effected  by  means  of  the  divisional  adminis- 
trative services;  it  is  made  in  the  same  zone  in  which  the 
exploitation  by  the  corps  themselves  would  have  been  made, 
but  it  is  effected  only  around  the  three  central  stations: 
one  for  each  of  the  administrative  trains  belonging  to  the 
divisions,  and  one  for  that  belonging  to  headquarters.  The 
diffusion  is  then  necessarily  less  and  the  utilization  of  the 
resources  of  the  zone  not  so  well  distributed. 

3d.  If  the  circumstances  are  such  as  rot  to  permit  of 
using  the  resources  of  the  zone  of  occupation  for  the  re- 
supply  of  the  regimental  trains,  nor  for  that  of  the  adminis- 
trative trains,  it  is  possible  to  use  them  for  the  resupply  of 
the  section  of  the  auxiliary  train  which  has  been  obliged  to 
go  forward  in  order  to  resupply  the  administrative  train. 
The  operation,  however,  takes  place  in  the  zone  in  which 


90  Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 

the  army  is  cantoned,  but  it  is  extended  to  the  second  day; 
moreover,  since  the  auxiliary  train  is  not  divided  like  the 
administrative  train  into  separate  sections  for  each  division 
and  the  headquarters,  the  contact  of  this  train  with  the  ad- 
ministrate train  is  made  at  one  point;  the  exploitation  for 
the  resupply  of  this  train  is  made  by  the  administrative 
services  of  the  advanced  de'pot,  and  is  enforced  through- 
out the  zone  from  a  single  center  of  supply.  The  dispersion 
is  then  still  less  than  in  the  preceding  case. 

4th.  Finally,  the  exploitation,  instead  of  being  made 
in  the  different  zones  successively  occupied  by  the  army, 
can  be  made  in  rear  at  a  point  from  which  the  rations  neces- 
sary for  three  or  four  days  are  obtained  and  from  where  they 
are  forwarded  to  the  army  by  means  of  requisitioned  trains. 
They  reach  the  army  after  having  been  transferred  from  the 
requisition  trains  to  the  auxiliary  trains,  from  the  latter  to 
the  administrate  trains,  and  then  to  the  regimental  trains, 
by  which,  finally,  they  are  brought  to  the  troops.  As  gener- 
ally a  line  of  communications  serves  for  at  least  two  army 
corps,  it  is  evident  that,  in  this  fourth  method,  the  exploita- 
tion is  made  for  two  or  more  corps  from  a  single  center  of 
supply. 

This  summing  up  makes  it  possible  to  indicate  the  ad- 
vantages and  disadvantages  of  these  different  methods  of 
effecting  the  exploitation  of  the  country.  In  the  order  in 
which  they  are  pointed  out,  each  possesses  over  the  one 
following  the  advantage  of  a  greater  dispersion,  of  a  greater 
division  of  the  wTork.  We  know  also  that  each  of  these 
methods  has  the  advantage  over  the  one  following  of  re- 
quiring the  employment  of  a  less  number  of  successive 
trains. 

The  first,  for  instance",  does  not  exact  the  employment 
of  any  trains;  the  second  necessitates  the  introduction  of 


Notes  on  1he  Supply  of  an  Amu/.  91 

tlie  administrative  train;  the  third,  the  introduction  of  the 
administrative  train  and  of  the  auxiliary  train;  finally,  for 
the  fourth  method,  it  is  necessary  to  add  to  the  administra- 
tive and  auxiliary  trains  the  employment  of  requisitioned 
trains  for  the  service  of  the  line  of  communication.  But, 
in  following  these  methods  in  the  same  order,  it  is  seen  that 
the  time  available  for  the  application  of  the  first  is  less  than 
for  the  second,  and  for  the  latter  less  than  for  the  third. 
Moreover,  if  the  division  of  the  work  is  of  advantage  in  facil- 
itating the  operation,  it  does  not  possess  equal  advantages 
when  the  husbanding  of  the  resources  is  considered.  This 
Inst  consideration  has  led  some  authors  to  regard  unfavor- 
ably the  use  of  requisitions  imposed  by  the  corps  themselves, 
and  to  advocate,  except  in  special  cases,  only  the  use  of  gen- 
eral requisitions — that  is  to  say,  the  last  of  the  methods 
above  enumerated.  We  have  already  mentioned  the  opinion 
of  Clausewitz  concerning  the  advisability  of  entrusting  the 
exploitation  to  the  troops.  He  says:*  ''This  manner  of 
proceeding  causes  the  greatest  wTaste;  it  is  the  exception 
that,  when  given  the  opportunity,  the  men  do  not  take  more 
than  is  moderately  necessary  for  them,  so  that  a  large  por- 
tion of  the  resources  are  thus  lost  without  benefiting  any 
one." 

General  Pierron  says  the  same:f  "Concerning  requisi- 
tions, it  is  the  fundamental  interest  of  the  army  to  make  use 
of  them  as  little  as  possible,  for  they  are  the  most  rapid 
means  of  wasting  and  destroying  the  resources  of  the 
country,  for  which  resources  the  army  moreover  has  the 
greatest  need  in  the  long  run To  make  requi- 
sition to  exhaustion  is  to  deprive  one's  self  of  the  rations  for 
the  future." 


*Clausewitz,  "Theorie  de  la  grande  Guerre,"  page  353 

tGene"ral  Pierron,  "  Strategic  et  grande  Tactique,"  Vol.  I.,  p.  331. 


92  Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army, 

In  this  question,  as  in  everything  in  war,  the  choice  to 
be  made  will  depend  upon  circumstances  and  the  end  to  be 
gained,  before  which  all  other  questions  should  give  way. 

It  is  thus  that  "at  the  outset,  when  the  troops  or  de- 
tachments are  on  the  march  and  arrive  for  the  first  time  in 
a  place,  it  is  almost  unavoidable  to  have  recourse  to  the, 
systems  of  requisitions.*  The  subdivisions  of  troops  which 
are  immediately  confronting  the  enemy,  such  as  the  advance 
guards  and  pickets,  can  in  case  of  a  forward  movement  only 
make  use  of  this  single  method  of  assuring  their  subsist- 
ence."! When  it  will  be  necessary  to  move  quickly  and 
with  rapid  marches,  "the  time  is  most  frequently  limited, 
it  is  understood  that  it  may  often  be  necessary  to  have  re- 
course to  requisitions  enforced  directly  by  the  troops,  be- 
cause they  yield  unquestionably  the  quickest  returns. "J 

VI.     Maximum  Length  of  Time  during  Which  It  Will  be  Possible 
to  Subsist  an  Army  from  the  Resources  of  the 

Same  Region  of  Country. 

That  the  country  offers  ample  resources  is  the  neces- 
sary condition  in  order  to  be  able  to  apply  the  methods  of 
exploitation  of  the  country  to  provide  for  the  subsistence. 
From  the  discussions  we  made  in  Chapter  II.,  we  can  con- 
clude that  it  will  generally  be  so,  when  the  army  traverses 
the  country  by  a  rapid  and  continuous  march;  but  it  cer- 
tainly would  not  be  the  same  if  the  army  were  stationary 
and  if  its  stay  in  the  same  section  were  prolonged.  It  is  im- 
portant to  consider  the  time  during  which  it  is  possible 
to  subsist  an  army  under  such  conditions  without  being 
obliged  to  have  recourse  to  consignments  from  the  rear. 

*'G6n6ral  Pierron,  "  Strategic  et  grande  Tactique,"  page  331. 
tClausewitz,  "  The"orie  de  la  grande  Guerre,"  page  353. 
tClausewitz,  "  Theorie  de  la  grande  Guerre,"  page  354. 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army.  93 

The  investigation  will  constitute  a  natural  conclusion  to  the 
present  chapter,  devoted  to  the  question  of  subsisting  on 
the  country,  and  also  as  an  introduction  to  the  following 
chapter,  which  will  discuss  the  question  of  resupply  by 
means  of  trains  forwarded  from  the  rear. 

It  is  evident  that  the  time  during  which  an  army  will 
be  able  to  live  upon  the  resources  of  a  country  will  depend 
upon  the  richness  of  the  country;  it  will  also  depend  upon 
the  time  of  the  year  during  which  the  operation  is  made; 
moreover,  the  time  during  which  it  will  be  possible  to  find 
the  resources  in  the  country  wTill  not  be  the  same  for  all  the 
supplies.  Therefore  the  conclusions  stated  by  the  different 
authors  are  very  contradictory.  We  are  going  to  attempt 
to  express  an  opinion  from  the  facts  by  making  use  of  the 
conclusions  recorded  in  Chapter  II.  and  by  making  use  of  the 
coefficients  obtained  in  Tables  Nos.  1  and  2  of  that  chapter. 

At  the  outset  we  will  admit,  as  this  results  from  an 
inspection  of  Figure  3  of  Plate  I.,  that  under  the  conditions 
of  average  concentration  the  army  can  directly  turn  to  ac- 
count the  resources  of  a  zone  having  a  front  of  about  40  kilo- 
metres and  a  depth  of  50  kilometres.  The  area  of  this  zone 
is  then  about  2000  square  kilometres.  It  is  an  easy  matter 
to  calculate  the  resources  of  this  zone  by  means  of  the  co- 
efficient for  a  square  kilometre  given  in  Table  No.  2.  Re- 
garding the  requirements,  Table  No.  1  gives  them  for  an 
army  corps;  it  is  only  necessary  to  multiply  them  by  5  to 
obtain  the  requirements  for  an  entire  army.  The  compari- 
son of  the  two  results  will  show  the  time  during  which  the 
resources  will  provide  for  the  wants. 

For  meat,  for  instance,  the  requirement  for  a  corps 
being  100  head  of  cattle,  500  head  will  be  required  for  the 
entire  army.  The  coefficient  of  the  resources  per  square 
kilometre  being  15,  the  resources  of  the  zone  occupied  will 


94  Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 

be  15  X  2000  =  30,000  head  of  cattle,  which  is  GO  times 
the  requirements.  It  seems  then  from  this  that  it  will  be 
possible  to  find  sufficient  meat  in  the  country  to  last  60  days. 

The  requirements  of  oats  is  500  q-m.  for  an  army  corps, 
and  2500  q-m.  for  the  entire  army.  The  coefficient  from 
Table  No.  2  for  this  supply  is  93  q-m.,  which  represents 
the  resources  only  at  the  time  of  harvest;  at  that  time  the 
total  resources  in  the  zone  occupied  by  the  army  would 
be  93  X  2000  =  18(5,000  quintals,  about  74  times  as  much 
as  required.  The  zone  occupied  by  the  army  would  be  able 
to  supply  the  oats  required  for  2  months  in  round  numbers. 
If  we  now  refer  to  the  most  unfavorable  time  and  adopt  the 
number  7  q-m.  as  the  coefficient  per  square  kilometre,  as  we 
have  already  done,  the  resources  of  the  zone  will  be  more 
than  14,000  quintals  and  will  only  provide  a  sufficient 
amount  for  5  or  6  days.  Similar  results  would  be  obtained 
for  the  forage  and  the  straw. 

It  is  of  importance  to  make  a  calculation  concerning 
potatoes,  a  food  supply  more  generally  cultivated  than 
beans,  and  which  can  be  issued  in  lieu  of  rice  and  vegetables 
at  the  rate  of  750  grammes.  The  requirement  would  be  1115 
q-m.  The  coefficient  from  Table  No.  2  is  207  q-m.  per  square 
kilometre,  and  the  resources  at  the  time  of  harvest,  in  the 
zone  occupied  by  the  army,  would  consequently  be  414,000 
quintals,  or  more  than  300  times  the  amount  required.  The 
consumption  by  the  inhabitants  and  the  animals  quickly 
reduces  the  stock,  but  it  is  an  important  supply,  which 
should  not  be  overlooked. 

The  following  lines,  which  we  take  from  a  letter  of  Na- 
poleon's to  M.  I'etiet,  the  intendant  (/('in' nil  of  the  Grande 
Armee,  shows  that  it  is  important  to  recognize  the  necessity 
of  thus  utilizing  all  the  resources:  "We  have  marched 
without  magazines;  we  were  constrained  to  do  so  bv  circum- 


Notes  on  tlie  Supply  of  an  Army.  95 

stances;  we  have  had  an  extremely  favorable  season  for  it 
after  the  harvest  [October,  1805] ;  but,  although  we  have 
been  constantly  victorious  and  we  have  found  vegetables 
in  the  fields,  we  have,  however,  suffered  very  much.  In  a 
season  when  there  were  no  potatoes  in  the  fields,  or  if  the 
army  experienced  some  reverses,  the  lack  of  magazines 
would  have  cost  us  the  greatest  misfortunes.'1* 

But  bread  being  the  most  essential  food,  wheat  is  the 
most  important  supply  to  be  investigated.  For  this  supply 
we  cannot  make  the  calculations  as  we  have  just  made  for 
the  other  products  of  the  soil,  because  the  production  all 
throughout  France  is  less  than  the  consumption,  wiiich  is 
consequently  provided  in  part  by  importation;  consequently 
it  cannot  be  said  that  towards  the  end  of  the  year  the  re- 
sources can  be  considered  as  equal  to  one-twelfth  of  the 
production,  and  deduce  from  this,  writh  sufficient  accuracy 
for  the  present  subject,  the  resources  of  the  most  unfavor- 
able time  of  the  year.  But  if  this  reasoning  cannot  be  ap- 
plied to  the  whole  of  France,  it  can  be  to  the  regions  where 
the  production  is  equal  to  the  requirements  for  the  consump,- 
tion  of  the  inhabitants.  In  the  departments  where  the  pro- 
duction is  greater  than  the  consumption,  it  is  possible-  also, 
after  deducting  this  surplus,  to  consider  it  as  immediately 
exported  (although  in  reality  it  will  only  be  so  in  the  course 
of  the  year),  and  calculating  then,  as  we  have  done  above,  to 
take  as  the  smallest  stock  one-twelfth  of  the  figure  thus 
obtained;  this  amounts  to  saying  that  the  minimum  stock 
is  equal  to  one-twelfth  the  requirements  for  the  population, 
which  could  at  once  be  expressed  in  that  wTay;  that  being  so, 
the  average  population  being  taken  as  70  inhabitants  to  the 
square  kilometre,  it  is  evident  that  the  zone  occupied  by  the 
army  corresponds  to  a  population  of  (TO  X  2000  =)  140,000 

*General  Pierron,  "  Strategic  et  grande  Tactique,"  Vol.  I  ,  page  23. 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

/.     General  Methods  of  Supply. 

We  have  studied  in  the  foregoing  chapters  the  means 
of  assuring  the  supply  of  rations  to  an  army  at  a  fixed  point, 
and  thus  to  dispense  with,  or,  at  any  rate,  to  retard  or  reduce 
as  far  as  possible  the  employment  of  trains.  Under  similar 
conditions,  we  must  now  study  the  means  necessary  to  as- 
sure the  supply  by  the  exclusive  use  of  trains  and  of  trans- 
portation from  the  rear. 

One  may  under  this  hypothesis  render  certain  the  pro- 
visioning of  an  army  by  various  means. 

1st.  The  necessary  supplies  can  be  carried  in  trains 
immediately  behind  the  army,  thus  constituting  a  species 
of  movable  depots,  from  which  would  be  issued  these  sup- 
plies as  needed. 

2d.  Depots  of  supplies  can  be  established  at  the  rear 
of  the  army,  and  the  rations  necessary  for  the  subsistence  of 
the  army  be  obtained  from  these  depots  by  wagons  attached 
to  the  army. 

3d.  In  place  of  sending  teams  from  the  army  to  seek 
the  rations  at  these  depots,  one  might,  on  the  contrary, 
cause  these  supplies  to  be  hauled  from  the  depots  to  the 
army  by  means  of  trains  formed  as  necessity  required  and 
which  would  not  be  attached  to  the  army  in  a  permanent 
manner. 

4th.  One  might  employ  each  one  of  the  foregoing 
methods  separately  and  each  independent  from  the  others, 
but,  in  fact,  it  is  by  a  combination  of  these  three  methods 
that  the  continued  supply  is  secured.  There  is  attached  to 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army.  99 

the  army  regular  trains  carrying  a  specified  number  of  days' 
rations;  it  is  by  drawing  upon  these  trains  that  the  daily 
issues  are  secured.  Then  these  army  trains,  thus  emptied, 
are  sent  to  meet  the  special  wagon-trains  which  are  bringing 
to  them  supplies  drawn  from  the  depots  that  have  been 
established  at  the  rear. 

//.      1st  Method:     Transports  of  Supplies  in  the  Rear  of  the 

Column. 

The  first  method  would  suffice  to  secure  the  rationing 
of  the  army  if  it  were  possible  to  haul  with  it  all  of  the 
supplies  which  would  be  necessary  during  the  entire  period 
of  the  projected  march.  It  can  easily  be  seen  that  this  pro- 
cedure is  impracticable,  and  that  it  would  require  the  form- 
ation of  enormous  wagon-trains  for  a  numerous  body  of 
troops,  if  the  operation  were  to  be  a  long  one,  and  especially 
when  its  duration  was  unknown. 

Transports  of  Supplies  in  Movable  Columns  in  Countries 
Other  than  Europe. — One  is  nevertheless  forced  to  adopt  this 
means  of  supply  for  distant  expeditions,  out  of  Europe  (in 
Africa,  for  instance),  when  one  cannot  find  supplies  along 
the  route  of  march  and  the  unsettled  condition  of  the  coun- 
try, or  any  other  cause,  prevents  the  creation  of  a  line  of 
communications  to  connect  the  column  with  its  base  of 
operations.  Although  these  notes  are  based  particularly  on 
European  wars,  it  will  not  be  without  interest  to  say  a  few 
words  upon  the  organization  of  a  supply-train  for  an  expedi- 
tion of  this  kind. 

When  the  expedition  is  an  important  one,  the  supply- 
train  must  be  enormous;  if  it  consisted  of  an  army  corps, 
and  if  one  estimates  at  150  only  as  the  number  of  wagons 
required  to  carry  1  day's  provisions,  there  would  be  required 


100  Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 

1500  wagons  for  10  days,  3000  for  20  days,  and  so  on ;  further- 
more, it  is  rare  that  in  countries  where  such  expeditions 
would  occur  that  wragons  can  be  found,  and  it  is  only  by  the 
means  of  pack-animals  that  the  supply-trains  can  be  organ- 
ized. I  wdll  borrow  from  a  recent  publication  the  follow- 
ing example,  which  gives  some  idea  of  what  supply-trains 
are  under  these  conditions.  During  the  Abyssinian  cam- 
paign of  1 807-08  the  British,  to  keep  supplied  for  a  march 
of  16  days  a  column  consisting  of  13,000  men  only,  were  com- 
pelled to  organize  a  train  of  16,000  mules. 

One  more  example,  which  I  have  taken  from  an  article 
by  M.  Tlntendant  Coulombeix  (I  think)  upon  the  organiza- 
tion of  an  expedition  in  Algeria.  The  column,  composed 
of  3000  men  and  1260  horses,  was  required  to  carry  30  days' 
supplies. 

The  train  was  to  consist  of 

144  mules  belonging  to  the  train; 
325  mules  which  were  requisitioned; 
3130  camels. 

It  is  proper  to  remark  that  it  is  only  by  the  use  of  camels 
that  it  is  possible  to  organize  a  train  for  so  great  a  number 
of  days.  If  one  were  compelled  to  employ  pack-mules  only, 
the  limit  to  which  one  could  maintain  the  supplies  would 
be  much  more  restricted.  In  that  case,  in  fact,  the  weight 
of  the  stores  required  for  the  food  of  the  animals  and  their 
drivers  constitutes  a  dead  weight,  which  reduces  by  so  much 
the  quantity  of  supplies  usefully  carried  by  the  trains  for 
the  provisioning  of  the  column.  Each  pair  of  mules  re- 
quires 1  driver,  and  one  can  estimate  at  15  kilogs.  at  least 
the  weight  of  the  forage  necessary  each  day  for  these  2 
mules  and  the  rations  of  the  driver.  The  amount  of  dead 
or  lost  weight  is  equal,  therefore,  to  the  number  of  days' 
march  multiplied  by  15  kilogs.;  thus,  for  instance,  15  x  IT 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army.  101 

On  the  other  hand,  after  deducting  the  harness  of  the  mules 
and  the  kit  of  the  driver,  one  can  consider  200  kilogs.  as  the 
weight  that  these  2  mules  ought  to  carry;  the  actual  weight 
of  supplies  for  the  rationing  of  the  column  is  therefore  re- 
duced to 

200  —  15  X  N, 
and  that  weight  would  become  zero  when 

15  x  N=200, 
from  whence,  in  round  numbers,  N  is  equal  to  14  or  15  days. 

That  is  the  extent  to  which  a  column  could  be  subsisted 
by  means  of  pack-mules.  One  can  also  see  from  this  that 
if  the  command  had  to  make  the  entire  trip,  going  and  re- 
turning, with  no  other  means  of  subsistence  during  the  trip, 
it  could  not  separate  itself  from  its  base  for  more  than  8 
days'  march. 

It  is  only  by  the  use  of  camels,  for  which  one  has  to 
carry  but  little  if  any  forage,  that  expeditions  of  greater 
duration  may  be  organized.  In  Tunis  one  obtains  similar 
results  by  the  use  of  light  vehicles,  called  arabas,  drawn  by 
but  1  horse,  and  which  can  carry  from  200  to  250  kilo- 
grammes. With  these  wagons  the  theoretical  limit  to  which 
the  supply  of  rations  could  be  maintained,  calculated  as 
above,  would  be  from  30  to  35  days. 

Organization  of  Supply  Trains  in  a  European  War. — In 
the  armies  of  Europe  there  is  a  limit  placed  on  the  amount 
of  rations  carried  by  the  train.  The  number  of  days'  rations 
loaded  in  the  wagons  is  determined,  through  probabilities 
and  experiences  acquired  in  preceding  wrars,  upon  the  time 
during  which  the  army  may  be  exposed  to  the  chances  of 
receiving  supplies  in  no  other  way.  In  Fiance  10  days  has 
been  adopted  as  the  number,  and  consequently  the  supply- 
trains  organized  ard  attached  to  the  army  carry  10  days' 
rations  and  short  forage  (oats).  But  it  is  proper  to  say  that 


102  Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 

some  other  number  might  have  been  adopted,  either  less  or, 
on  the  other  hand,  greater;  it  is  a  matter  of  selection,  the 
number  10  rations  for  transportation  being  in  no  way 
imposed  by  the  other  methods  of  supply  which  it  will  be 
necessary  to  consider. 

This  train  of  10  days'  supplies  has  not  been  formed  in 
a  compact  and  undivided  mass,  but,  on  the  contrary,  split 
up  into  Echelons  so  that  it  can  be  distributed  to  the  column 
according  to  the  necessities;  there  have  thus  been  formed 
three  principal  Echelons: 

1st.  The  regimental  trains,  carrying  2  days';  these 
trains,  as  their  name  indicates,  are  separately  attached  to 
bodies  of  troops,  regiments,  groups  of  batteries,  and  so 
forth,  and  constitute  the  special  wagons  pertaining  to  those 
organizations. 

2d.  Four  days'  rations  are  carried  by  the  administra- 
tive trains;  these  trains  are  distributed  in  groups  correspond 
ing  to  each  division  of  the  army  corps  or  to  troops  not  in- 
cluded in  any  division;  there  is  thus  in  the  army  corps  an 
administrative  train  for  each  division  and  an  administrative 
train  for  the  headquarters;  each  train  is  furthermore  divided 
into  four  sections,  each  representing  one  day's  rations. 

3d.  The  four  other  days'  rations  are  carried  in  the 
auxiliary  train,  which  is  not  split  up  like  the  general  train 
into  groups  corresponding  with  the  divisions  and  head- 
quarters, but  forms  one  group  for  the  whole  army  corps ;  it  is 
only  divided  into  four  sections,  each  having  one  day's 
rations. 

We  shall  see  shortly  that  these  divisions  result  ration- 
ally from  the  role  assigned  to  each  of  these  trains  in  main- 
taining the  supply  of  rations. 

With  regard  to  the  names  that  have  been  adopted,  ex- 
cept as  concerns  the  regimental  trains,  they  answer  to 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army.  103 

nothing  based  either  upon  fact  or  logic;  but  they  are  well 
established  by  long  usage,  and  it  would  be  going  too  far  in 
the  love  for  logic  and  symmetry  to  wish  to  change  them. 

///.     2d  Method:     The  Continued  Supply  by  Means  of  Train* 

Forming  an  Integral  Part  of  the  Columns  and 

Permanently  Attached  Thereto. 

The  second  method  of  maintaining  the  supply  consists 
in  sending  for  the  rations  to  the  depots,  where  they  have 
been  collected,  by  the  special  army  trains.  We  will  first 
look  into  this  method  by  itself  and  then  in  combination  with 
other  means. 

Periods  during  Which  the  Command  is  Stationary. — If  the 
army  is  stationary  at  A,  let  M  represent  the  depots  of  sup- 
plies, the  transportation  between  the  two  points  will  be 
easy  to  organize.  The  supply-train  leaving  A  goes  for  new 
supplies  to  M,  and,  returning  to  A,  unloads  there  the  goods 
with  which  it  was  loaded,  then  returns  to  the  d£pot,  and  so 
on.  If  the  trip  from  A  to  M  and  return  could  be  made  on 
the  same  day,  one  train  only  would  suffice  to  keep  up  a 
supply.  If  this  trip,  going  and  coming,  should  require  two 
days,  there  would  be  necessary,  in  order  that  the  rationing 
of  the  army  be  continuous,  two  trains.  Three  will  be  requi- 
site if  the  distance  A  M  requires  three  days  for  the  round 
trip,  and  so  on.  The  distance  at  which  one  can  keep  up  the 
supply  depends,  therefore,  upon  the  number  of  trains  that 
are  available.  By  this  expression  we  understand  wagon- 
trains  capable  of  carrying  one  day's  supplies  for  the  entire 
command.  If  one  wished,  therefore,  to  employ  for  the  con- 
tinued supply  of  this  kind  the  ten  trains  (regimental  trains, 
administrative  and  auxiliary)  which  are  attached  to  an  army 
corps,  it  would  be  possible,  without  forced  marches,  to  se- 
cure a  supply  for  five  days'  march  of  the  army. 


102  Notes  on  tlie  Supply  of  an  Army. 

some  other  number  might  have  been  adopted,  either  less  or, 
on  the  other  hand,  greater;  it  is  a  matter  of  selection,  the 
number  10  rations  for  transportation  being  in  no  way 
imposed  by  the  other  methods  of  supply  which  it  will  be 
necessary  to  consider. 

This  train  of  10  days'  supplies  has  not  been  formed  in 
a  compact  and  undivided  mass,  but,  on  the  contrary,  split 
up  into  Echelons  so  that  it  can  be  distributed  to  the  column 
according  to  the  necessities;  there  have  thus  been  formed 
three  principal  Echelons: 

1st.  The  regimental  trains,  carrying  2  days';  these 
trains,  as  their  name  indicates,  are  separately  attached  to 
bodies  of  troops,  regiments,  groups  of  batteries,  and  so 
forth,  and  constitute  the  special  wagons  pertaining  to  those 
organizations. 

2d.  Four  days'  rations  are  carried  by  the  administra- 
tive trains;  these  trains  are  distributed  in  groups  correspond 
ing  to  each  division  of  the  army  corps  or  to  troops  not  in- 
cluded in  any  division;  there  is  thus  in  the  army  corps  an 
administrative  train  for  each  division  and  an  administrative 
train  for  the  headquarters;  each  train  is  furthermore  divided 
into  four  sections,  each  representing  one  day's  rations. 

3d.  The  four  other  days'  rations  are  carried  in  the 
auxiliary  train,  which  is  not  split  up  like  the  general  train 
into  groups  corresponding  with  the  divisions  and  head- 
quarters, but  forms  one  group  for  the  whole  army  corps;  it  is 
only  divided  into  four  sections,  each  having  one  day's 
rations. 

We  shall  see  shortly  that  these  divisions  result  ration- 
ally from  the  role  assigned  to  each  of  these  trains  in  main- 
taining the  supply  of  rations. 

With  regard  to  the  names  that  have  been  adopted,  ex- 
cept as  concerns  the  regimental  trains,  they  answer  to 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army.  103 

nothing  based  either  upon  fact  or  logic;  but  they  are  well 
established  by  long  usage,  and  it  would  be  going  too  far  in 
the  love  for  logic  and  symmetry  to  wish  to  change  them, 

///.     2d  Method:     The  Continued  Supply  by  Means  of  Trains 

Forming  an  Integral  Part  of  the  Columns  and 

Permanently  Attached  Thereto. 

The  second  method  of  maintaining  the  supply  consists 
in  sending  for  the  rations  to  the  depots,  where  they  have 
been  collected,  by  the  special  army  trains.  We  will  first 
look  into  this  method  by  itself  and  then  in  combination  with 
other  means. 

Periods  during  Which  the  Command  is  Stationary. — If  the 
army  is  stationary  at  A,  let  M  represent  the  depots  of  sup- 
plies, the  transportation  between  the  two  points  will  be 
easy  to  organize.  The  supply-train  leaving  A  goes  for  new 
supplies  to  M,  and,  returning  to  A,  unloads  there  the  goods 
with  which  it  was  loaded,  then  returns  to  the  depot,  and  so 
on.  If  the  trip  from  A  to  M  and  return  could  be  made  on 
the  same  day,  one  train  only  would  suffice  to  keep  up  a 
supply.  If  this  trip,  going  and  coming,  should  require  two 
days,  there  would  be  necessary,  in  order  that  the  rationing 
of  the  army  be  continuous,  two  trains.  Three  will  be  requi- 
site if  the  distance  A  M  requires  three  days  for  the  round 
trip,  and  so  on.  The  distance  at  which  one  can  keep  up  the 
supply  depends,  therefore,  upon  the  number  of  trains  that 
are  available.  By  this  expression  we  understand  wagon- 
trains  capable  of  carrying  one  day's  supplies  for  the  entire 
command.  If  one  wished,  therefore,  to  employ  for  the  con- 
tinued supply  of  this  kind  the  ten  trains  (regimental  trains, 
administrative  and  auxiliary)  which  are  attached  to  an  army 
corps,  it  would  be  possible,  without  forced  marches,  to  se- 
cure a  supply  for  five  days'  march  of  the  army. 


104  Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 


&Y////////////A 


Let  it  be  noted  that  this  might  be  done  in  two  ways:  to 
send  each  one  of  the  trains,  after  unloading  at  A,  either  a 
section  of  the  regimental,  administrative,  or  auxiliary  trains 
back  to  M  to  be  reloaded,  requiring  it  to  make  the  entire 
trip  from  A  to  M  and  from  M  to  A,  so  that  each  should 
resume,  at  the  expiration  of  ten  days,  contact  with  the  army; 
or  to  make  use  of  the  different  echelons  of  the  trains  in 
organizing  relays,  and  thus  to  secure  the  transportation  of 
supplies  from  M  to  A  by  transferring  them  from  one  train 
to  the  other;  the  work  of  regimental  trains  would  b<j  limited 
to  the  distance  A  H,  one  day's  march,  the  wTork  of  the  ad- 
ministrative trains  to  the  distance  H  J,  of  twro  days'  march, 
and  that  of  the  auxiliary  trains  to  the  distance  J  M.  also 
of  two  days'  march.  It  is  evident  that  this  second  anavige- 
ment  (preferable  because  of  its  greater  uniformity  and  that 
the  normal  position  of  the  trains  is  not  changed)  requires 
the  same  number  of  trains  as  the  first  in  order  to  obtain  a 
continued  supply  of  rations  at  A. 

Although  the  continued  supply  can  thus  be  maintained 
theoretically  at  a  distance  of  five  marches,  in  practice  this 
limit  is  lowered  to  four  only;  the  round  trips  are  organized 
in  a  slightly  different  way:  the  regimental  trains  go  back 
and  forth  between  the  army  and  the  station  of  the  admin- 
istrative trains  to  half  a  march  in  rear;  the  administrative 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 


105 


trains  between  the  points  H  and  I  situated  one  and  one-half 
days'  march  in  rear  of  the  place  where  the  auxiliary  trains 
are  stationed;  and  these  latter  go  back  and  forth  between 
the  point  I  and  the  depot  two  marches  further  in  rear. 


H 


M 


Distance  to  be  covered 
by  the  regimental  trains. 


Distance  to  be  cov- 
ered by  the  admin- 
strative  trains. 


Distance  to  be  cov- 
ered by  the  auxil- 
iary trains. 


FIG.  18 


Length  of  the  Marches;  General  Theory  of  the  Maintenance 
of  Supply  hy  Trains. — When  the  army,  instead  of  being 
stationary  at  A,  changes  its  position,  its  distance  from  the 
de~pot  of  supplies  would  augment  each  day,  and  it  would 
soon  exceed  the  limit  to  which  the  supply  would  be  possible. 
It  is  necessary,  therefore,  that  this  depot  (or,  to  be  more 
explicit,  that  the  furthest  point  at  which  the  teams  pertain- 
ing to  the  army  could  come  for  supplies)  should  change  with 
the  army.  If  the  trains  could  not,  each  day,  cover  a  greater 
distance  than  the  column,  they  could  evidently  not  be  left 
in  rear,  nor,  from  the  same  course  of  reasoning,  could  they 


J06 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 


be  sent  at  a  greater  distance  for  supplies,  because  they 
would  no  longer  be  able  to  rejoin  the  column.  But,  happily, 
the  distance  marched  by  the  trains  can  be  made  greater  than 
that  covered  by  the  troops.  If  it  is  conceded  that  it  will 
be  thus  possible  for  a  wagon-train  to  cover  one  and  one-half 
days'  march  each  day,  the  train  can  make  three  marches  in 
two  days.  Under  these  conditions,  if  a  train  makes  a  first 
delivery  of  supplies  to  the  column  at  A  the  first  day  (see 
figure  below,  No.  19,  in  which  A  B  C  D  are  the  successive 


2d  Day  3d  Daj 

FIG.  19 

positions  occupied  by  the  column),  one  can  check  during  all 
of  the  second  day  the  forward  movement  of  the  train,  and 
this  train,  starting  the  third  day,  will  still  be  able  to  rejoin 
the  column  at  D  to  make  a  second  issue  for  the  fourth  day. 
The  second  day,  during  which  the  movement  of  the  train 
has  been  interrupted,  can  be  used  either  to  resupply  from 
the  country  in  the  manner  described  in  Chapter  III.,  or  to 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army.  107 

take  the  train  back  to  a  depot  as  at  M,  where  it  can  be 
reloaded.  This  point  M  will  not  in  general  be  an  actual 
depot  of  supplies,  but  simply  the  point  at  which  specially 
organized  trains  fetching  up  supplies  from  the  rear  may 
arrive.  Wherever  the  point  M  may  be,  one  can  see  that  it 
cannot  be  more  than  half  a  day's  march  from  A  in  order 
that  the  train  can  return  the  end  of  the  second  day  to  A  and 
start  out  again  the  third,  as  it  is  necessary  that  it  should 
reach  D  on  the  fourth  day. 

Each  train  resuming  contact  with  the  column  every 
three  days,  it  follows  from  the  foregoing  analysis  that  one 
might  establish  the  continuity  of  supply  under  those  con- 
ditions by  employing  but  three  trains;  and,  in  that  case, 
the  reloading  of  the  train  which  has  made  distribution,  at 
some  point  as  A,  would  take  place  at  only  half  a  day's 
march,  or  two-thirds  of  a  day's  march  at  the  farthest,  in 
rear  of  that  point. 

One  might,  in  place  of  one  day  only,  defer  for  two  days 
the  starting  of  the  train  whose  load  has  just  been  discharged 
at  A;  and  thus  have  this  train  not  return  until  the  fourth 
day;  by  forcing  the  marches  and  completing  one  and  one- 
half  days'  journey  each  day,  this  train  could  cover  six  days' 
march  in  four  days — for  instance,  the  fourth,  fifth,  sixth, 
and  seventh;  and  would  consequently  reach,  the  seventh 
day,  the  column,  which  would  itself  have  at  that  time  made 
six  marches  beyond  A.  The  halt  of  two  days  in  advance  of 
this  train  would  permit  its  being  sent  to  the  rear,  for  a  new 
load,  one  or  one  and  one-half  marches  from  A.  The  service, 
In  order  to  be  continuously  established,  would  require  six 
trains. 

With  nine  trains  it  would  be  possible  to  establish  the 
point  for  the  resupply  of  the  train  at  two  days'  march  in 
rear,  and  so  on. 


108  Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 

This  demonstration  shows  that  in  order  to  carry  farther 
to  the  rear  by  half  or  two-thirds  of  a  march  the  point  where 
the  train  emptied  at  A  will  go  to  reload,  it  will  be  necessary 
to  have  three  additional  trains;  that  is  too  much  in  order  to 
gain  so  very  small  an  advantage.  Furthermore,  in  actual 
practice  it  would  not  be  possible  to  distribute  thus  the  trains 
pertaining  to  the  army  over  so  great  a  depth ;  therefore,  the 
limit  of  half  a  march  to  the  rear  is  set  as  that  which  can  be 
made  by  the  train,  as  it  is  represented  in  the  diagram  given 
below,  and  the  zone  within  which  the  trains  pertaining  par- 
ticularly to  the  army  operate  is  thus  limited  to  two  or  at 
most  two  and  one-half  days'  march. 

One  can  well  see  therein  the  movements  of  the  auxiliary 
trains  wrhich  are  indicated  in  the  Regulations  of  November 
20,  1889,  to  insure  the  continuous  supply  of  rations,  and  the 
notes  which  precede  have  had  no  other  object  than  to  demon- 
strate that  these  methods  are  the  necessary  and  logical  con- 
sequences of  the  conditions  required  by  the  problem. 

The  conclusions  which  we  have  reached,  that  the  con- 
stant relation  of  a  column  with  its  depot  of  supplies  (or,  to 
be  more  exact,  the  point  of  delivery  of  the  trains  from  the 
rear)  may  be  established  with  three  trains  only,  seems  a 
contradiction  of  the  Regulations,  which,  to  accomplish  the 
same  object,  put  in  operation  eight  trains;  for  instance,  twTo 
sections  of  the  regimental  trains,  twTo  sections  of  the  admin- 
istrative trains,  and  four  sections  of  the  auxiliary  trains. 

Following  our  course  of  reasoning,  explained  visually 
by  the  diagram  wThich  follows,  it  w7ould  appear,  on  the  con- 
trary, that  the  supply  can  be  kept  up  with  three  trains; 
three  sections  only  of  the  auxiliary  trains,  for  instance. 

But  to  carry  into  effect  this  arrangement  without  call- 
ing in  either  the  administrative  trains  or  the  regimental 
trains,  it  would  be  necessary  that  this  supply-train  should 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 


109 


itself  deliver  the  rations  within  the  cantonments  of  each 
regiment.  This  journey,  or,  at  any  rate,  this  prolongation 
of  the  march  to  the  cantonments,  coming  on  top  of  the  day's 
march,  would  exceed  the  powers  of  a  single  train.  One  is 
therefore  compelled  to  aid  in  some  way  the  maintenance 


1st  Day 


«D 


2d   Day 


-*D 


FIG.  20 


1st  Day 


2d  j  Day 


3d  ,  Day 


2 

Q- 


Jf 


! 


U- 


FIG.  21 

Cantonments  of  the  column. 
A  section  of  the  administrative  train. 
Second  section  of  that  train. 
March  of  the  administrative  train. 
March  of  the  auxiliary  train. 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army.  Ill 

of  supplies  by  the  use  of  the  administrative  and  regimental 
trains.  The  administrative  train,  formed  in  three  sections 
corresponding  to  the  grand  divisions  of  the  army  corps,  pro- 
longs the  supply-train  up  to  the  zones  of  the  cantonments 
of  each  of  these  grand  units.  The  distribution  of  sup- 
plies is  further  accomplished  by  the  regimental  trains, 
which  diverge  from  the  centers  to  the  cantonments  of  each 
regiment. 

It  would  then  be  possible  under  these  principles  to  effect 
the  daily  distribution  of  supplies  in  the  following  manner: 
Rations  coming  up  from  the  rear  would,  each  day,  be  carried 
by  a  section  of  the  auxiliary  train  (constituting,  to  be  accu- 
rate, a  veritable  supply-train)  up  to  some  central  point,  when 
they  would  be  received  by  the  administrative  train.  The 
three  groups  of  that  train  would  proceed  respectively  to  the 
three  centers  of  distribution  at  C,  C',  and  C"  assigned  to 
each  of  the  grand  divisions  of  the  army  corps;  finally,  the 
supplies  would  be  carried  from  the  points  C,  C',  and  C"  to 
the  cantonments  by  the  regimental  trains.  The  next  day 
one  could  begin  anew  with  the  supplies  brought  up  by 
another  section  of  the  auxiliary  train,  and,  if  necessary,  the 
same  section  of  the  regimental  and  of  the  administrative 
train  would  suffice,  as  can  be  seen,  without  further  explana- 
tion, by  an  examination  of  Figure  20. 

But,  if  one  operated  in  this  manner,  the  resupply  each 
day  would  depend  upon  the  arrival  of  the  supply-train,  and 
in  case  of  any  delay  in  its  march  the  daily  issue  would  be 
jeopardized.  Tn  order  to  allow  some  play,  the  two  sections 
of  the  regimental  trains  and  the  two  sections  of  the  admin- 
istrative train  must  intervene;  each  section,  instead  of  dis- 
tributing its  supplies  on  the  same  day  that  they  were  re- 
ceived from  the  next  train  in  rear,  would  not  distribute 
them  until  the  morrow.  Each  section  having  thus  been 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 

loaded  on  the  day  preceding  that  on  which  it  is  to  make  a 
distribution,  the  uncertainty  which  a  delay  in  the  arrival  of 
the  main  supply-train  is  guarded  against.  We  are  thus  led, 
by  the  force  of  circumstances,  and  of  necessity  even,  to 
follow  the  arrangements  prescribed  by  the  Regulations  for 
the  maintenance  of  supplies  and  the  functions  of  the  various 
trains.  Figure  21,  which  does  not  differ  from  Plate  I.  of  the 
Regulations  of  November  20,  1889,  represents  how  this  is 
worked.  In  comparing  it  with  the  preceding  figure,  it  will 
likewise  be  noted  that  there  is  no  material  difference  be- 
tween them,  except  that  in  the  second  an  interval  of  twenty- 
four  hours  has  been  made  between  the  operation  of  receiving 
a  load  by  each  section  in  rear  and  the  issue  of  this  load  to 
the  section  in  front  or  to  the  troops. 

An  examination  of  the  two  figures  will  demonstrate  it 
sufficiently  without  the  necessity  of  further  explanations. 

Critical  Examination  of  the  Theoretical  Arrangement;  Prac- 
tical Conclusions. — This  tedious  analysis  would  be  useless 
were  it  not  that  we  draw  from  it  some  practical  conclusions 
and  some  useful  information  which  it  will  be  our  duty  to 
disclose. 

1st.  The  foregoing  discussion  has  shown  us  that  it  is 
the  auxiliary  trains  which  are,  properly  speaking,  the  true 
supply-trains,  maintaining  a  constant  communication  be- 
tween the  army  and  the  trains  pushed  up  from  the  rear  to 
meet  the  army.  In  an  emergency  three  sections  of  that 
train  would  suffice  to  secure  this  connection,  but  since  in 
everything  we  must  provide  a  reserve,  the  number  of  four 
sections  is  logically  justified. 

The  administrative  and  regimental  trains  are  only  ex 
tensions  in  like  manner  of  the  preceding,  wThich  theoretically 
could  not  be  brought  into  play,  but  are  nevertheless  useful 
and  even  necessary  to  effect  the  distribution  of  the  rations 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  on  Army.  113 

within  the  cantonments.  Two  sections  of  each  are  necessary 
to  avoid  accidents,  to  prepare  against  unforeseen  delays, 
and  furthermore  to  give  some  relief  to  the  teams. 

This  determination  of  the  true  role  for  each  train  is  of 
importance,  because  it  indicates  those  features  in  the  role 
of  these  trains  which  are  necessary  and  those  that  are  mere- 
ly a  matter  of  regulation  and  order.  It  shows  to  us  how,  in 
rlie  event  of  the  loss  or  capture  of  a  certain  number  of 
trains,  it  would  nevertheless  be  possible  to  keep  up  the 
service1  with  a  lesser  number  of  units  than  that  of  the  normal 
arrangement. 

This  contingent  character,  that  the  foregoing  theory 
assigns  to  the  role  of  regimental  and  administrative  trains, 
is  particularly  marked  as  regards  the  latter.  If  it  is  not 
possible  to  cause  the  auxiliary  trains  to  come  up  to  the 
cantonments,  and  if  it  is  necessary  to  continue  the  trans- 
portation in  order  to  complete  the  distribution  of  the  sup 
plies  to  the  troops,  it  is  not  absolutely  necessary  to  employ 
at  the  same  time  the  administrative  trains  and  the  regi- 
mental trains,  and  these  latter  would,  in  an  emergency,  suf- 
fice. One  could  easily,  if  compelled,  establish  a  direct  con- 
tact between  the  auxiliary  and  the  regimental  trains,  and 
that  without  making  any  essential  changes  in  the  arrange- 
ment. This  results  from  all  that  we  have  said,  and  is 
clearly  apparent  to  the  eye  by  inspecting  Plate  I.  of  the 
Regulations  of  November  20,  1889,  and  also  Plate  II.  hereto 
annexed,  where  the  same  arrangement  is  graphically  repre- 
sented. It  is  possible  on  these  two  plates  to  entirely  omit 
the  administrative  train,  without  changing  anything  else. 
Figure  No.  22,  which  reproduces  from  Plate  I.  of  the  Regu- 
lations of  November  20,  1880,  the  movements  for  the  third 
and  fourth  days,  shows  this  clearly.  If  one  bars  out  all 
which  relates  to  the  administrative  train,  one  sees  that  on 


114  Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 

the  third  day,  for  instance,  it  would  suffice  to  assure  the 
movement  that  the  first  section  of  the  regimental  train 
should  receive  its  load  from  the  first  section  of  the  auxiliary 
train,  which  is  possible,  since  they  can  meet  at  A;  the  follow- 
ing day  it  would  again  suffice  to  reload  the  second  section 
from  the  auxiliary  train  at  B,  where  these  two  sections 
would  be  on  the  same  day.  It  will  consequently  be  sufficient 
for  that  purpose  to  regulate  the  hour  of  arrival  of  the  auxil- 
iary train,  and  so  on. 

By  acting  in  this  manner,  the  four  sections  of  the  ad- 
ministrative train  would  be  given  the  character  of  a  mov- 
able d£pot,  which  in  the  normal  arrangement  is  that  of  the 
two  reserve  sections  only. 

This  modification  of  the  normal  order  can  be  accom- 
plished without  any  modification  in  the  organization,  at  the 
wish  of  the  commander,  and  by  a  simple  arrangement  of  the 
order.  It  seemed  to  me  useful  to  point  out  the  possibility 
of  this  arrangement,  although  during  the  remainder  of  these 
notes  we  shall  adhere  to  the  arrangement  of  the  Regulations. 

This  modified  arrangement  may,  however,  be  made 
necessary  by  circumstances,  and  we  find  one  instance  in  the 
grand  maneuvers,  during  which  reasons  of  economy  do  not 
permit  the  organizing  of  administrative  trains;  it  is  in 
reality  the  arrangement  provided  for  in  Article  51  of  the 
Regulations  of  April  12,  1892,  relative  to  the  execution  of 
the  autumn  maneuvers.  In  accordance  with  the  require- 
ments of  these  regulations,  the  sections  of  the  regimental 
trains  receive  their  supplies  from  the  advance  depots,  either 
directly,  when  the  distance  permits  it,  or  through  the  inter- 
vention of  supply-trains  taking  the  place  of  the  auxiliary 
trains  and  filling  their  roles. 

2d.  It  is  of  interest  to  examine  whether  the  organiza- 
tion of  the  various  trains  corresponds  well  to  the  roles  the 


\  v\  \\-\\ 

mm 

1      X    4 


2          1 


2134 


^  i 

\A-\-V  '    I 


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423 
2d   Day 


3d    Day 


4th   Day 


FIG.  22 

0    •    £  Sections    regimental  train,  empty,  loaded, 

^^  and  when  reloaded. 

'-^    Q  OH  Sections  administrative  train,  empty,  load- 

_  ed,  and  when  reloaded. 

/\  ^  /\  Sections  auxiliary  train,  empty,  loaded,  and 

when  reloaded. 

rL.  Requisition  train. 


116  Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 

foregoing  arrangement  assigns  to  them  in  the  maintenance 
of  supplies. 

The  auxiliary  train,  which  has  so  important  a  role  and 
which  constitutes  the  real  supply-train,  is,  however,  not  so 
well  organized  as  the  others,  since  it  is  formed  in  large  part 
by  wagons  obtained  by  requisitions  united  as  necessity  re- 
quires. But  it  would  be  well  to  observe  that  this  train  will 
generally  be  required  to  move  only  on  the  main  line  of 
march,  which  without  doubt  will  be  a  wide  and  good  road; 
this  train  never  is  dispersed  throughout  the  various  bodies 
of  the  troops.  For  these  reasons,  it  is  not  essential  that  it 
should  be  so  well  equipped  as  the  others. 

The  administrative  trains  have  to  proceed  from  the 
point  designated  for  meeting  the  auxiliary  trains  up  to  the 
centers  of  distribution  designated  for  the  units  to  which 
they  belong.  These  centers  are  within  the  limits  of  the 
cantonments  of  these  units;  these  trains  spreading  out 
among  the  troops  need  a  better  organization  and  should  be 
under  military  control.  The  dividing  of  this  train  into 
divisional,  or  headquarter,  groups  corresponds  well  to  its 
destination.  It  is  to  be  presumed,  furthermore,  that  it  will 
always  be  practicable  for  these  trains  to  operate,  if  not  on 
some  highway,  at  any  rate  on  some  adjoining  roads,  and  that 
there  will  always  be  a  good  road  to  connect  the  general  line 
of  march  with  the  zones  of  the  cantonments. 

But  the  regimental  trains  which  must  reach  the  very 
cantonments  of  the  different  regiments  will  undoubtedly 
often  be  compelled  to  proceed  over  difficult  cross  roads.  It 
may  be  asked  if  the  heavy  two- wheeled  wagon  used  for  the 
transportation  of  supplies  by  the  regimental  trains  answers 
well  under  the  desired  conditions.  Would  it  not  be  prefer- 
able to  replace  it  by  a  light  wagon  able  to  go  everywhere? 
The  regimental  baggage-wagon  being  of  the  same  model  as 


Notes  on  tlie  Supply  of  an  Army.  117 

that  of  the  administrative  train,  the  renewal  of  supplies  can 
be  effected  by  an  exchange  of  wagons.  It  is  doubtless  an 
advantage,  but  one  which  perhaps  does  not  compensate  for 
the  disadvantage  of  not  being  able  to  follow  the  regiment 
over  every  road. 

Application  to  the  Principal  Column  Formations. 

Column,  Consisting  of  an  Army  Corps,  Cantoned  iti  a 
Spare  Wl/nse  Depth  is  Equal  to  Half  the  Length  of  the  Marching 
Column. — Plate  I.,  annexed  to  the  Regulations  of  November 
20,  1889,  gives  a  very  clear  representation  of  the  required 
arrangement  for  the  maintenance  of  supplies,  of  the  dis- 
tribution of  the  trains  and  their  relations  to  one  another, 
but  it  does  not  permit,  as  would  a  graphical  representation, 
of  taking  note  of  the  conditions  of  time  in  which  the  move- 
ments are  executed,  or  the  arrangements  to  be  made  to 
establish  contact  betwreen  the  Echelons  without  checks  or 
delays  at  crossings;  and  finally,  as  no  note  has  been  taken 
of  the  depth  of  the  cantonments,  certain  details  which  result 
from  the  extent  of  the  same  will  not  be  apparent.  To  fill 
up  this  gap  we  have  represented  the  same  arrangement  of 
the  Regulations  in  a  graphic  form  in  Plate  II.,  hereto  an- 
nexed, the  study  of  which  will  throw  light  upon  certain 
arrangements  of  practical  utility. 

Graphical  representation  No.  1  is  applicable  to  an  army 
corps  marching  upon  a  single  road,  in  the  formation  which 
is  the  diagram  of  marching  order  No.  1  from  the  staff  aide- 
mi  moire.  Conforming  to  the  positions  indicated  in  Chapter 
I.,  we  assume  that  tjie  advance  guard  camps  8  kilometres 
in  advance  of  the  main  body,  and  that  the  cantonments  of 
the  latter  are  echeloned  upon  a  depth  of  10  kilometres  (vide 
page  24)  in  the  order  in  which  it  marched.  We  will  assume 
also  that  the  length  of  the  first  day's  march  is  32  kilometres, 


118  Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 

which,  from  the  principles  recalled  in  that  same  chapter 
(page  27)  is  the  maximum  day's  march  which  can  normally 
be  made  under  such  conditions.  For  the  following  marches 
we  have  assumed  a  shorter  distance,  in  order  to  be  able  to 
vary  the  conditions  for  applying  the  arrangement. 

We  will  further  assume  that  the  movement  begins  at 
5  a.  m.,  and  that  the  regimental  trains  will  be  able  to  reach 
the  cantonments  at  about  4  p.  m.  for  the  head  of  the  column 
and  about  6  p.  m.  for  the  rear,  the  others  at  hours  inter- 
mediate between  these  given;  following  the  general  rule, 
w7e  suppose  that  the  issue  is  made  each  evening  by  drawing 
upon  one  of  the  sections  of  the  regimental  train,  and  that 
this  section  must  at  once  return  to  the  designated  center  of 
supply,  where  it  must  receive  a  new  load  from  the  section 
of  the  administrative  train.  Depending  upon  the  season 
and  upon  circumstances,  the  reloading  of  the  regimental 
train  may  be  accomplished  on  the  same  evening,  or  else  it 
will  have  to  be  delayed  until  the  following  morning.  In 
order  to  resupply  the  regimental  train  from  the  designated 
section  of  the  administrative  train  and  to  cause  this  train 
to  arrive  at  the  center  of  distribution,  one  can  proceed  in 
several  ways;  each  offers  its  advantages  and  its  inconven- 
iences. These  various  ways,  choice  between  which  must 
be  made  according  to  circumstances,  are  as  follows: 

1st.  The  section  of  the  administrative  train  designated 
for  the  renewal  of  supply  can  be  started  so  that  it  will  reach 
the  center  of  distribution  on  the  same  evening;  its  load  is 
there  transferred  to  the  regimental  trains,  either  at  once  or 
the  following  morning.  It  is  this  method  which,  in  the 
drawing  No.  1,  is  represented  for  the  supply  on  the  second 
day.  The  supply  section  is  started  so  that  it  can  reach, 
as  soon  as  possible,  the  rear  of  the  column;  as  soon,  be  it 
understood,  as  the  military  considerations  will  permit.  It 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army.  119 

can  be  seen  from  the  drawing  that  in  starting  this  section 
(which  is  supposed  to  be  camped  12  kilometres  in  rear)  at 
9  o'clock,  it  will  follow  immediately  in  rear  of  the  column, 
and  that  thus  it  would  arrive  in  the  evening  about  8  o'clock. 
In  order  that  it  should  reach  that  same  evening  the  cen- 
ters of  distribution,  the  section  of  the  administrative  train 
should  make  a  march  which  is  equal,  in  the  case  of  the  train 
belonging  to  the  leading  division,  to  the  sum  of  the  three 
following  factors: 

The  day's  march, 

The  depth  of  the  cantonments, 

The  distance  which  the  train  was  from  the  tear  of 

the  cantonments. 

Under  the  conditions  assumed  in  the  drawing,  the  day's 
march  being  30  kilometres,  the  depth  10  kilometres,  and  the 
distance  of  the  train  12  kilometres,  the  march  to  be  required 
of  the  train  would  be  52  kilometres;  this  is  a  considerable 
effort,  particularly  if  it  is  to  be  repeated  every  two  days, 
which  the  continuity  of  the  movement  would  exact.  With- 
out doubt,  the  day  following  this  great  effort  that  section 
of  the  train  has  only  to  make  a  very  short  march,  and,  on 
the  whole,  the  total  effect  is  equal  to  one  moderate  march 
per  day;  but,  from  the  question  of  economy  of  forces,  it  is 
not  the  same  thing  to  cover  a  certain  distance  by  regular 
marches  or  to  make  it  by  alternating  excessively  long  ones 
with  very  short  marches. 

2d.  To  avoid  this  inconvenience,  it  can  be  arranged 
that  the  supply-train  is  to  arrive  at  the  centers  of  distribu- 
tion only  the  following  morning  for  this  purpose;  it  is  halted 
the  evening  before  at  the  proper  distance,  having  made  on 
that  day  a  march  only  equal  to  that  made  by  the  column 
itself.  The  following  morning  this  section  reaches  the 
center  of  distribution  and  replenishes  the  regimental  train; 


120  Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 

the  evening  of  the  second  day  it  proceeds  to  its  new  canton- 
ment, and  has  again  made,  on  this  day,  but  in  two  stages,  a 
day's  march.  It  is  in  this  manner  that  it  is  represented  on 
the  drawing,  for  the  third  and  fourth  days,  the  march  of 
section  No.  2  of  the  administrative  train  charged  with  the 
duty  of  replenishing,  on  the  morning  of  the  fourth  day,  the 
section  of  the  regimental  train  emptied  by  the  issue  of  the 
third  day.  By  this  method,  in  order  that  the  movement 
of  the  train  should  not  interfere  with  the  formation  of  the 
column,  it  is  necessary  that  the  train  should  reach  the 
centers  of  distribution  very  early  in  the  morning;  in  fact,  as 
soon  as  the  column  begins  to  form,  the  roads  are  no  longer 
free  within  the  limits  of  the  cantonments,  and  the  trains 
could  no  longer  ply  over  them.  The  drawing  shows  that, 
in  order  to  satisfy  these  conditions,  it  will  be  necessary  to 
have  the  administrative  train  start  about  1  or  2  a.  in. 

3d.  The  necessity  for  causing  the  train  to  start  so  early 
would  be  avoided  by  not  having  it  penetrate  within  the  /one 
of  cantonments  until  after  the  departure  of  the  troops,  as 
we  have  represented  it  on  the  fifth  day  for  section  No.  1, 
detailed  to  resupply  the  section  of  the  regimental  train 
which  has  been  emptied  by  the  issues  on  the  fourth  day.  By 
this  method  the  section  of  the  regimental  train,  with  its 
new  load,  can  start  only  after  the  arrival  of  the  administra 
tive  train.  This  section  of  the  regimental  train  can  there- 
fore no  longer  take  its  normal  place  in  the  column:  it  will 
have  to  be  formed  into  a  distinct  group,  which  will  not 
reach  its  destination  until  later  in  the  evening.  This  offers 
but  few  objections;  the  issue  of  the  evening  of  the  fifth  day 
is,  in  point  of  fact,  assured  by  the  other  section  of  the  regi- 
mental train,  which  can  start  at  the  usual  hour  and  can  as 
usual  arrive  for  that  issue. 

4th.      The   difficulties   indicated   for   carrying    out   the- 


Notes  on  Hie  Supply  of  an  Army.  121 

three  preceding  methods  of  establishing  contact  between  the 
trains  relate  to  the  necessity  of  causing  the  administrative 
train  to  penetrate  within  the  zone  of  cantonments;  they 
would  be  avoided,  therefore,  if  a  point  outside  of  that  zone 
could  be  chosen  for  the  contact  of  the  regimental  train  with 
the  administrative  train.  If  the  cantonments,  instead  of 
being  arranged  in  column,  were  formed  in  line,  this  condition 
would  be  attained  by  fixing  the  point  of  contact  in  rear  of 
the  cantonment.  One  could  then,  without  being  annoyed 
by  the  movement  of  the  troops,  proceed  with  the  work  of  re- 
supply,  having  the  entire  morning  available  for  this  duty, 
up  to  the  hour  when  the  regimental  train  should  take  its 
place  in  the  column.  But  if  this  method  was  adopted  when 
the  cantonment  was  made  in  column,  the  regimental  trains 
of  the  leading  subdivisions  would  be  compelled,  in  order  to 
reach  the  point  of  contact,  selected  at  the  rear  of  the  zone 
of  cantonments,  to  travel  the  entire  length  of  this  zone. 
This  operation  for  these  trains  would  make  an  additional 
march  of  twice  the  length  of  the  column,  added  to  the  day's 
march  of  from  20  to  24  kilometres;  this  is  too  great  an  effort, 
and  one  which  renders  hardly  practicable  this  method  of 
operation  in  the  case  of  a  cantonment  in  column. 

But  in  such  cases  one  will  be  able,  if  the  ground  will 
permit,  to  obtain  the  same  result  by  choosing  the  point  of 
contact  between  the  regimental  and  administrative  trains 
upon  one  of  the  flanks  outside  of  the  cantonments.  It  will 
b(-  necessary,  to  operate  in  this  manner,  to  have  a  lateral 
road,  not  used  by  the  columns,  and  over  which  the  admin- 
istrative trains  can  reach  the  points  of  contact  so  chosen. 

Such  are  the  principal  means  to  be  employed  in  order 
to  maintain  the  supply  of  the  regimental  train  by  the  ad- 
ministrative train. 

Adopting  the  method  that  we  have  already  employed 


122  Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 

in  Chapter  I.  and  in  Plate  I.,  of  giving  an  example  along  with 
the  geometrical  types  in  order  to  show  how  these  should 
be  modified  according  to  circumstances,  we  are  going  to 
apply  these  various  methods  to  a  stated  situation.  We  will 
take  that  one  to  which  the  cantonments  represented  in  Fig. 
li  of  Plate  No.  I.  relate. 

The  hypothesis  is  as  follows: 

May  31st  the  army  corps  is  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
Meuse;  it  is  broken  to  the  rear,  to  the  right,  and  to  the  left. 
June  1st  it  crosses  the  Meuse,  forms  in  one  column,  and 
follows  the  road  Pont-sur-Meuse — Gironville — Broussey— 
Beaumont — Manonville.  The  evening  of  the  1st  it  occupies 
the  cantonments  indicated  in  the  above  figure.  June  2d  it 
continues  its  march  in  the  same  formation  on  the  road 
Manonville — Dieulouard. 

June  1st,  after  reaching  cantonments,  the  issue  of  sup- 
plies is  secured  by  drawing  upon  the  regimental  trains.     The 
sections  of  the  regimental  trains  emptied  by  this  issue  will 
be  reloaded  from  the  administrative  trains  at  the  centers 
of  distribution,  which  will  be  as  follows: 
For  the  1st  Division,  Berne'court ; 
For  the  Headquarters,  Ansauville; 
For  the  2d  Division,  Mandres. 

The  operation  of  renewing  the   supplies  of  the  regi- 
mental trains  at  these  points  can,  as  we  have  just  shown,  be 
done  in  several  ways : 
1st;  in  that  case  the  regimental  wagons  that  are  to  be  re- 

1st.  It  can  be  accomplished  during  the  night  of  June 
loaded  proceed,  immediately  after  the  issue,  to  the  points 
above  specified,  receive  from  the  administrative  train  the 
necessary  supplies,  and  without  delay  rejoin  their  respective 
cantonments.  The  section  of  the  administrative  train 
designated  for  the  delivery  of  supplies  marches  with  the 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army.  123 

main  train  as  far  as  Le'rouville,  where  the  latter  is  to  go 
into  camp,  while  the  former  continues  its  march,  and  each 
group  directs  itself  upon  the  center  of  issue  which  has  been 
assigned  for  its  corresponding  unit.  It  will  be  seen  that 
this  section  will  have  to  make,  in  addition  to  the  normal 
march  of  the  main  train,  the  distance  from  Le'rouville  to 
Berne'court — Ansauville — Mandres — that  is,  a  supplement- 
ary march  of  at  least  20  kilometres;  if  the  march  has  been 
long,  it  is  to  be  feared  that  it  will  not  reach  its  destination 
until  very  late. 

2d.  The  renewal  of  the  supplies  can  be  made  only  dur- 
ing the  morning  of  the  2d  of  June.  The  entire  train  in  this 
case  would  camp  at  Le'rouville  the  1st,  and  the  section  desig- 
nated for  making  the  issues  would  not  start  until  very  early 
on  the  2d  in  order  to  reach  the  centers  of  distribution.  If 
it  is  desired  to  complete  the  reloading  of  the  regimental 
train  before  the  hour  at  which  it  should,  normally,  take  its 
place  in  the  column,  it  is  necessary  that  the  administrative 
train  should  arrive  at  least  twyo  hours  in  advance,  so  that 
there  will  be  time  to  transfer  the  loads.  It  would  then  be 
necessary  for  the  administrative  train  to  have  completed  its 
transfer  by  8  o'clock  a.  m.,  at  the  latest,  but  this  would  in 
fact  compel  it  to  pull  out  towards  midnight  in  order  to  have 
it  arrive  at  5  a.  m.  at  the  latest.  The  hours  indicated  on 
Fig.  li  opposite  each  cantonment  are  the  hours  at  which 
the  troops  occupying  them  are  to  pull  out.  The  examina- 
tion of  these  numbers  will  readily  show  that  from  5  a.  m. 
the  roads  are  no  longer  open,  and  if  the  train  had  not  already 
reached  its  destination,  it  would  no  longer  be  able  to  arrive 
at  the  centers  of  distribution  until  after  the  rear  of  the 
column  had  passed  beyond  the  highways  from  Beaumont 
and  from  Berne'court,  which  would  not  be  until  about  10 
a.  m. 


124  Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 

3d.  If  it  is  not  desired  to  cause  the  section  of  supply 
to  start  so  early,  it  could  set  out  only  at  4  a.  in.;  it  would 
arrive  at  Broussey  when  the  troops  which  occupied  that 
cantonment  had  already  left,  and  it  could  follow  in  rear  of 
the  column.  It  could  thus  reach  the  centers  of  distribution 
towards  10  a.  in.  The  sections  of  the  regimental  trains, 
having  reloaded,  could  set  out  between  11:30  a.  in.  and  12 
m.  to  rejoin  their  corps. 

4th.  There  is  no  lateral  road  available  permitting  the 
arrival  of  the  administrative  train  at  the  center  of  distribu- 
tion except  by  following  the  road  upon  which  the  army 
corps  is  moving;  and  therefore,  unless  the  corps  has  passed, 
the  fourth  method  indicated  above  cannot  be  employed  in 
this  case. 

Let  it  be  noted  that  in  the  formation  of  the  halts  in  the 
order  of  march  represented  in  Figure  1-J  of  Plate  I.,  the 
ammunition  sections  and  other  elements  of  the  combat  train 
remain  grouped  at  the  rear,  and  thus  find  themselves  sepa- 
rated by  from  8  to  10  kilometres  from  the  centers  of  dis- 
tribution assigned  to  the  divisions  or  headquarters  to  which 
they  belong.  In  the  method  indicated  above  as  No.  1,  for 
effecting  the  resupply,  the  regimental  trains  of  these  sec- 
tions would  have  to  make  15  to  20  kilometres  in  order  to 
reach  the  place  of  issue  of  their  divisions  and  return.  In 
order  to  avoid  this  inconvenience,  it  will  suffice  if  they  are 
reloaded  from  the  administrative  train,  as  this  train  must 
pass  through  their  cantonments.  If  the  issues  are  to  be 
made  in  accordance  with  method  No.  2  or  3,  this  inconven- 
ience does  not  exist,  since  the  regimental  trains  do  not  have 
to  return  to  their  cantonments  and  the  distance  traveled 
in  order  to  reach  the  centers  of  distribution  is  in  the  direc- 
tion of  the  march. 

The  drawing  of  Plate  IT.  and  the  notes  which  precede 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army.  125 

it  are  applicable  to  the  ordinary  formation  of  an  army  corps 
in  one  column,  with  cantonments  having  a  depth  of  from 
10  to  12  kilometres.  The  operations  will  not  differ  essen- 
tially if  the  formation  is  different,  but  they  may  become  more 
or  less  difficult. 

If,  instead  of  forming  but  one  column,  the  army  corps 
had  two  roads  at  its  disposal,  it  is  evident  that,  each  divi- 
sion being  able  to  form  a  separate  column  and  be  followed 
by  its  own  train,  the  difficulties  of  having  these  two  trains 
come  up  would  be  lessened. 

Application  w  the  Case  of  Two  Army  Corps  Operating  on 
the  Same  Road. — The  reverse  would  happen  if,  on  the  other 
hand,  there  were  two  army  corps  on  the  same  road.  In  that 
case  the  more  usual  formation  is  that  described  in  Chapter 
I.,  and  which  the  following  figure  represents.  If  the  trains 
of  the  two  corps  were  left  at  the  rear  of  the  column,  when 
the  column  makes  the  march  A  B,  the  distance  necessary  for 
the  section  of  the  administrative  train  that  has  been  desig- 
nated for  the  supply  of  the  regimental  trains  to  make, would 
be,  for  the  leading  division,  equal  to  the  following: 

Kilometres. 

The  day's  march,  on  an  average 24 

The  depth  of  the  cantonments  of  the  1st  corps 10 

The  interval  (?")  between  the  two  corps 12 

The  depth  of  the  cantonments  of  the  2d  corps 12 

The  distance  (d)  of  the  train  in  rear  of  the  column 12 

Total 70 

It  w7ould  be  impossible  to  have  the  trains  of  the  leading 
subdivisions  reach  the  centers  of  distribution  during  the 
night.  Would  it  be  possible  to  reduce  the  march  to  be  made 
by  the  supply-train  of  the  1st  corps  by  decreasing  the  dis- 


126  Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 

tance  i  and  J?  The  distance*  i  is  intended  to  facilitate  the 
formation  of  the  column  and  to  decrease  the  time  lost  in 
marching  out;  this  interval  is  calculated  in  such  a  way  that, 
the  2d  corps  setting  out  at  about  the  same  hour  as  the  first, 
its  leading  point  will  reach  the  point  c,  the  rear  of  the  can- 
tonments of  the  1st  corps,  when 'the  left  of  that  corps  will 
be  setting  out,  and  that  thus,  without  delay  or  loss  of  time* 
the  column  is  formed.  This  distance  i  cannot  therefore  be 
reduced  arbitrarily.  The  distance  d  can,  on  the  other  hand, 
be  reduced,  but  it  is  to  be  noted  that  if  it  is  diminished  by 
the  marching  length  of  the  train,  the  hour  of  its  arrival  at 
destination  will  not  for  this  reason  be  advanced,  because 
it  will  not  in  any  event  be  able  to  pass  the  point  F  before 
the  last  of  the  two  army  corps  shall  have  left  the  point. 
From  this  point  of  view  there  is  therefore  no  inconvenience 
in  holding  the  train  to  the  rear  a  distance  (F  G)  equal  to 
the  distance  that  the  train  can  cover  during  the  time  that 
the  rear  corps  is  marching  out.  This  distance  is  about  10 
or  12  kilometres. 

If  under  these  conditions  an  attempt  is  made  to  effect 
the  movement,  as  we  have  done  in  drawing  No.  2  of  Plate 
II.,  it  will  be  seen  how  very  difficult  it  is.  The  supply-train 
of  the  1st  corps  starting  between  8  and  9  a.  m.,  which  would 
enable  it  to  follow  as  close  as  possible  to  the  rear  of  the 
column,  could  not  arrive  before  about  2  o'clock  in  the  night 
at  the  earliest.  But  it  would  not  be  wise  to  require  it  to 
make  so  long  a  trip  without  a  rest;  it  can  be  seen,  and  an 


*"If  the  movement  is  continued  the  next  day  in  the  same  forma- 
tion as  that  of  the  evening,  the  head  of  the  2d  corps,  after  marching 
three  hours,  will  follow  immediately  after  the  rear  of  the  column  formed 
by  the  corps  in  the  first  line.  If  it  was  foreseen,  however,  that  the 
corps  in  the  first  line  will  march  in  double  column,  the  corps  in  the 
second  line  is  closed  up  upon  the  cantonments  of  the  first  to  avoid 
causing  an  interval  in  the  columns."— Maillard,  "  Elements  de  Guerre" 
page  752. 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army.  127 

examination  of  the  drawing  (Fig.  2)  brings  it  out  clearly, 
that  if  it  is  required  that  the  train  shall  have  reached  its 
destination  before  2  o'clock  in  the  morning,  this  rest  could 
not  be  more  than  two  hours,  which,  undoubtedly,  is  insuf- 
ficient. In  the  drawing  No.  2,  Plate  II.,  the  movement,  the 
first  day,  has  been  represented  by  supposing  the  principal 
halt  of  this  train  to  be  made  at  4  p.  m.,  because  thus  it  would 
divide  the  route  into  two  approximately  equal  portions. 
This  arrangement  is  not  essential;  the  halt  for  rest  could 
be  made  later,  when,  for  instance,  the  train  has  passed  the 
cantonments  of  the  2d  corps,  and  consequently  in  the  inter- 
val between  the  cantonments  of  the  two  corps;  this  is  what 
has  been  established  for  the  second  day;  in  one  way  or 
another,  the  arrival  of  the  train  has  thus  been  secured,  but 
the  inconvenience  of  compelling  it  to  make  a  march  of  60  or 
70  kilometres  with  a  halt  of  two  hours  at  most  has  not  been 
avoided.  Furthermore,  this  arrangement  is  impracticable, 
and  we  have  developed  it  only  in  order  to  show  its  incon- 
veniences. The  true  solution  of  the  problem  is  the  arrange- 
ment represented  by  the  drawing  No.  3,  Plate  II.;  it  is,  ap- 
proximately, the  arrangement  indicated  by  General  Schne'e- 
gans.*  It  consists  in  having  each  army  corps  followed  by 
the  two  sections  of  the  administrative  trains  that  have  not 
been  reserved,  and  to  effect  the  supplying  of  each  army  corps 
as  if  it  were  a  separate  corps.  There  is  no  difficulty  for  the 

*"When  two  army  corps  follow  on  the  same  road,  the  supplies 
for  the  leading  one  are  partially  secured  by  means  of  requisitions. 
Should  it  be  otherwise,  the  maintenance  of  supply  will  present  serious 
difficulties,  unless  the  road  be  wide  and  good,  because  in  this  case  the 
two  columns  may  occupy  less  depth  than  the  normal  one.  In  any  case, 
the  1st  corps  will  retain  only  such  portion  of  the  regimental  train  as 
is  indispensable,  the  balance  will  follow  the  2d  corps ;  this  latter  will 
calculate  its  time  of  departure  in  such  a  manner  as  not  to  be  halted  by 
the  rear  of  the  1st  corps;  the  supply  section  for  the  1st  corps  will  pass 
the  2d  corps  during  the  night,  and  will  halt  between  the  cantonments 
of  the  two  corps:  it  is  therefore  necessary  that  it  should  make  a  forced 
march." — Schneegans,  "La  Guerre  raisonnce"  page  234. 


1st   Day 


^ 
^ 


2d   Day 


X 


D> 


4 


tTrains  of  1st  corps. 
^Trains  of  2d  corps. 


FIG.  23 


POSITION  JUNE  IST. 


Dieulouard 


Manonville 


POSITION  JUNE  2o. 


1st  Corps 
Dieulouard  \       i 
Goiscourt  Jl 


Martiu-Court 


r 1  JW'> 

1  Bernecourt  _,  .       *~  .  1     * 

Se  hepreyj  (  RQC 
Beaumont 


!  ls\  Corps 


Gironville 


FIG.  24 


Supply  sections  administrative  train,  1st  corps. 
Supply  sections  administrative  train,  2d  train. 

Reserve  sections  administrative  trains  of  both 
corps,  and  main  body  of  the  other  trains. 

March,  June  2d,  of  administrative  train  .supply 
section  of  1st  corps). 


March  of  the  section  of  the  auxiliary  train  to 
resupply  the  preceding. 


130  Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 

2d  corps;  as  regards  the  1st  corps  the  trains  should  go  into 
camp  in  the  interval  which  separates  the  cantonments  of 
the  two  corps.  The  trains  of  the  1st  corps  set  out  as  soon 
as  the  road  has  been  cleared  by  the  2d  corps — that  is  to  say, 
when  the  rear  of  the  2d  corps  has  passed  the  cantonments 
of  these  trains;  these  then  follow  as  closely  as  possible  on 
the  rear  of  the  2d  corps;  they  pass  during  the  night  the  new 
cantonments  of  the  2d  corps.  The  reserve  section  halts  and 
camps  in  the  interval  between  the  two  corps;  the  section 
carrying  the  day's  supplies  continues  to  the  centers  of  issue, 
which,  under  ordinary  conditions,  it  is  able  to  reach  about 
2  a.  m.  In  point  of  fact,  the  issue  of  supplies  in  the  1st  corps 
is  made  as  if  this  corps  were  not  followed  by  another ;  except 
that,  as  the  trains  cannot  start  until  after  the  passage  of  the 
2d  corps,  they  cannot  reach  the  issue  centers  until  well  into 
the  night,  and  the  reloading  of  the  regimental  trains  will 
necessarily  take  place  in  the  morning. 

We  will  now  give  an  illustration  of  this  arrangement. 
For  this  purpose  we  will  again  take  the  same  hypothesis  as 
above,  but  we  will  assume  that  the  1st  corps,  which  oc- 
cupies, on  June  1st,  the  cantonments  represented  in  Fig. 
1-J,  Plate  I.,  instead  of  being  isolated,  is  followed  on  the 
same  road  by  a  second  army  corps,  camped  June  1st  at  L£- 
rouville.  June  2d  the  two  corps  will  be  assumed  to  set  out 
in  a  single  column;  the  1st  corps  will  go  into  cantonments 
at  Dieulouard,  and  the  2d  corps  will  take  the  same  canton- 
ments which  the  1st  corps  occupied  the  day  previous.  We 
will  only  consider  the  supplying  of  the  1st  corps,  the  ques- 
tion presenting  no  difficulties  in  all  that  concerns  the  2d 
corps.  It  can  readily  be  seen  that  if  the  administrative 
trains  of  both  corps  remained  together  on  the  left,  the  one 
pertaining  to  the  1st  could  not  be  brought  up  within  the 
zone  of  cantonments  of  that  corps  in  time  to  effect  a  dis 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army.  131 

trilmtion  of  supplies;  it  will  therefore  be  necessary  to 
operate  in  the  following  manner:  On  the  night  of  June  1st 
the  two  sections  of  the  administrative  train  of  the  1st  corps 
which  are  not  reserved  camp  at  Gironville;  the  section 
designated  for  the  supply  sets  out  very  early  on  the  morning 
of  the  2d,  reaches  the  centers  of  distribution  established  at 
Berne'court,  Mandres,  and  Ansauville,  and  there  resupplies 
the  regimental  trains;  it  is  formed  then,  and  halts  to  permit 
the  2d  corps  to  pass.  The  section  which  has  remained  at 
Gironville  leaves  there  as  soon  as  the  rear  of  the  2d  corps 
has  passed  beyond  that  point;  the  other  section  also  starts 
as  soon  as  the  road  in  front  of  it  is  free,  and  these  two 
sections  go  into  camp  the  night  of  June  2d  at  Griscourt  be- 
tween the  two  army  corps. 

Application  in  the  Case  of  a  Column  Consisting  of  One  Army 
Corps  in  Cantonment  Equal  in  Depth  to  the  Length  of  the  Column. 
—Analogous  difficulties  would  be  experienced  in  keeping  up 
the  supply  in  the  case  of  an  army  corps  whose  cantonments 
occupy  a  depth  equal  to  that  of  the  marching  column,  say 
20  to  24  kilometres.  When  the  cantonment  is  in  this  forma- 
tion, it  is  for  the  purpose  of  giving  to  the  day's  march  its 
greatest  extent,  say  40  kilometres;  the  section  designated 
for  the  supply,  in  order  to  reach  the  head  of  the  canton- 
ments, would  have  to  make  a  march  of  (40  -f-  24  =)  64  kilo- 
metres at  least,  admitting  that  the  train  follows  immedi- 
ately behind  the  column  without  intervals.  We  have  ob- 
served that  this  difficulty  must  sometimes  compel  us  to 
reduce  the  depth  of  the  cantonments,  but  more  often  the 
difficult}'  will  solve  itself,  since  this  extent  of  the  canton- 
ments w-ill  permit  the  supplies  being  secured  without  having 
recourse  to  the  trains,  and  this  would  be  the  most  advanta- 
geous solution. 

From  the  point  of  view7  which  we  are  now  considering, 


132  Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 

it  is  of  very  small  importance  whether  the  columns  are 
formed  of  troops  from  one,  two,  or  more  army  corps,  as  in 
the  marching  formation  indicated  by  Figure  5  in  Chapter 
I.;  it  is  the  total  strength  of  the  column  which  is  important, 
and  not  the  origin  of  the  troops  which  compose  it.  The 
principal  cases  to  which  we  have  just  applied  the  arrange- 
ment for  resupply — the  following:  columns  of  divisions, 
columns  of  army  corps  cantoning  on  one-half  the  length  of 
the  column  or  on  the  whole  length,  columns  of  two  army 
corps — include  then  all  the  hypotheses  which  it  is  worth 
while  to  consider. 

In  order  to  exhaust  the  subject,  it  is  only  necessary  to 
say  a  few  words  concerning  the  movements  of  the  auxiliary 
train,  and  we  will  do  so  in  the  following  remarks. 

Movements  of  the  Auxiliary  Train  in  the  Different  Types  of 
Formation  of  Columns. — The  general  movements  of  the  auxil- 
iary train  are  not  always  made  over  the  same  roads  as  those 
of  the  columns,  the  regimental  and  administrative  trains. 

The  auxiliary  trains  in  reality  move  upon  the  lines  of 
communication,  which  are  not  identical  with  the  lines  of 
advance  of  the  army  corps,  since  a  line  of  communication 
generally  supplies  several  corps.  The  march  of  the  auxiliary 
trains  then  necessarily  requires  transverse  movements  in 
order  to  pass  from  the  line  of  communication  to  the  points 
where  the  contact  with  the  administrative  trains  should  be 
made.  These  movements  can  be  represented  in  the  follow- 
ing manner:  let  I  and  T  be  the  lines  of  advance  of  corps  A 
and  B,  and  L  the  line  of  communication;  the  auxiliary 
trains  being  formed  by  corps  and  not  subdivided  as  the  ad- 
ministrative trains  are  for  division  or  headquarters,  it  is 
necessary  to  have,  for  the  contact  with  the  auxiliary  train 
with  the  three  administrative  trains  of  the  same  corps,  a 
single  point;  we  will  designate  it  by  C  for  corps  A,  by  C' 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 


133 


o 

< 

^ 

1 

,O 
\ 
\ 

M 

i 

''  ll 

W//////////////////A 
/D 

W//////////////////A 

V 

X 

\1 

^s, 

\ 

/ 

/ 

\ 

/ 

\ 

/        / 

\ 

'     / 

\ 

/    / 

\ 

'  / 

r—  * 

i 

/ 

(-H 

V 

FIG.25 

for  corps  B.  The  auxiliary  trains  in  order  to  reach  these 
{joints  will  first  follow  the  line  of  communication  and  will 
cut  off  from  it  by  making  use  of  the  most  available  cross- 
roads. If  the  same  line  L,  instead  of  only  two  corps,  had 
to  serve  a  greater  number  (D,  E),  the  hauls  across  country  in 


134  Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 

order  to  join  them  would  be  very  great  and  the  advantage  of 
establishing  several  lines  of  communication  for  every  army 
is  seen  from  this,  in  order  to  lessen  the  work  required  of 
the  trains  in  effecting  the  resupply. 

In  order  to  avoid  unnecessary  marches  for  the  admin- 
istrative trains,  it  would  be  natural  to  select  the  point  of 
contract  with  the  auxiliary  train  as  near  the  centers  of  distri- 
bution as  possible,  to  which  places  the  administrative  train 
has  advanced  in  order  to  resupply  the  regimental  trains, 
and  there  will  be  no  difficulty  if  there  is  only  one  army  corps. 

In  the  movement  represented  in  drawing  1  of  Plate  II., 
section  1  of  the  administrative  train  can  without  difficulty 
be  resupplied  at  C  the  third  day.  That  place  was  in  fact 
vacated  by  the  troops  about  noon,  and  nothing  prevents  the 
arrival  of  the  auxiliary  train  there. 

On  the  other  hand,  when  there  are  two  army  corps 
following  each  other  on  the  same  road,  there  will  be  diffi 
culty  in  regulating  the  meeting  of  the  administrative  train 
with  the  auxiliary  train  belonging  to  the  corps  in  the  ad- 
vance. By  examining  drawing  1  or  2  of  Plate  II.,  it  is  seen 
that  it  would  be  difficult  to  resupply  at  C  the  third  day 
section  No.  1  of  the  administrative  train  of  the  1st  corps. 
The  point  C  on  the  third  day  is  in  the  midst  of  the  canton- 
ments of  the  2d  corps.  The  auxiliary  train  cannot  reach 
the  place  until  the  completion  of  the  movement  of  that  corps 
—that  is,  in  the  evening;  the  resupply  of  the  administrative 
train  would  be  made  entirely  too  late  at  night;  besides,  this 
accumulation  of  trains  in  the  zone  of  the  cantonments  will 
cause  great  inconvenience.  We  have,  however,  represented 
the  movement  as  executed  in  that  way,  the  third  day,  in 
drawing  3  of  Plate  II.,  in  order  to  showT  clearly  the  difficulty 
of  arranging  the  march  of  the  auxiliary  train  so  as  to  have 
it  arrive  at  any  time  except  during  the  night.  But  in  order 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army.  135 

to  avoid,  as  much  as  possible,  delaying  the  resupply  of  the 
administrative  train,  it  will  be  necessary,  whenever  possible, 
to  arrange  for  the  junction  of  the  administrative  and  auxil- 
iary trains  outside  the  zone  of  the  cantonments  on  the  flank 
nearest  the  line  of  communications;  so  that  the  auxiliary 
train  being  able  to  reach  the  meeting-place  without  making 
use  of  the  road  which  the  column  does,  it  will  be  possible 
to  have  it  arrive  in  time  to  effect  the  resupply  of  the  ad- 
ministrative train  without  wraiting  until  the  2d  corps  has 
completed  its  movement.  An  example  will  better  explain 
the  working  of  this  operation. 

In  the  example  cited  above  in  the  case  of  a  single  army 
corps,  nothing  will  prevent  establishing  at  Berne'court,  if 
desired,  the  contact  between  the  auxiliary  train  and  the 
section  of  the  administrative  train,  which  made  on  June  1st, 
at  Mandres,  Berne'court,  Ansauville,  the  resupply  of  the  regi- 
mental train.  If  we  suppose  that  the  terminal  station  is  at 
Saint-Mihiel  and  that  the  auxiliary  train  comes  there  by  the 
road  Saint-Mihiel — Apremont — Bouconville,  it  will  be  neces- 
sary to  leave  the  latter  place  by  7  a.  m.,  the  hour  when  the 
rear  of  the  column  passes  there;  it  would  reach  Berne'court 
then  about  10  o'clock  at  the  latest,  and  the  administrative 
train,  having  been  resupplied,  could  start  from  there  not 
later  than  12  m. 

But  if,  as  we  have  supposed  in  the  second  case,  the  1st 
corps  is  followed  by  another,  the  auxiliary  train  would  not 
be  able  to  pass  the  cross-road  for  Bouconville  until  after 
the  passage  of  that  point  of  the  entire  2d  corps  and  the  ad- 
ministrative trains  of  the  1st  and  2d  corps,  which  immedi- 
ately follow;  consequently  the  auxiliary  train,  directed  to 
go  to  Berne'court  to  resupply  the  administrative  train  of  the 
1st  corps  on  June  2d,  would  arrive  there  only  very  late  on 
the  evening  of  that  day.  To  obviate  that  inconvenience,  it 


136  Notes  on  the  .Supply  of  an  Army. 

will  be  necessary  to  make  the  meeting  between  this  auxil- 
iary train  and  the  administrative  train  outside  the  zone  of 
the  cantonments,  on  the  flank,  at  Seicheprey,  for  instance;  to 
effect  this,  the  issue  having  been  made  early  in  the  morning 
of  June  2d,  the  section  of  the  administrative  train  of  the  1st 
corps  to  be  resupplied  will  take  the  road  Mandres — Ansau- 
ville — Bernecourt  to  Seicheprey,  where  the  auxiliary  train 
will  meet  it  by  the  side-road  Apremont — Montrec — Ri die- 
court,  without  waiting  until  the  2d  corps  has  completed  its 
movement.  The  administrative  train,  resupplied  at  an  early 
hour,  would  be  able  to  complete  its  movement  when  the  2d 
corps  is  in  cantonment — that  is,  about  4  p.  m.,  if  it  is  obliged 
to  follow  the  same  road  as  the  column;  but  in  our  example 
it  will  be  able  to  start  out  immediately  by  the  side-road  from 
Flirey — Limey — Martincourt  to  Griscourt. 

IV.     3d  Method:      Consignment   of  Ration?   Drawn   from    the 
Depots  in  Rear  by  the  Requisitioned  Trains. 

Instead  of  forwarding  the  rations  for  the  army  by  the 
military  trains  Echeloning  in  rear,  it  would  theoretically  be 
possible,  as  we  have  said  at  the  beginning  of  this  chapter, 
to  have  them  brought  up  by  trains  starting  out  from  the 
depots  where  the  rations  are  collected.  But  in  practice  this 
is  not  possible:  if  the  auxiliary  trains  have  been  unable  to 
enter  the  cantonments  and  carry  the  rations  directly  to  the 
troops,  and  if  it  has  been  necessary  to  meet  them  by  the  ad- 
ministrative and  regimental  trains,  such  is  also  true  of  the 
requisition  trains  pushed  towards  the  army  by  the  service 
in  rear.  In  reality,  the  rations  carried  by  the  trains  from 
the  rear  are  received  by  the  auxiliary  trains  and  the  latter 
send  them  forward  to  the  troops  in  the  manner  described 
in  the  preceding  article. 

But  wherever  may  be  the  place  of  meeting  of  the  trains 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army.  137 

from  the  rear,  the  problem  to  be  solved  is  presented  in  the 
same  manner  and  can  be  stated  as  follows: 

The  subdivision  to  be  resupplied,  starting  out  and 
moving  successively  to  A,  B,  C,  D,  has  brought  to  each  of 
these  points  the  stores  drawn  from  a  depot  (M). 

M  A  B  C D B 

FIG.26 

When  a  railway  or  a  navigable  stream  is  available,  the 
employment  of  them  will  be  the  readiest  solution  of  the 
problem;  when  such  are  not  available,  it  will  be  necessary, 
on  starting  from  the  terminus  M  of  the  railway,  to  organize 
on  the  line  M  A  B  C  D  E  a  system  of  wagon-trains,  the  work- 
ings of  which  we  are  about  to  study.  We  will  later  study 
the  employment  of  railways  and  navigable  streams. 

General  Theory  Concerning  the  Organization  of  Transports; 
Different  Methods  of  Transport. — The  possibility  of  having  the 
moving  subdivision  met  by  the  trains  starting  out  from  M 
depends  upon  whether  the  trains  can  make  a  forced  march 
and  cover  daily  a  greater  distance  than  the  moving  subdi- 
visions. The  daily  movement  of  the  latter  is  equal  to  the 
march  made  by  the  army,  the  average  length  of  which  is 
from  20  to  24  kilometres;  the  trains  can  cover  a  much 
greater  distance.  The  march  of  the  army  is  limited  by 
tactical  and  strategical  considerations,  by  reason  of  the  time 
lost  in  the  deployment  of  the  columns,  by  their  installation 
at  the  cantonment,  etc.,  none  of  which  causes  limit  the 
march  of  the  trains.  The  distance  a  consignment  can  be 
forwarded  each  day  will  always  be  greater  that  that  the 
army  advances  and  will  depend  upon  the  kind  of  train  organ- 
ized. An  ordinary  train — that  is,  one  having  to  carry  the 
same  consignment  to  its  destination,  during  several  days' 
march,  with  the  same  teams — can  make  a  daily  march  of 


138  Notes  on  Hie  Supply  of  an  Army. 

from  35  to  40  kilometres,  or  about  one  and  a  half  days' 
march  of  the  army.  But  by  organizing  relays  it  is  possible 
to  forward  a  consignment  from  60  to  70  kilometres  in  24 
hours,  if  alternate  relays  of  wagons  are  employed;  by  using 
alternate  relays  of  teams  it  would  be  possible  to  extend  this 
to  80  or  90  kilometres.  In  the  first  case  the  number  of 
hours  usefully  employed  in  forwarding  the  consignment  is 
from  15  to  16,  and  8  hours  are  allowed  for  the  various  opera- 
tions of  taking  fresh  teams,  loading,  arid  unloading;  in  the 
second  place,  the  time  lost  by  changing  teams  can  be  de- 
creased and  reduced  to  3  or  4  hours,  arid  the  time  devoted 
to  the  forwarding  of  the  consignment  increased  to  20  hours. 

Under  such  conditions  it  is  seen  that,  by  the  ordinary 
train,  it  is  possible  for  the  trains  from  the  rear  to  cover 
daily  a  distance  equal  to  one  and  a  half  days'  march  of  the 
army;  that  by  organizing  relays  of  wagons  the  train  can 
make  two  or  three  average  marches  of  the  army.  By  means 
of  the  relays  of  teams  a  still  more  rapid  movement  would 
result,  and  it  would  be  possible  under  an  emergency  to  make 
nearly  four  average  marches. 

To  effect  such  an  organization  the  line  of  communica- 
tions by  which  the  depot  M  should  be  connected  with  the 
successive  points  of  supply  is  arranged  in  the  following 
manner:  Advance  depots  are  located  on  this  line  distant 
on  an  average  from  30  to  35  kilometres  from  each  other. 

These  stations  are  not  necessarily  the  same  as  those 
where  the  columns  have  halted;  we  know  also  that  the 
columns  do  not  occupy  a  point,  but  that  their  cantonments 
form  an  extended  zone,  and,  moreover,  the  line  of  communi- 
cation and  the  line  of  operations  of  the  column  are  not 
always  the  same.  To  represent  and  study  the  movement 
we  need  not  consider  the  column,  but  simply  occupy  our- 
selves with  the  auxiliary  trains;  A,  B,  C,  D  will  be  then  the 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army.  139 

successive  points  where  the  auxiliary  trains  should  be  resup- 
plied;  the  distance  between  these  points  is  an  average 
march,  equal  for  the  column  to  20  or  24  kilometres.  Under 
these  theoretical  conditions,  the  intermediate  depots  estab- 
lished on  the  line  of  communications  at  30  or  35  kilometres 
from  each  other  should  fall  at  G,  G',  G",  for  instance:  G  at 
the  center  of  the  distance  A  B;  G'  opposite  C;  G"  at  the 
center  of  the  distance  D  E,  and  so  on. 

MA  B  C  D  e 

Line  of  March  of  the  Column 
M  G  G'  G" 

Line  of  Communication 

FIG.27 

If  a  consignment  is  forwarded  over  this  line  by  ordinary 
train,  it  will  remain  at  G  the  first  night,  the  second  at  G', 
the  third  at  G",  and  it  is  evident  that  such  a  train  would 
take  only  two  days  to  reach  the  point  C  of  resupplying,  when 
the  latter  has  already  advanced  three  days  beyond  M;  to 
reach  the  point  F,  the  train  would  take  four  days,  and  so  on. 

By  organizing  in  the  depots  G,  G',  G",  G"'  relays  of 
wagons,  it  would  be  possible  to  forward  the  consignment  to 
G'  the  first  day,  and  consequently  reach  the  point  C,  situated 
three  days'  march  in  advance  of  M;  in  two  days  the  train 
belonging  to  the  line  of  communications  would  meet  the 
auxiliary  train  at  G'",  at  six  days'  march  beyond  M,  and 
so  on. 

By  organizing  relays  of  teams  in  the  intermediate 
dep6ts,  it  would  be  possible,  even  the  same  day,  to  forward 
the  consignment  three  days'  march,  and  therefore  as  far  as 
G".  The  train  connected  with  the  line  of  communication 
would  then  be  able  to  overtake  in  one  day  the  auxiliary 
train,  as  long  as  the  distance  of  the  latter  beyond  M  does 


140  Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 

not  exceed  four  marches  and  even  four  and  one-half  marches 
in  an  emergency. 

When  the  celerity  in  forwarding  the  consignment  is  con- 
sidered, it  makes  no  difference  whether  alternate  or  succes- 
sive relays  are  made  use  of;  moreover,  when  the  trains  must 
follow  each  other  daily  during  a  certain  period,  the  two 
systems  require  the  organization  of  the  same  number  of 
units  of  transport.  To  organize  by  alternate  relays  a  con- 
tinued movement  on  the  line  M  G'  G",  for  instance,  it  would 
be  necessary  to  establish  at  each  depot  two  groups  of  teams, 
or  six  groups  in  all.  A  consignment  No.  1  starting  from  M 
(Figure  28),  the  first  day,  would  be  transported  as  far  as  G 
by  group  1  of  the  depot  M,  which  we  will  designate  by  ml. 
The  second  day  a  second  train,  No.  2,  would  be  transported 
from  M  to  G  by  a  team  (m2),  then  from  G  to  G'  by  a  team  pro- 
vided by  the  d£pot  G,  which  we  will  designate  by  gl;  a  third 
consignment  would  be  transported  from  M  to  G  by  team 
ml,  which  returned  to  the  former  place  the  evening  before, 
then  from  G  to  G'  by  g2,  and  from  G'  to  G"  by  g'l ;  a  fourth 
consignment  would  be  transported  from  M  to  G  by  m2,  from 
G  to  G'  by  gl,  from  G'  to  G"  by  g'2;  to  move  four  consign- 
ments over  a  distance  equal  to  three  marches,  six  transport 
units  will  be  employed  (ml,  m2,  gl,  g2,  g'l,  and  g'2).  If  the 
same  movement  had  been  organized  by  successive  relays, 
only  four  units  of  transport,  all  held  at  M,  would  have  been 
employed.  The  first  consignment  would  have  been  trans- 
ported to  G  by  the  train  ml;  the  second  consignment  would 
have  been  carried  from  M  to  G  by  the  train  m2,  and  from  G 
to  G'  by  ml;  the  third  consignment  would  be  carried  from 

M  to  G  bv  m3,  from  G  to  G'  by  m2,  from  G'  to  G"  bv  ml,  and 

» 

so  on.  The  figure  below  shows  this  movement  clearly.  The 
method  of  transport  by  successive  relays  requires  a  less 
number  of  teams.  But  if  the  movement  is  to  continue  and 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army.  141 

it  is  not  desired  to  send  far  from  M  the  teams  taken  from 
that  place,  these  teams  in  order  to  return  from  G"  to  M  will 
lose  three  days,  during  which  it  would  still  be  necessary  to 
equip  at  M  two  new  units  of  transport,  m3  and  m6,  in  order 
to  operate  by  successive  relays,  while  the  double  relays 
organized  at  each  d£pot  would  make  it  possible  to  continue 
the  movement  indefinitely  by  alternate  relays.  Definitely, 
for  a  continued  movement  of  long  duration,  the  same  number 
of  teams  will  be  necessary  in  the  two  systems,  the  following: 
a  number  of  teams  equal  to  double  the  number  of  the 
marches  to  be  made. 

The  method  of  transport  by  alternate  relays  of  wagons 
or  teams  makes  it  possible  to  organize  a  continued  move- 
ment by  means  of  two  transport  units  formed  at  each  depot; 
it  has  the  advantage  of  distributing  the  requisition  for  the 
teams  equally  among  all  the  depots,  but  it  renders  it 
essential  to  have  a  perfect  organization  at  these  depots  and 
to  establish  a  regular  service  there.  The  preference  then 
is  for  the  organization  of  a  permanent  and  regular  line  of 
communication. 

The  method  of  transport  by  successive  relays  throws 
the  whole  burden  of  the  requisition  on  the  starting-point; 
but  it  is  not  necessary  that  the  line  followed  should  be 
marked  out  by  depots  organized  in  advance,  as  required  in 
the  preceding  method,  where  the  train  should  find  relays 
prepared  at  the  changing-points.  When  the  service  re- 
quires only  a  limited  number  of  consignments,  the  trains 
by  successive  relays  require  a  less  number  of  units  of  trans- 
port than  the  preceding,  but  that  advantage  disappears 
when  the  number  of  consignments  exceeds  the  total  number 
of  the  marches  to  be  made  by  the  trains.  When  the  move- 
ment is  continued  and  constant,  the  total  number  of  units 
of  transport  is  the  same  as  in  the  preceding  method;  the 


142 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 


M          G 
(ml) 


(V 


1st    Consignment 


2d     do 


3d     do 


4th   do 


5th    do 


6th    do 


7th    do 


(m2) 


GX/M  G 

(ml) 


(m2) 


G' 


8tli    do 


FIG.  28 


Organization  of  the  move-       Organization  of  the  move- 
ment by  alternate  relays.          ment  by  successive  relays. 

second  method  of  transport  will  be  particularly  suitable  on 
a  temporary  line,  which  may  be  used  for  only  a  few  days. 

In  the  two  methods,  the  total  number  of  units  of  trans- 
port necessary  is  equal  to  two  for  each  d£pdt,  or,  in  other 
words,  to  double  the  number  of  stations  into  which  the  line 
of  communications  is  divided.  This  conclusion  applies  as 
well  to  the  transports  by  relays  of  wragons  as  to  the  trans- 
ports by  relays  of  teams;  the  only  difference  is  in  the  rapid- 
ity of  the  movement  obtained,  which,  in  the  case  of  relays 
of  W7agons,  enables  two  stations  to  be  reached,  and  three  in 
the  case  of  relavs  of  teams. 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army.  143 

Order  and  Eclielonment  of  the  Consignments  during  a  Pro- 
tracted Period. — If,  however,  by  means  of  two  transport  units 
in  each  despot,  it  is  possible  to  insure  the  daily  consignment 
of  rations  from  the  dEpot  M  to  the  army  and  its  arrival  at 
the  place  of  issue  in  the  least  time  possible,  it  would  be  a 
mistake  to  suppose  that  it  wTill  always  be  possible  to  arrange 
for  the  arrival  at  the  army  every  day  of  the  consignment  of 
rations  in  order  to  provide  for  the  resupply  of  each  day. 
We  will  ascertain  how,  in  that  case,  the  Eclielonment  of  con- 
signments from  the  dEpot  M  should  be  arranged.  Let  us 
suppose  a  column  is  moving  forward  from  M,  and  let  A,  B, 
C,  D,  E  be  the  points  where  the  successive  resupply  of  the 
auxiliary  train  must  be  effected.*  We  know,  from  what  has 
been  said  in  the  preceding  article,  that,  at  the  time  these 
resupplies  are  being  made  in  those  places,  the  army  is  al- 
ready two  days'  march  in  advance  of  such  places.  Conse- 
quently, the  day  when  the  first  resupply  was  made  at  A  the 
army  was  already  in  advance  of  C,  the  day  in  which  the 
second  resupply  was  made  at  B  the  army  would  be  in  ad- 
vance of  D,  and  so  on.  In  order  to  indicate  this  corollation, 
we  will  designate  by  the  third  day  that  on  which  the  first 
resupply  for  the  auxiliary  train  should  have  been  made  at 
A,  by  the  fourth  that  on  which  the  second  resupply  was  ac- 
complished at  B,  etc.  The  distances  M  A,  A  B,  B  C,  which 
separate  the  points  in  which  the  resupply  is  successively 
made,  are  equal  to  an  average  march  of  the  army,  20  to  24 
kilometres.  The  depots  established  for  the  organization  of 
the  line  of  communication  at  G,  G',  G",  etc.,  are  distant 
from  each  other  from  30  to  35  kilometres,  and  fall,  as  we 
have  already  said,  the  first  between  A  and  B,  the  second 
opposite  C,  the  third  between  D  and  E,  the  fourth  opposite 

*The  graphical  representation  of  this  movement  is  given  in  Fig- 
ure 1  of  Plate  III. 


144  Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 

F,  and  so  on.  It  is  evident,  moreover,  that  the  installation 
of  the  service  of  the  line  of  communication  can  be  com- 
menced at  G  the  third  day,  and  that  this  depot  can  the  fol- 
lowing day  supply  a  team;  that  the  organization  of  the  depot 
G'  can  be  commenced  the  fifth  day,  and  that,  in  consequence, 
this  d£pot  can  act  as  relay  station  the  following  day,  the 
sixth,  and  so  on. 

These  preliminaries  arranged,  it  is  an  easy  matter  to 
consider  the  different  consignments.  The  resupply  of  the 
auxiliary  train  at  A  can  be  made  the  third  day  by  a  train 
forwarded  from  M  the  same  day.  The  teams  (ml)  which 
have  drawn  this  load  remain  over  night  at  A. 

The  resupply  at  B  can  also  be  provided  by  a  consign- 
ment sent  from  M  the  fourth  day.  The  load  is  drawn  from 
M  to  G  by  the  team  m2,  changed  at  G  by  a  team  (g)  fur- 
nished by  that  de'pot,  and  which  draws  the  load  to  its 
destination. 

The  resupply  at  C  the  fifth  day  may  still  be  assured  I  y 
a  consignment  forwarded  from  M  only  the  fifth  day.  This 
third  consignment  will  be  drawn  to  G  by  the  team  ml,  which 
returned  to  M  the  evening  before,  changed  at  G,  and  drawn 
from  there  to  C  by  the  team  gl,  which  was  able  to  return 
to  G  the  previous  evening. 

Moreover,  in  order  to  provide  for  the  resupply  at  D  the 
sixth  day,  it  is  not  sufficient  to  forward  the  consignment 
in  the  morning,  for  it  would  not  be  possible  to  send  it  beyond 
0  in  only  one  day.  The  consignment  to  provide  for  the  re- 
supply  at  D  the  sixth  day  should  then  be  started  the  even- 
ing before — that  is,  the  5th  day;  to  do  so,  it  will  be  necessary 
to  fit  out  at  M  a  third  group  of  teams  (m3),  since  ml  is 
employed  in  drawing  the  third  consignment  and  m2  is  re- 
turning from  G  to  M.  It  is  not  necessary  to  go  into  further 
details  in  order  to  be  able  to  state  the  law  for  the  movement. 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army.  145 

as  an  inspection  of  Plate  III.  shows  it  plainly.  In  order  to 
provide  for  the  daily  resupply,  the  despot  at  M  should  for- 
ward a  consignment  the  even-numbered  days,  lourth,  sixth, 
eighth,  etc.,  and  two  consignments  the  odd-numbered  days, 
fifth,  seventh,  ninth,  etc.;  that  necessitates  the  formation 
at  M  and  at  each  of  the  relay  stations  of  three  transport 
units. 

It  is  very  evident  that  if  it  were  known  that  the  resup- 
plies  would  halt  at  F,  for  instance,  and  that  there  would 
only  be  six  resupplies  to  be  provided,  it  would  be  possible 
to  stop  the  consignments  at  the  VI.;  but  such  will  in  general 
not  be  the  case,  and,  not  having  such  information,  in  order 
to  provide  the  uninterrupted  resupply  and  always  be  able 
to  arrange  that  the  consignments  reach  the  point  of  meeting 
in  ample  time,  it  will  be  necessary  to  have  them  sent  for- 
ward, and,  therefore,  have  them  Echeloned  as  has  just  been 
said.  If  we  do  not  know  that  the  resupply  will  stop  at  F, 
it  will  be  very  necessary  to  send  forward  at  all  events,  on 
the  seventh  day,  the  VII.  consignment,  although  it  may  not 
be  necessary  until  the  ninth  day;  unless  that  is  done,  it 
would  not  arrive  on  time  the  ninth  day  at  H. 

The  first  three  consignments  forwarded  from  M  (as  I., 
II.  and  III.)  can  be  arranged  for  with  the  two  teams  at  M, 
the  following  (ml  and  m2),  and  the  two  teams  at  G  (gl  and 
g2) ;  in  the  same  way  the  first  three  consignments  which  go 
beyond  G'  (IV.,  V.,  VI.)  can  be  carried,  from  that  point,  with 
two  relays  gl  and  g'2  and  g"l  and  g"2,  and  so  on ;  it  would 
not  be  necessary,  then,  to  have  three  relays  of  teams  in  the 
relay  stations,  if  new  de'pots  were  formed  at  G"  and  at  G'" 
and  the  number  of  consignments  forwarded  from  depots 
were  limited  to  three.  This  takes  it  for  granted  that  it  will 
be  possible  to  supply  these  successive  de'pots  directly,  either 

from  the  local  resources,  as  in  the  case  we  considered  in  the 
10 — 


146  Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 

fourth  paragraph  of  Chapter  III.,  or  by  means  of  a  railway 
or  navigable  stream. 

If  such  were  not  the  case,  there  would  be,  however, 
every  advantage  to  insure  order  and  for  regulating  the  move- 
ments, to  divide  the  line  of  communication  by  intermediate 
depots  established  in  principal  stations  and  distant  from 
each  other  at  least  three  marches.  The  advance  de'pot 
would  forward  directly  to  the  points  to  be  resupplied,  and 
each  despot  would  be  supplied  from  the  one  in  rear  of  it.  But 
this  advantageous  arrangement  for  the  organization  would 
not  make  any  changes  either  in  the  number  of  the  transport 
units  or  in  the  movement  of  the  trains.  If  the  stores  re- 
quired for  the  IV.  consignment  cannot  be  forwarded  directly 
from  G'  and  must  be  drawn  from  the  de'pot  at  M,  since  that 
train  should  arrive  on  the  fifth  day  in  order  to  start  out  on 
the  sixth,  it  is  nearly  always  necessary  to  forward  it  from 
M  the  fifth  day,  as  is  showTn  in  Figure  1  of  Plate  III.;  the 
same  is  true  of  the  fifth  and  sixth  consignments;  and,  finally, 
the  movement  of  the  trains  represented  is  that  which  sup- 
plies the  intermediate  de'pot  G'  by  using  the  smallest  number 
of  teams.  If  it  was  desired,  for  instance,  to  have  arrive  in 
succession  at  G'  the  fifth  or  sixth  day  all  the  stores  required 
for  the  several  consignments  which  that  intermediate  de'pot 
should  make — for  the  IV.,  V.,  and  VI.,  for  instance — in  ad- 
dition to  the  transport  units  already  formed  at  M,  as  ml, 
m2,  and  m3,  which  are  upon  the  road,  it  would  be  necessary 
to  organize  two  more  trains. 

The  definite  conclusion  of  all  this  is:  1st,  that,  in  order 
to  have  the  stores  necessary  for  the  daily  resupply  brought 
from  M  to  the  auxiliary  trains,  it  is  not  enough  to  send 
forward  a  consignment  every  day,  but  that  the  shipment 
should  be  one  day  by  a  single  train  and  the  following  day 
by  two;  2d,  that  the  organization  of  this  continued  resupply 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army.  147 

can  be  made  by  means  of  three  transport  units  in  each  relay 
station. 

These  conclusions  are  the  same,  as  we  have  already 
shown,  when  the  movement  is  organized  between  each  of 
the  intermediate  depots  by  alternate  relays,  as  far  as  con- 
cerns the  total  number  of  equipages  necessary,  with  this 
single  exception,  that  by  successive  relays  all  the  equipages 
would  be  taken  from  M,  instead  of  being  divided  among  the 
various  intermediate  stations.  Therefore,  the  organization 
by  alternate  relays  is  preferable;  it  will  be  possible,  however, 
in  practice  to  assure,  by  successive  relays,  the  first  consign- 
ments from  each  principal  station — for  instance,  the  con- 
signments IV.,  V.,  and  VI.  to  start  from  G',  the  consign- 
ments VII.,  VIII.,  and  IX.  to  start  from  G'",  and  so  on — and 
to  organize  the  movement  by  alternate  relays  only  at  the 
installation  of  a  more  advanced  de'pot.  But,  however  that 
may  be,  the  movement  of  the  trains  and  the  representation 
of  the  same,  as  they  are  shown  in  Plate  III.,  would  not  be 
modified.* 

Estimates  of  the  Importance  of  the  Means  of  Transport 
Requisitioned  in  Order  to  Organize  the  Lines  of  Wagon  Transport. 
— Is  it  likely  that  the  hypothetical  case  of  a  movement  in 
which  the  supplies  will  be  drawn  for  a  long  time  by  wagon 
transport  from  a  distant  de'pot  (M)  will  be  met  with?  It  is 
not  possible,  although  the  experience  of  recent  wars  shows 
that  armies  were  deprived  of  the  use  of  railways  for  their 
supplies  for  a  considerable  time.  However  that  may  be, 

*We  have  supposed,  in  this  entire  discussion,  that  the  marches  of 
the  trains  are  equal  to  an  average  march  and  a  half  of  the  column.  If, 
however,  the  marches  of  the  trains  were  equal  to  those  of  the  column, 
the  successive  relay  stations  would  be  at  A,  B,  C,  D,  etc.;  a  consignment 
forwarded  from  M  would  in  one  day  only  arrive  at  B ;  it  would  require 
two  days  to  go  as  far  as  D,  and  so  on.  If  Plate  III'  were  constructed 
under  that  supposition,  it  could  be  easily  seen  that  it  would  be  neces- 
sary to  establish  in  each  station  four  transport  units  instead  of  three. 


148  Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 

it  was  of  interest  to  find  the  law  for  such  an  operation.  We 
intend  to  use  this  law  in  order  to  determine  what  would  be 
the  means  of  transport  necessary  for  the  organization  of  the 
line  of  communication. 

General  Pierron*  estimates  at  1000  for  each  corps  the 
number  of  necessary  wagons  in  an  unloading  station  serving 
as  the  point  of  departure  for  the  supplies  by  wagon-roads — 
that  is  to  say,  filling  the  role  of  the  de'pot  M  considered  in 
this  study:  400  of  these  wagons  are  necessary,  according 
to  this  author,  for  unloading  and  carrying  away  the  ma- 
terial brought  daily  by  the  railway  and  to  thus  relieve 
the  station;  600  wagons  are  necessary  in  order  to  supply 
the  subsequent  depots  which  will  be  established  on  the  line 
of  communication  when  the  army  moves  to  a  distance  from 
that  de'pot. 

One  would  obtain  an  incorrect  idea  of  the  number  of 
wagons  necessary  to  provide  the  resupply  if  it  was  thought 
to  be  limited  to  the  figure  above  expressed,  which  in  reality 
only  gives  the  number  necessary  at  the  discharging  station. 
The  number  of  400  wagons  is  indeed  sufficient,  as  will  be 
seen  later,  in  order  to  discharge  the  two  trains  which  must 
come  each  day  to  this  station  to  provide  the  resupply  of 
the  army  with  subsistence.  But  with  600  wagons  it  would 
not  be  possible  to  provide  the  consignments  to  the  army  or 
to  an  intermediate  depot  on  the  line  of  communication. 
It  is  necessary  to  estimate  the  number  of  wagons  required 
to  transport  a  day's  rations  for  an  army  corps  as  150 — that 
is,  to  form  what  we  have  termed  a  unit  of  transport  for  a 
corps.  Under  such  conditions,  600  wagons  represent  four 
units  of  transport;  as  the  terminal  station  should,  besides 
the  subsistence,  provide  the  transports  for  the  materiel  for 
all  the  other  services,  it  must  be  taken  for  granted  that  it 


*General  Pierroii,  "Strategic  et  grande  Tactique,"  page  325. 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army.  149 

will  be  necessary  to  reserve  a  fourth  of  these  wagons  for 
these  other  services,  and  that  only  450  wagons  can  be  made 
use  of  for  the  subsistence  service.  Under  these  conditions, 
the  number  of  wagons  assigned  by  General  Pierron  to  the 
de'pot  M  would  make  it  possible  to  create  there  only  the 
three  units  of  transport  we  have  designated  in  the  preceding 
theoretical  discussion  by  the  signs  ml,  m2,  and  m3;  referring 
to  that  discussion  and  to  Plate  III.,  it  can  be  seen  that  that 
assignment  would  permit  of  arranging  for  three  consign- 
ments to  the  distance  of  three  marches  beyond  M  if  a  con- 
tinuous movement  were  not  undertaken;  but  if  the  con- 
signment beyond  M  were  to  be  continuous,  these  three  trans- 
port units  would  only  be  sufficient  to  organize  the  transport 
by  alternate  relays  between  M  and  the  first  station  G  estab- 
lished on  the  line  of  communication. 

The  number  given  by  General  Pierron  represents  then 
only  what  is  required  for  the  trains  at  the  starting-point. 
The  total  number  of  wagons  necessary  for  the  service  of 
the  line  of  communication  will  include,  then,  in  addition  to 
these,  all  the  wagons  for  the  formation  of  the  relays  in  the 
other  stations. 

At  the  rate  of  150  wagons  to  a  corps  for  a  day's  rations, 
the  three  units  of  necessary  transport  in  each  station  repre- 
sent a  total  of  450  wagons  for  each  army  corps  supplied 
by  the  line  of  communication;  if  the  same  line  must  supply 
an  arnn7  of  five  corps,  each  station  should  have  2250  wagons 
solely  for  the  transport  of  the  subsistence.  Admitting 
that  it  would  be  possible  to  establish  in  each  station  only 
two  units  of  transport,  the  number  of  wagons  for  an  army 
corps  would  still  go  up  to  300  and  to  1500  for  an  entire  army. 
The  size  of  these  quotas  leads  us  at  once  to  this  conclusion 
previously  stated:  that  it  will  be  necessary  to  establish 


150 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 


several  lines  of  communication  whenever  possible,  and  to 
assign  only  two  or  three  corps  at  the  most  to  each  line. 

The  following  table  shows  at  a  glance  the  size  of  the 
transport  detachments  to  be  formed  in  each  station: 


ON  A 

LINE  OF  COMMUNICATIONS 
SUPPLYING: 

Number  of  Wagons  to  be  Fitted 
out  in  each  Station  in 
order  to  Form  there  : 

One 
Transport 
Unit. 

Two 

Transport 

Units. 

Three 
Transport 
Units. 

1  Army 
2  Army 
3  Army 
4  Army 
5  Army 

Corps        .        

150 

800 

450 
600 
750 

300 
600 
900 
1.200 
1,500 

450 
900 
1,350 
1,800 
2250 

Corps            .  .                 

Corps    

Corps      ...                                •  .  .  . 

Corps  

What  will  be  the  probable  resources  of  the  theatre  of 
war  in  order  to  provide  for  such  establishments?  It  is  diffi- 
cult to  establish  it  with  absolute  certainty;  it  is  possible, 
however,  to  make  estimate  in  the  following  manner: 

According  to  the  statistics  of  the  Minister  of  Agri- 
culture (for  the  year  1891),  there  are  in  France  a  number  of 
animals  equal  to : 

Number  of  horses 2,883,460 

Number  of  mules 250,877 


Total 3,114,337 

That  number  represents  an  average  of  five  animals  to 
the  square  kilometre,  but  the  figures  above  include  both  the 
old  and  young  animals;  if,  moreover,  those  which  would  be 
taken  for  the  mobilization  are  considered,  it  seems  prudent 
to  reduce  this  coefficient  to  3  for  a  square  kilometre.  In 
default  of  more  exact  information,  the  number  3  can  be 
taken  for  the  remaining  wagons  per  square  kilometre,  rely- 
ing upon  the  following  reasons:  the  average  rural  popula 
tion  is  42,  representing  8  families;  it  is  not  far  wrong  to 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 


151 


estimate  at  3  the  number  of  those  who  possess  a  wagon 
suitable  for  the  transports. 

Adopting  this  coefficient  of  3  equipped  wagons  to  a 
square  kilometre,  it  is  possible  to  calculate,  as  we  have 
already  done,  the  radius  of  the  zone  over  which  it  would  be 
necessary  to  extend  the  requisitions  in  order  to  raise  the 
requisite  number  indicated  in  the  preceding  table.  It  will 
thus  be  found: 


TO  FORM 

THE  RADIUS  OF  REQUISITION  AROUND  A 
STATION  SHOULD  BE  IN  KILOMETRES: 

One 
Transport 
Unit. 

Two 
Transport 
Units. 

Three 
Transport 
Units. 

For  1  Army  Corps  .... 

4 

6 

7 

For  2  Army  Corps  .    . 

6 

g 

10 

For  3  Army  Corps  ...    . 

7 

10 

12 

For  4  Army  Corps  

g 

11 

14 

For  5  Army  Corps    .          

9 

13 

J6 

These  estimates  are  evidently  too  small,  and  in  practice 
it  would  surely  be  necessary  to  double  these  figures.  What- 
ever may  be  their  practical  value,  they  show  the  difficulty 
that  would  be  encountered  in  organizing  a  continuous  re 
supply  of  some  duration  by  wagon-trains,  and  the  impor- 
tance of  railways,  which  alone  make  it  possible  to  provide 
the  resupply  without  too  much  complication. 

V.     Employment  of  Railways  and  Navigable  Streams. 

A  railway  can  be  used  either  to  stock  the  d£pot  on  the 
line  of  communication  and  to  forward  the  supplies  from  the 
rear  as  near  as  possible  to  the  army,  in  order  to  shorten  as 
much  as  possible  the  length  of  the  haul  for  the  wagon- 
trains,  or  to  directly  supply  the  troops,  when  the  railway 
extends  into  the  zone  of  the  cantonments.  The  order  of 
the  Ministry  dated  August  30,  1885,  does  not  make  explicit 
reference  to  the  employment  of  railways  or  navigable  rivers^ 


152  Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 

for  the  direct  supply  of  the  troops,  and  it  may  be  inferred 
that  the  consignment  of  stores  by  the  railways  should  not 
go  beyond  the  advance  d£p6t.  The  order  of  the  Ministry 
to  ascertain  certain  facts  or  conditions  as  provided  in  that 
dated  January  11,  1893,  has  removed  all  uncertainty  upon 
that  subject. 

It  is  not  the  province  of  this  study  to  explain  in  detail 
the  workings  of  the  railways;  we  wrill  simply  refer  to  some 
general  facts  which  are  indispensable  in  order  to  under- 
stand the  method  of  supply  by  means  of  railways. 

The  transportation  of  a  day's  rations  for  an  army  corps 
requires  on  an  average  15  cars.  Military  trains  are  com- 
posed ordinarily  of  30  loaded  cars;  consequently  one  of  these 
trains  represents  either  two  days'  rations  for  an  army  corps, 
or  a  day's  rations  for  two  corps.  The  necessary  rations  for 
an  army  of  five  corps  of  the  normal  effective  strength  would 
represent  the  load  of  2  or  2-J  trains.  For  an  army  of  four 
corps  with  an  increased  effective  strength,  the  transport  of 
a  day's  rations  would  require  3  trains  of  the  size  above  indi- 
cated, or,  still  better,  4  trains  of  about  20  to  25  cars. 

It  is  estimated  that  it  will  take,  ordinarily,  7  hours  to 
unload  a  train  of  30  cars;  on  this  account,  when  the  plat- 
forms do  not  make  it  possible  to  unload  two  trains  at  the 
same  time,  an  interval  of  8  hours  should  then  be  provided 
between  the  arrival  of  two  successive  trains  at  the  same 
discharging  station,  in  order  to  allow  time  to  unload  the 
first  trains  and  move  it  to  the  rear  before  the  arrival  of  th  > 
second,  and  thus  avoid  crowding  the  station. 

Under  such  conditions  the  unloading  of  these  twTo  trains 
will  require  15  hours;  that  is  the  time  which  would  be  neces- 
sary in  order  to  unload  a  day's  rations  for  an  army  of  five 
corps,  if  the  two  trains  required  to  transport  these  rations 
could  be  unloaded  at  the  same  station. 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army.  153 

These  are  the  principal  facts  it  is  necessary  to  keep  in 
mind  in  the  organization  of  the  supply  by  means  of  railways. 

The  method  of  using  railways  will  depend  upon  their 
situation  in  reference  to  the  army. 

If  the  two  lines  L  and  L'  (Figure  29)  are  available,  the 
line  L  will  be  assigned  to  the  corps  A  and  B  and  the  line  L' 
to  the  corps  O,  D,  and  E.  In  that  case  the  resupply  of  the 
regimental  trains  will  be  effected  at  the  stations  G  and  G'. 
Each  of  these  stations  having  to  receive  rations  for  only 
two  or  three  corps,  1  train  will  be  sufficient,  the  unloading 
of  which  will  only  take  7  hours,  if  in  an  enemy's  or  friendly 
country;  but  in  the  vicinity  of  the  enemy,  the  trains  will 
only  be  able  to  go  as  far  as  the  stations  G  and  G'  wrhen  the 
army  has  advanced  as  far  as  those  points  and  occupied  the 
surrounding  country.  That  amounts  to  saying  that  in  the 
course  of  the  daily  marches  it  will  only  be  possible  to  send 
forward  the  supply  trains  into  the  zone  of  the  cantonments 
after  the  arrival  of  the  columns — that  is,  in  the  evening;  but, 
since  the  unloading  of  these  trains  requires  only  7  hours, 
everything  will  nevertheless  be  in  readiness  so  that  the  re- 
supply  of  the  regimental  trains  can  be  made  the  next  day  at 
daybreak,  and  these  trains  will  be  able  to  rejoin  their  re- 
spective corps  before  recommencing  their  march.  The 
distance  of  the  cantonments  to  the  stations  G  and  G'  is  for 
some  corps  from  10  to  12  kilometres,  which  would  make  a 
march,  going  and  coming,  of  20  to  25  kilometres  for  the 
regimental  trains  of  those  corps. 

To  avoid  imposing  upon  the  regimental  trains  so  long 
a  journey,  whenever  possible,  arrangement  would  be  made 
to  assign  a  station  to  each  army  corps  and  even  to  each 
division.  Assigning  station  gl  to  corps  A,  station  g2  to 
corps  B,  g'l  to  corps  r  and  D,  g'2  to  E,  the  distance  from 
the  cantonments  to  the  stations  would  not  exceed  for  any 


154 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 


corps  4  or  5  kilometres.  The  train  over  the  line  L  carrying 
the  rations  to  the  corps  A  and  B  would  leave  at  g2,  on  pass- 
ing that  place,  the  cars  containing  the  rations  for  corps  !>, 
will  continue  to  gl  and  there  will  be  unloaded,  will  then 


FIG  29 

move  back  and  pick  up,  when  passing  g2,  the  cars  which  it 
had  left  there;  the  line  L'  will  be  operated  in  like  manner. 

If  only  one  line  (L)  is  available,  that  one  having  to 
supply  the  entire  army,  it  would  be  necessary  to  dispatch 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army.  155 

2  trains;  and  if  the  unloading  must  be  made  at  a  single 
station  (G),  15  hours  would  be  required  to  accomplish  it. 
Under  such  conditions  it  would  be  more  difficult  to  have 
everything  in  readiness  to  be  able  to  commence  the  issue 
to  the  regimental  trains  at  an  early  hour  the  following 
morning.  However,  that  would  not  prove  to  be  the  main 
difficulty,  for  undoubtedly  it  will  generally  be  possible  to 
have  at  least  two  stations  for  unloading  in  a  distance  of  40 
kilometres,  which  is  the  depth  of  the  army,  and  thus  to 
unload  only  one  train  at  each  station.  But  it  would  be 
difficult  to  send  the  regimental  trains  from  the  corps  C,  D, 
and  E  to  reload  on  the  line  L  at  G,  gl,  or  g2,  because  the 
distance  may  be  from  15  to  20  kilometres.  In  such  case  it 
would  be  possible  to  resupply  by  the  line  L  only  the  regi- 
mental trains  of  corps  A  and  B. 

The  army  in  its  movement  does  not  necessarily  retain 
the  same  situation  in  reference  to  the  railway,  and  the  corps 
D  and  E,  which  at  first  were  further  from  it,  may  the  follow- 
ing day  be,  on  the  contrary,  the  most  advantageously  situ- 
ated. It  may  happen,  for  instance,  that  the  army  occupying 
the  first  day  a  position  ABODE,  occupies  the  next  day 
the  position  A'  B'  C'  D'  E'  (Figure  30).  In  the  first  position 
the  corps  on  the  right,  which  are  fartherest  from  the  rail- 
way, cannot  be  directly  resupplied  by  it;  in  the  second  po- 
sition the  corps  on  the  left  are  farthest  off.  In  the  latter 
case  it  will  be  possible  to  postpone  the  reloading  of  the 
section  of  the  regimental  train  of  corps  D  and  E,  emptied 
by  the  issue  on  the  first  day;  that  section  will  be  reloaded 
the  following  day  at  the  same  time  as  the  second  section 
of  the  train  of  these  same  corps,  emptied  by  the  issue  of  the 
second  day;  thus  both  sections  of  the  regimental  trains  of 
the  corps  on  the  right  would  be  reloaded  at  the  same  time 
at  the  stations  g'l  and  g'2.  In  the  example  represented  in 


156  Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 

the  figure  below,  there  will  be  resupplied  the  first  day  (or 
rather,  the  morning  of  the  second  day)  at  gl  and  g2  only 
the  corps  A  and  B;  the  next  both  sections  of  the  train  of  the 
other  corps  will  be  reloaded  at  the  same  time  at  g'l  and  g'2. 

But  the  conditions  will  not  always  favor  this  combina- 
tion; and  it  will  happen  that  the  same  corps  are  during 
several  days  too  far  from  the  railway  to  permit  of  their 
regimental  trains  being  able  to  go  there  to  reload.  In  that 
case,  if  the  distance  from  the  railway  is  not  more  than  20 
to  25  kilometres,  it  will  be  possible  to  empty  the  auxiliary 
trains  in  order  to  directly  effect  the  resupply.  We  know 
in  reality  that  each  section  of  this  auxiliary  train,  after 
having  assisted  in  the  resupply  of  the  administrative  trains, 
can  interrupt  its  forward  movement  for  one  day;  this  inter- 
ruption will  be  made  use  of  in  order  to  send  that  section  to 
reload  at  the  advance  depots  or  the  adjacent  stations;  that 
day  will  be  sufficient  if  the  railway  is  rot  too  far  away. 

The  rate  of  speed  upon  the  railways  will  always  be  suf- 
ficient to  allow  the  supply  trains  formed  at  the  main  depot 
or  at  a  station  further  in  advance  to  be  held  at  the  advance 
de"pot  until  such  time  as  they  will  be  able  to  enter  the  zone 
of  the  cantonments  of  the  army;  a  few  hours  wTill  be  suf- 
ficient to  forward  them  to  the  discharging  stations,  where 
they  will  be  able  to  arrive  at  the  latest  by  the  evening  of 
each  day. 

It  would  not  be  an  easy  matter  to  bring  the  stores  there 
if,  instead  of  a  railway,  it  should  be  necessary  to  make  use 
of  a  navigable  stream,  in  the  general  case  a  canal.  Upon 
the  canals,  in  fact,  the  rate  of  march  is  often  very  low;  it 
depends  upon  several  conditions:  method  of  traction,  form 
of  the  boats,  number  and  kind  of  the  locks.  The  rate  of 
traction  by  man-power  is  6  centimetres  a  second,  by  horses 
50  centimetres  to  1  metre  a  second,  or,  respectively,  216, 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army.  157 


FIG.  30 


158  Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 

1800,  or  3600  metres  an  hour.  But  the  real  rate  is  dimin- 
ished by  the  time  lost  in  passing  through  the  locks,  which 
may  require  from  20  to  30  minutes  for  each  lock;  as,  on 
some  canals,  locks  are  encountered  every  4  or  5  kilometres, 
it  results  that  the  rate  of  movement  of  the  supplies  is  there 
very  small  and  does  not  exceed  40  kilometres  in  24  hours. 
Under  such  conditions,  the  flotilla  of  boats  carrying  stores, 
to  be  in  a  position  to  be  made  use  of  in  the  daily  resupply, 
should  be  kept  at  the  head  of  the  columns,  so  that  this 
method  of  transport  is  not  so  available  for  the  direct  resup- 
ply of  the  columns  as  for  the  formation  and  supply  of  the 
depots  on  the  line  of  communication. 

VI.      Modifications  of  the  Arrangement  in  Accordance  with  the 
Kind  of  Formation  to  Which  It  may  he  Applied. 

As  we  have  seen  in  the  preceding  article,  effecting  the 
junction  between  the  regimental  train  and  the  administra- 
tive train,  between  the  latter  and  the  auxiliary  trains,  is 
more  or  less  easy,  depending  upon  whether  it  is  for  columns 
of  divisions,  for  a  column  of  an  army  corps,  or  for  a  column 
of  two  corps  on  the  same  road.  The  formation  is  of  less 
importance,  as  far  as  relates  to  the  consignments  of  supplies 
from  the  rear,  either  by  means  of  the  railways  or  by  the 
requisitioned  trains. 

As  far  as  relates  to  the  consignments  of  stores  by  rail- 
way, the  only  thing  which  may  be  of  importance,  as  far  as 
the  success  of  the  operation  is  concerned,  is,  we  have  seen, 
to  be  able  to  assign  stations  for  issues  to  each  corps  and 
that  these  stations  are  not  too  far  off.  The  satisfaction  of 
that  condition  depends  in  no  way  upon  the  formation  of  the 
army,  but  simply  upon  the  topographical  situation  of  the 
lines. 

Concerning  the  consignments  by  the  requisition  trains 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army.  159 

and  the  junction  of  these  trains  with  the  sections  of  the 
auxiliary  train  to  be  supplied,  no  more  difficulty  will  be 
encountered  in  the  case  of  two  corps  following  on  the  same 
road  than  in  the  case  of  a  detached  corps.  We  know,  in 
reality,  that  in  the  case  of  a  column  of  twro  corps  it  will  be 
necessary  in  most  instances  to  establish  beyond  the  zone 
of  the  cantonments,  on  the  flank  which  is  nearest  the  line 
of  communication,  the  point  of  meeting  of  the  administra- 
tive trains  and  the  auxiliary  trains,  which  is  also  the  place 
to  which  the  requisition  trains  should  go  to  resupply  the 
auxiliary  trains.  The  requisition  trains  in  such  case  will 
not  be  obliged  to  enter  the  zone  of  the  cantonments  and 
their  movement  will  in  no  way  be  dependent  upon  the  de- 
ployment of  the  column.  But  if,  as  we  have  represented 
in  drawing  No.  3  of  Plate  II.,  it  was  necessary  to  send  the 
auxiliary  trains  across  the  cantonments,  there  wrould  be  no 
difficulty  in  having  them  met  by  trains  from  the  rear.  Let 
us  suppose,  for  example,  by  referring  to  that  drawing  No.  3, 
that  we  desired  to  resupply  at  C  the  auxiliary  train  which 
came  to  that  place  to  resupply  the  administrative  train 
(section  No.  1)  of  the  1st  corps ;  we  have  the  entire  third  day 
available  for  that;  now,  on  that  day,  the  2d  corps,  in  the 
zone  of  cantonments  in  which  C  is  situated  (which  was  the 
cause  of  the  difficulty  experienced  the  second  day  to  resupply 
the  administrative  train  of  the  1st  corps  and  also  to  have 
the  auxiliary  train  come  up  to  it),  the  2d  corps  then 
leaves  that  zone  and  thus  permits  the  trains  from  the  rear 
to  come  up  immediately  after  its  deployment.  The  resup- 
ply of  the  auxiliary  train,  which  could  moreover  be  done 
without  inconvenience  only  the  evening  of  the  third  day  or 
the  morning  of  the  fourth,  can  be  accomplished  the  morning 
of  the  third  day,  both  for  the  1st  corps  at  C  and  the  2d  corps 
at  C';  an  inspection  of  the  drawing  will  show  this  at  a 
glance. 


160  Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 

VII.     Application  to  a  Particular  Case. 

One  can,  as  an  example  of  the  organization  of  the  lines 
of  communication  and  supply  from  the  rear,  study  the  march 
of  the  3d  German  Army,  in  August,  1870,  from  Worth  to 
Nancy.  Figure  2  of  Plate  III.  represents  it.  We  have 
shown  there  the  lines  of  march  of  the  different  corps  (except 
the  VI.,  which,  left  at  first  in  rear,  did  not  rejoin  until  later), 
as  well  as  the  lines  of  communication  which  were  estab- 
lished; until  the  18th  of  August,  the  Saverne  tunnel  was 
obstructed,  it  was  necessary  to  organize  lines  for  wagon- 
communication;  two  lines  were  established:  the  one  on  the 
right,  for  the  two  Bavarian  corps,  started  from  Wissem- 
bourg  and  went  from  there  by  way  of  Niederbronn  and 
Puberg  to  Marsal;  the  other,  serving  the  Prussian  corps, 
started  from  Haguenau,  going  from  there  by  way  of  Petite- 
Pierre  and  Fenetrange  to  Sarrebourg.  On  the  18th  com- 
munication was  opened  by  railroad  as  far  as  Nancy.  This 
place  became  the  starting-point  for  a  new  line  of  communi- 
cation, which  it  was  necessary  to  establish  for  the  second 
period  of  the  advance,  as  the  resistance  of  the  fortifications 
of  Toul  did  not  permit  the  use  of  railroads  beyond  there; 
this  new  line  of  communication  went  from  Nancy  to  Bar-le- 
Duc,  by  way  of  Colombey,  Vaucouleurs,  and  Void. 

Ky  way  of  applying  the  foregoing  theories,  we  are  going 
to  attempt  to  sketch  how  they  would  have  been  used  for  the 
supply  of  the  two  Prussian  corps  (V.  and  XI.)  on  that  march. 
We  will  assume  that  from  Worth  to  Lune'ville  it  was  impos- 
sible to  obtain  subsistence  from  the  local  resources,  and  that 
everything  had  to  be  brought  from  the  advance  depot, 
Haguenau  fulfilling  the  role  of  the  d^pot  designated  as  M  in 
the  theoretical  drawing  No.  1  of  Plate  III.  As  in  the  draw- 
ing, and  in  Article  IV.  of  this  chapter,  we  will  especially 
study  the  march  of  requisitioned  trains  and  the  resupply 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army.  161 

of  the  auxiliary  trains,  the  examples  that  we  have  previ- 
ously developed  concerning  the  workings  of  administrative 
and  regimental  trains  being  sufficient. 

We  will  commence  the  operation  on  August  8th.  That 
day  the  V.  corps  is  at  Uhviller,  the  XI.  at  Pfaffendorf.  In 
order  to  conform  to  the  conditions  of  our  regulation  and  to 
our  hypothesis,  we  suppose  that  that  day's  issue  is  provided 
for  by  drawing  upon  a  section  of  the  regimental  train.  This 
section  should  be  reloaded  the  evening  of  the  8th  or  the 
morning  of  the  9th  by  a  section  of  the  administrative  train, 
which  will,  in  its  turn,  be  resupplied  the  evening  of  the  9th, 
by  a  section  of  the  auxiliary  train.  We  have  the  entire  day 
of  the  10th  in  which  to  resupply  that  section  of  the  auxiliary 
train. 

Likewise  on  the  9th,  the  two  corps  occupying  Weiter- 
viller  (V.)  and  Hattmatt  (XI.),  a  section  of  the  regimental 
train  must  be  resupplied  at  those  points  on  the  10th  by  the 
administrative  train,  the  latter  by  the  auxiliary  train,  the 
resupply  of  which  should  finally  be  accomplished  during  the 
day  of  the  1 1th  of  August. 

And  so  on;  by  referring  to  the  table  showing  the 
stations  of  the  corps*  it  is  possible  to  form  the  following 
table,  indicating  the  consignments  of  rations  to  be  made 
from  the  advance  depot.  The  date  indicated  in  this  table 
is  that  of  the  day  during  which  the  auxiliary  train  should 
be  resupplied.  In  the  following  column  the  points  are 
shown  to  which  the  section  of  the  auxiliary  train  which  is 
to  effect  the  resupply  should  be  sent  forward  in  order  to 
make  a  junction  with  the  administrative  trains;  the  detail 
of  the  march  of  the  requisitioned  trains  is  given  in  the  third 
column. 


*See  the  following  tables. 
11  — 


162 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 


General  Head- 
quarters of  the 
Army. 


SXJ 


1 


a 

ill 


- 
" 


Wiirtemberge 
Division. 


1  f  J  5    g 

§ 


S 


! 


1 

»S   iS          rtrt> 
W^          W       W     < 


i 


1 


.§   S   1 


<U        K. 

" 


3 

00       05       <£ 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 


163 


Point  where  the  Section  of  the 

Auxiliary   Train  designated 

_§^ 

to  make  the  Resupply  met 

£•§ 

the  Administrative  Train  in 

s§ 

the   evening    and    where    it 

March  of 

si 

a* 

should  be  reloaded   by  the 
Requisitioned  Trains. 

Requisitioned  Trains. 

V.  Corps. 

XI.  Corps. 

Aug.  10 

Uhviller  

Pfoffendorf. 

As  the  distance  is  short,  the  auxiliary  trains  go  to 

ETaguenau  to  reload. 

11 

Weiterviller 

Hattematt..  . 

The  stores  for  this  resupply  are  forwarded    from 

Elaguenau  by  train  (H1);  the  auxiliary  trains  can  meet 

t  halfway,  which  allows  the  relay  trains  (H1)  to  return 

in  the  evening  to  Haguenau. 

12 

Weyer  

Mittelfrronn 

The  stores  for  this   resupply  start  out   from    Ha- 

yuenau  very  early  on  the  12th;  carried  to  Petite-Pierre 
3yteam  (H1);  relay  at  Petite-Pierre;   load  carried  from 

Petite-  Pierre  to  destination  by  relay  teams  (P1)  —  (H1) 

returns  the  next  day,  August  13th,  to  Haguenau.    The 
auxiliary  trains  having  been  able  to  meet  half  way,  the 

latter  can  return  the  same  day  to  Petite-Pierre. 

13 

Lixheim  

Sarrebourg. 

The  stores  for  this  resupply  start  from  Haguenau 
early  on  the  13th;  carried  as  far  as  Petite-Pierre  by  re- 

lay teams  (H2)  —  relay  at  Petite-Pierre  —  load  carried  from 

there  to  destination  by  relay  teams  (P1)—  (P1)  and  (H2) 

return  on  the  14th  to  Petite-Pierre  and  to  Haguenau. 

14 

Lixheim.  .  .  . 

Sarrebourg. 

The  stores  for  this  resupply  start  from  Haguenau 
early   on   the   14th;    carried  to  Petite-Pierre  by  relay 

teams  (H1)  —  relay   at  Petite-Pierre  —  load  carried  from 

there  to  destination  by  relay  teams  (P2)—  (H1)  and  (P2) 

return  on  the  15th  to  Haguenau  and  Petite-  Pierre. 

15 

Maizieres.  .  . 

Blamont.  .  .  . 

The  stores  for  this  resupply  should  also  start  from 
Haguenau  early  on  the  14th;    carried  as  far  as  Petite- 

Pierre  by  relay  teams  (H3)  —  relay  at  Petite-Pierre  —  load 

carried   from    Petite-Pierre    to    Fenestrange   by   relay 

teams   (P3)  —  remains  over  night  at  Fenestrange;    the 

load   starts   again   early  on  the  15th  —  drawn  by  relay 

teams    (F1)    as   far  as    Sarrebourg  —  transported    from 
Sarrebourg  to  destination  by  relay  teams  (Sl).     (H3) 

and  (P3)  return  on  the  15th  to  Haguenau  and  Petite- 

Pierre—  (F1;  and  (S1)  return  the   16th  to  Fenestrange 

and  Sarrebourg. 

164  Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 

It  would  be  possible  to  continue  the  resupply  in  this 
manner,  but  it  is  useless  to  press  this  example  further,  which 
well  confirms  the  correctness  of  the  conclusions  of  the  theo- 
retical study,  particularly  as  it  relates  to  the  necessity  of 
forming  three  trains  in  each  station.  Although  the  move- 
ment studied  only  covers  a  period  of  six  days,  we  have  neces- 
sarily supposed  the  establishment  of  three  relays  of  horses 
at  Haguenau  (hi,  h2,  and  h3)  and  at  Petite-Pierre  (pi,  p2, 
and  p3).  If  the  supply  were  to  be  continued  by  the  same 
line  of  communication,  it  would  be  necessary  to  create  three 
relays  of  horses  in  the  other  stations:  Fenestrange,  Sarre- 
bourg,  etc. 

Terminating  here  the  description  of  the  supply  by  this 
line  of  communication,  we  in  fact  are  conforming  to  what 
actually  occurred,  for,  upon  the  arrival  of  the  army  at  Lun£- 
ville  and  Nancy,  it  may  be  taken  for  granted  that  the  neces 
sary  supplies  would  be  found  there,  since  it  would  be 
possible  to  bring  them  up  by  the  railroad,  the  traffic  over 
which  was  reestablished  on  the  18th. 

Summary  and  Conclusion. 

In  the  foregoing  we  have  only  considered  the  movement 
of  the  trains,  and  it  would  be  necessary  to  apply  the  same 
principles  in  order  to  study  the  special  arrangements  which 
would  be  necessary  in  order  to  provide  the  supply  of  meat 
and  bread.  We  will  avoid,  however,  entering  into  greater 
details  on  this  subject,  so  as  not  to  further  extend  this  study. 
Moreover,  all  we  have  said  on  the  subject  of  trains  in 
general  can  be  adapted,  almost  without  any  modification, 
to  the  resupply  of  meat,  by  assigning  to  the  successive  trains 
of  the  cattle  and  herds  the  role  which  the  trains  play  in  the 
foregoing  discussion.  As  concerns  the  resupply  of  bread, 
we  will  also  be  brought  to  the  same  conclusion,  and.  on  the 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army.  165 

other  hand,  the  development  of  this  question  in  a  former 
study  of  the  workings  of  a  field  bakery  column*  relieves 
us  of  the  necessity  of  entering  into  further  details  on  this 
subject. 

We  will  confine  ourselves  to  close  this  study  to  a  single 
remark,  which  will  serve  as  the  conclusion. 

When  examining  Plate  I.  annexed  to  the  Regulations 
of  November  20,  1894,  or  Plate  II.  hereunto  annexed,  both 
of  which  give  the  theoretical  plan  of  the  movements  of  the 
trains,  it  seems,  at  first  sight,  that  the  arrangement  is  very 
complicated;  it  may  be  thought  that  it  forms  a  too  elaborate 
mechanism,  a  kind  of  wheel  mathematically  set  up  which 
the  least  unforeseen  circumstances  will  derange  and  which 
could  be  put  into  practice  only  by  providing  in  advance  and 
ordering  from  the  beginning  of  the  operation  all  the  move- 
ments which  should  bring  each  section  of  the  various  trains 
to  the  point  where  it  should  resupply  the  preceding  train. 

In  fact  it  is  not  so,  and,  on  the  contrary,  the  arrange- 
ment is  the  simplest ;  it  is  resolved  into  two  movements : 

1st.  A  general  movement  of  the  different  trains  con- 
forming to  the  general  advance  of  the  army,  so  that  the 
different  trains  always  keep  their  proper  positions,  as 
follows: 

The  main  body  of  the  administrative  trains  at  half  a 
march,  or  10  to  12  kilometres  from  the  columns; 

The  main  body  of  the  auxiliary  trains  at  the  advance 
despot,  about  two  marches  from  the  columns,  and  sending 
forward  a  section  half  a  march  to  be  more  within  reach,  so 
as  to  make,  when  necessary,  a  junction  with  the  administra- 
tive trains. 


*"Etude  sur  le  Fonctionnement  de  la  Boulangerie  de  Campagne 
d'un  Corps  d'Armee,"  par  O.  Espanet,  sous-intendant  militaire  de  3« 
classe. 


166  Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 

The  supplies  from  the  rear  collected  in  depots  and 
Echeloned  on  trains  in  conformity  with  the  arrangements 
shown  in  Plate  III.,  Figure  1. 

2d.  Each  train  sending  forward — when  a  requisition  is 
made  upon  it  by  the  preceding  train  which  must  be  resup- 
plied — a  section  which  goes  to  the  place  where  the  train  to 
be  resupplied  has  been  emptied.  This  section,  after  having 
turned  over  its  load  to  the  train  which  it  is  to  resupply,  is 
resupplied  itself  from  the  local  resources  or  otherwise,  and 
retakes  its  place  in  the  main  train  from  which  it  had  parted 
when  the  general  advance  of  the  latter  brings  it  up  to  the 
former. 

The  orders  for  these  two  movements  will  be  given  as 
follows: 

The  order  relating  to  the  general  advance  may  be  given 
at  the  same  time  as  the  order  for  the  advance  of  the  main 
columns.  As  a  general  rule,  omitting  the  accidents  result- 
ing from  the  military  incidents,  the  order  for  the  movement 
is  given  each  evening  for  the  following  day's  march.  If, 
for  instance,  it  is  a  question  of  the  march  represented  for 
the  second  day  in  diagram  I.  of  Plate  II.,  the  order  for  the 
movement  given  the  evening  of  the  first  day  will  give  the 
cantonments  of  the  column  for  the  second  day  and  also  the 
points  Al,  Bl,  HI,  where  the  main  body  of  the  various  trains 
would  be  stationed. 

It  will  be  possible  now,  from  the  preliminary  study  of 
the  theatre  of  operations  and  the  information  gathered  by 
the  cavalry  or  the  advance  guards,  to  know  if  it  will  be 
practicable  to  subsist  the  troops  by  billeting  them  upon  the 
inhabitants.  In  that  event,  the  order  for  the  movement 
given  in  the  evening  should  state  whether  this  method 
should  be  applied  as  a  general  means  of  subsistence,  or  if  it 
is  to  be  used  only  by  the  detachments  of  the  army.  We 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army.  167 

know,  moreover,  that  for  the  success  of  this  method  of  sub- 
sistence it  is  necessary  that  the  order  for  it  should  be  given 
in  advance  and  that  the  municipal  authorities  should  be 
likewise  informed. 

When  the  troops  are  not  to  be  billeted  upon  the  inhab- 
itants, the  order  for  the  movement  will  indicate  that  an 
issue  of  rations  will  be  made  upon  arrival  in  the  new  canton- 
ments, by  drawing  upon  the  regimental  train;  for  example, 
the  evening  of  the  first  day  the  order  for  the  second  day's 
march  will  state  that  the  issue  for  the  evening  of  the  second 
day  will  be  provided  by  the  regimental  train;  it  will  state 
undoubtedly,  once  for  all,  that  the  hay  and  straw  will  be 
bought  by  the  corps  in  the  places  where  required;  as  we 
have  already  shown,  this  will  generally  be  easily  accom- 
plished, and,  moreover,  when  this  method  is  impossible, 
those  stores  must  be  dispensed  with  on  account  of  the  im- 
possibility of  transporting  such  bulky  supplies. 

But  to  conform  to  the  condition  imposed  of  calling  upon 
the  rear  trains  to  resupply  the  one  in  advance  only  when  it 
has  been  impossible  to  resupply  it  from  the  country,  the 
order  given  the  first  day  cannot  state  whether  the  admin- 
istrative trains  should  send  forward  a  section  for  the  resup- 
ply of  the  section  of  the  regimental  train  emptied  by  the 
issue  in  the  second  day's  cantonments.  The  divisional  sous- 
intendants  and  the  supply  officers  upon  arriving  in  these  can- 
tonments will  proceed  to  make  a  careful  reconnaissance.  If 
the  results  of  this  reconnaissance  show  the  impossibility  of 
providing  for  the  resupply  of  the  regimental  train  from  the 
local  resources,  then  it  becomes  necessary  to  order  the  ad- 
vance of  a  section  of  the  administrative  train,  and  such  in- 
structions will  then  be  sent  to  it.  If  the  sous-intendants  and 
the  supply  officers  have  been  able  to  precede  the  column 
under  the  protection  of  the  advance  guard,  their  reconnals- 


168  Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 

sance  can  be  made  sooner  and  the  order  perhaps  sent  in 
time  to  Al  to  the  administrative  train  so  that  the  designated 
section  can  advance  in  the  evening  even  to  the  centers  of 
distribution  if  necessary;  the  order  sent  to  the  administra- 
tive train  will  indicate  which  one  of  the  three  methods, 
numbered  1st,  2d,  3d,  described  on  pages  118,  119,  and  120, 
it  is  desired  to  make  use  of  upon  the  arrival  of  the  sec- 
tion of  that  train  at  the  centers  of  distribution:  1st,  if 
the  section  of  the  auxiliary  train  should  arrive  the  same 
evening  (as  is  shown  the  second  day  in  the  drawing),  the 
order  indicates  the  hour  fixed  for  the  issue;  2d,  if  the  section 
of  the  administrative  train  is  only  to  arrive  the  following 
morning  before  the  formation  of  the  column  (as  represented 
for  the  fourth  day),  the  order  for  it  need  not  be  sent  until 
evening,  and  it  should  indicate  the  latest  hour  the  section 
should  arrive;  3d,  if  the  section  of  the  administrative  train 
is  not  to  make  the  junction  until  after  the  deployment  of 
the  troops  (as  is  represented  for  the  fifth  day),  it  will  be  like- 
wise sufficient  for  the  order  to  reach  it  in  the  evening  of  the 
preceding  day,  and  that  order  should  state  by  what  hour  the 
roads  will  be  unobstructed  by  the  deployment  of  the  troops; 
practically  this  information  can  be  given  by  indicating  the 
hour  the  train  will  pass  the  cantonment  of  the  rear  of  the 
column.  It  is  understood,  whatever  may  be  the  time  fixed 
for  the  junction  of  the  administrative  train  and  the  regi- 
mental train,  the  order  will  always  designate  the  centers  of 
supply  and  the  roads  to  be  followed  to  reach  them. 

In  like  manner,  only  when  it  is  seen  to  be  impossible 
to  provide  for  the  resupply  of  that  section  of  the  administra- 
tive train  from  the  local  resources  should  an  order  be  issued 
to  send  forward  a  section  of  the  auxiliary  train.  If,  for  in- 
stance, it  is  a  question  of  resupplying  at  C  section  1  of  the 
auxiliary  train,  an  inspection  of  the  drawing  shows  that  it 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army.  169 

is  sufficient  to  issue  that  order  the  morning  of  the  third  day, 
so  as  to  make  it  possible  to  effect  a  junction  with  section  1 
of  the  auxiliary  train. 

It  would  also  appear  that  for  the  resupply  of  this 
section  1  of  the  auxiliary  train  the  order  for  the  dispatch  of 
a  requisitioned  train  bringing  stores  from  the  rear  can  be 
deferred  until  the  fourth  day. 

The  issue  of  rations  from  a  section  of  the  regimental 
train,  made  in  the  cantonments  the  second  day,  brings  suc- 
cessively into  action  section  1  of  the  administrative  train, 
section  1  of  the  auxiliary  train,  then  a  requisitioned  train; 
the  foregoing  analysis  shows  that  it  is  not  at  all  necessary 
to  foresee  and  order  in  advance  all  these  movements  at  the 
same  time  that  the  order  for  the  second  day's  march  is 
issued.  On  the  contrary,  the  order  for  the  particular  move- 
ment for  each  section  to  provide  for  the  resupply  can  be 
issued  whenever  it  is  seen  to  be  necessary,  without  these 
special  movements  interfering  in  any  way  with  the  general 
advance  of  the  column  and  of  the  main  trains  of  the  various 
Echelons. 

These  results,  concerning  the  manner  in  which  the  or- 
ders relating  to  the  subsistence  service  should  be  given,  are 
in  conformity  with  the  directions  of  Articles  76  and  77  of  the 
Regulations  of  January  11,  1893.  They  point  out,  however, 
it  seems  to  me,  the  conditions  of  time  in  which  these  orders 
are  given,  and  when  they  are  necessary,  better  than  Article 
77  before  cited,  which  gives  the  impression  that  all  these 
orders  may  be  incorporated  in  the  general  order  for  the  day. 

If  it  is  interesting  to  know  what  are  the  orders  that 
the  operation  of  the  subsistence  service  will  necessitate  and 
the  time  when  these  orders  should  be  given,  it  is  also  impor- 
tant to  ascertain  positively  upon  whom  will  fall  the  duty 
of  preparing,  publishing,  and  issuing  them. 


170  Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 

At  the  commencement  of  the  operation,  a  general  order 
of  the  army  will  undoubtedly  fix  the  number  and  composi- 
tion of  the  columns,  the  assignment  of  the  lines  of  march 
of  each — in  short,  the  general  formation  of  the  army  such 
as  we  have  defined  in  paragraph  11  of  Chapter  I.:  upon  this 
order  is  afterwards  arranged  the  general  movement  of  the 
trains  which  form  the  first  of  the  movements  in  which,  we 
have  said  above,  the  general  system  of  resupply  is  divided. 
The  movements  of  the  regimental  trains,  of  the  administra- 
tive trains,  the  herds,  the  field  bakery  column  when  it  is 
attached  to  the  army  corps,  are  in  accordance  with  these 
general  instructions  ordered  for  each  column  by  the  officer 
commanding  the  column.  It  is  also  upon  the  general  out- 
lines prescribed  by  this  principal  order  that  the  director  of 
communications  will  determine  the  direction  and  assign- 
ment of  the  lines  of  communications — that  is,  the  general 
movement  which  relates  to  the  service  of  the  line  of  com- 
munication and  the  auxiliary  trains. 

The  duty  of  informing  the  headquarters  of  the  possi- 
bility of  adopting  such  method  of  subsistence,  of  providing 
the  resupply  of  the  regimental  trains  or  of  the  administra- 
tive trains  from  the  local  resources,  falls  upon  the  sous- 
intendants  of  the  divisions  and  the  intendants  of  the  army 
corps,  who  draw  up  for  the  headquarters  and  afterwards 
transmit  the  necessary  orders  for  the  movement  to  the  ad- 
ministrative train  when  a  section  of  the  latter  must  partici- 
pate in  order  to  resupply  the  regimental  train.  The  centers 
of  supply  where  these  two  trains  should  meet  are  deter- 
mined by  the  generals  of  the  division  or  by  the  army  corps 
commanders,  according  to  circumstances. 

When  it  is  necessary  to  draw  upon  the  auxiliary  train 
for  the  resupply  of  the  administrative  train,  the  movement 
should  be  regulated  in  accordance  with  an  agreement  be- 


Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army.  171 

tween  the  headquarters  and  the  service  of  the  line  of  com- 
munication. There  are,  in  reality,  two  movements  to  be 
regarded:  that  of  the  administrative  trains,  which  should 
be  ordered  by  the  commander  of  the  unit  to  which  the  train 
is  attached;  and  the  movement  of  the  auxiliary  train,  which 
should  be  directed  by  the  authorities  of  the  line  of  communi- 
cation. Regarding  the  points  where  the  two  trains  should 
meet,  their  designation  is  made  by  the  commandants  of  the 
columns.  As  we  have  said  before,  the  movement  of  the 
auxiliary  train  is  directed  by  the  proper  official  attached  to 
the  service  of  the  lines  of  communication  in  accordance  with 
the  request  of  the  commandant  of  the  column,  a  request 
which,  in  addition  to  the  kind  and  quality  of  the  stores  to 
be  forwarded,  should  state  the  center  of  supply  where  the 
delivery  will  be  made  to  the  administrative  train. 

These  arrangements  are  in  conformity  with  the  terms 
of  the  order  of  January  11,  1893,  and  with  the  Regulations 
of  November  20,  1889,  which,  perhaps,  are,  however,  not 
explicit  in  indicating  the  official  to  whom  the  request  should 
be  addressed.  Article  57  of  the  regulation  for  the  service  of 
the  lines  of  communications  indeed  declares  in  effect  that, 
for  one  day's  rations  and  forage,  the  administrative  trains 
are  supplied  by  the  advance  or  temporary  depots  without 
requests  or  previous  notification;  but,  on  the  other  hand, 
Article  11  of  the  same  regulation  says  that  the  requests  for 
stores  are  made  in  conformity  with  the  regulation  or  without 
the  authority  of  the  army  commander,  by  the  corps  com- 
manders to  the  chief  of  the  line  of  communication,  and  that 
in  concert  these  two  authorities  settle  upon  the  means  relat- 
ing to  the  deliveries  to  be  made  to  the  army  trains.  These 
arrangements  do  not  seem  to  me  to  be  compatible  with  the 
urgent  conditions  which  will  generally  accompany  the  de- 
mands made  by  the  columns  upon  the  auxiliary  trains.  It 


172  Notes  on  the  Supply  of  an  Army. 

would  be  better  to  say  that  when  the  corps  commanders — 
or,  better  still,  the  commanders  of  the  columns — have  recog- 
nized the  necessity  of  calling  upon  a  section  of  the  auxil- 
iary train  for  the  resupply  of  their  administrative  trains, 
they  will  address  the  necessary  order  direct  to  the  com- 
mander of  the  advanced  section  of  the  auxiliary  train  which 
it  will  be  the  duty  of  the  service  of  the  line  of  communica- 
tion to  constantly  maintain  in  position  one  march  or  one 
and  one-half  inarches  in  rear  of  the  columns.  The  chief  of 
that  section  should  comply  immediately  with  that  order, 
which  the  headquarters,  whence  it  emanates,  should  for- 
ward in  duplicate  to  the  military  commander  of  the  advance 
de'pot,  in  order  that  the  latter  can  at  once  send  another 
section  forward  to  take  the  place  of  the  preceding. 

The  order  in  question  will  always  indicate  the  points 
designated  as  centers  of  supply  where  the  section  should 
repair.  When  these  points,  as  will  generally  be  the  case 
(for  instance,  the  point  C  in  Figure  1  of  Plate  II.,  and  par- 
ticularly the  points  C  and  Cl  of  Figure  3  of  same  plate), 
are  in  the  zones  of  cantonments  still  occupied  by  the  troops, 
the  above  order  should  always  indicate  the  hours  at  which 
the  communicating  roads  will  be  cleared  by  the  completion 
of  the  movement  of  the  columns,  and  therefore  the  hour  the 
auxiliary  train  can  make  use  of  them. 

The  columns  being  composed  of  troops  of  two  army 
corps  and  often  of  subdivisions  belonging  to  several  army 
corps — as  in  the  example  given  in  the  formation  represented 
by  Figure  5 — it  is  taken  for  granted  that  the  above  order 
must  be  given  by  the  same  authority  w7hich  directed  the 
movement  of  the  column  and  not  necessarily  by  the  corps 
commanders,  since  to  reach  a  subdivision  the  auxiliary 
trains  may  have  to  traverse  the  zones  of  subdivisions  be- 
longing to  other  corps. 

O.  ESPANET, 
Sous-Tntendant  Militaire  de  2n  Classe. 


PRIZE  ESSAY. 


THE  ART  OF  SUPPLYING  ARMIES  IN  THE  FIELD  AS  EXEM- 
PLIFIED DURING  THE  ClVIL   WAR. 

BY  CAPTAIN  HENRY  G.  SHARPE, 
Subsistence  Department. 

From  the  Journal  of  the  Military  Service  Institution  of  the  United  States,  Jan'y,  1896. 

The  art  of  supplying  armies  in  the  field  comprises  all 
those  means  essential  to  procure  the  supplies,  to  store 
them  in  depots  located  at  advantageous  points,  and  to  trans- 
port them  to  the  troops.  The  methods  of  operating  the  lines 
of  communication  so  as  to  expedite  the  transportation  of 
supplies,  materials,  and  troops  passing  along  them,  either 
going  to  the  front  or  moving  to  the  rear,  are  also  parts  of  the 
art  of  supplying  troops  in  the  field. 

In  war  a  well  organized,  armed,  and  trained  force 
should  be  always  ready  to  move  in  any  direction  and  pre- 
pared to  give  battle  upon  any  locality  that  may  have  been 
selected  by  the  commanding  general,  or  to  oppose  the  ad- 
vance or  check  a  flank  movement  of  the  enemy.  Mobility  is 
thus  a  factor  of  great  consequence,  and  it  follows  that  an 
army  can  only  be  endowed  with  equipment  and  supplies  up 
to  such  an  extent  as  will  not  impede  or  hinder  this  important 
factor.  To  make  the  best  possible  use  of  a  force  in  the  field 
it  must  therefore  be  provided  with  efficient  and  sufficient 
means  of  transport  and  with  a  practical  and  well-arranged 
system  of  supply. 

To  provide  for  the  wants  of  the  troops  every  army  has 


174  Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field. 

a  number  of  administrative*  departments  charged  with  the 
procuration,  custody,  and  distribution  of  certain  description 
of  supplies  which  are  essential  to  keep  the  troops  in  health 
and  strength,  and  which  provide  them  at  all  times  with 
everything  that  is  indispensable  for  the  furtherance  of  the 
plan  of  the  campaign.  The  supply  departments  in  our  army 
are  the  Quartermaster,  Subsistence,  Ordnance,  Pay,  and 
Medical  Departments.! 

The  work  performed  by  the  administrative  departments 
of  an  army  is  divided  into  two  distinct  and  separate  spheres 
of  action:  1st,  the  service  performed  in  rear  of  the  army; 
and  2d,  that  whose  province  is  confined  to  the  troops  in  the 
field.  These  two  services  are  entirely  separate,  but  work  in 
conjunction  with  each  other  to  carry  out  the  main  object 
for  which  they  are  created, — the  supply  and  maintenance 
of  the  army. 

SUPPLY  SERVICE  WORKING  AT  THE  REAR. 

The  service  in  rear  has  two  distinct  duties  to  perform: 
1st,  the  procuration  and  custody;  2d,  transportation  and  dis- 
tribution. The  supplies  are  procured  or  manufactured  in 
the  national  territory,  or  abroad,  and  experience  proves  that 
in  order  that  the  procuration  should  be  more  successful  it 
should  be  located  permanently  in  some  place  remote  from 

*"Men  brought  together  in  large  numbers  have  wants;  the  talent 
to  satisfy  these  with  order,  economy,  and  intelligence,  forms  the 
science  of  administration."  (Marmont.) 

tThe  duties  of  the  different  supply  departments,  as  prescribed 
by  laws  in  force  during  the  war,  are  set  forth  in  the  following  sec- 
tions of  the  Revised  Statutes,  U.  S.,  viz.: 

Section  1133— Quartermaster's  Department. 

1141— Subsistence 
"       1164 — Ordnance  " 

1188— Pay 

And  an  Act  passed  in  the  2d  Session  of  the  37th  Congress  and 
approved  April  16th,  1862,  prescribed  the  duties  of  the  Medical  De- 
partment. 


Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field.  175 

the  theatre  of  war,  because  it  is  only  at  a  distance  from  such 
locality  that  commerce  is  able  to  be  entered  upon  with  ad- 
vantage. These  reserve  supplies  that  are  accumulated  by 
the  service  in  rear  are  intended  to  replace  those  carried  with 
the  army,  and  are  located  in  such  parts  of  the  national  coun- 
try as  are  most  accessible  to  the  fields  of  operation,  and  such 
section  of  the  country  or  place  is  known  as  the  base  of 
operations  of  the  army.* 

The  base  of  operations  of  an  army  being  that  portion  of 
a  country  from  which  it  obtains  its  reinforcement  and  sup- 
plies, its  selection  necessarily  has  an  influence  upon  the 
strategy  of  a  campaign.  Jomini  says  that  it  is  a  principle 
to  establish  the  base  upon  those  points  where  it  can  be 
sustained  by  all  the  resources  of  the  country,  and  at  the 
same  time  provide  a  safe  retreat  for  the  army.  The  depend- 
ence of  an  army  upon  its  base  of  operations  increases  in  pro- 
portion with  its  size,  and  therefore  the  influence  of  the  base 
on  the  operations  of  an  army  is  magnified  as  the  numbers  of 
the  same  are  increased. 

"The  value  of  a  base  of  operations  will  seldom  deter- 
mine the  choice  of  an  undertaking  in  the  first  instance. 
Mere  difficulties  which  may  present  themselves  in  this 
respect  must  be  put  side  by  side  and  compared  with  other 
means  actually  at  our  command;  obstacles  of  this  nature 
often  vanish  before  the  force  of  decisive  victories."  t 

While  the  selection  of  a  base  of  operations  should  not, 
in  general,  interfere  with  the  plan  of  campaign,  the  location 
and  configuration  of  a  base  will  affect  the  readiness  with 

*"The  base  of  operations  is  most  generally  that  of  supply." 
(Jomini.) 

"The  base  of  operations  of  an  army  is  composed  of  the  country 
which  it  covers,  which  furnishes  its  wants,  which  sends  to  it  every 
day  the  supplies  of  every  kind  which  it  consumes, — and  which  re- 
ceives its  sick  and  wounded,  etc."  (Marmont.) 

tVon  Clausewitz. 


176  Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field. 

which  the  supplies  can  be  procured  and  forwarded  to  an 
army.  A  base  should  rest  on  many  points,  as  it  is  both 
difficult  and  dangerous  to  collect  all  the  supplies  in  one 
depot 

The  extent  of  the  Federal  base  gave  its  armies  an  ad- 
vantage; not  only  had  they  a  variety  of  lines  of  invasion  to 
select  from,  but  when  defeated  in  Virginia  it  was  almost 
hopeless  to  attempt  to  intercept  them.  In  1862,  Jackson's 
flanking  movement  cut  off  Pope  from  the  upper  Potomac, 
but  could  not  prevent  him  from  reaching  Alexandria;  and  if 
cut  off  from  Alexandria,  he  could  still  have  retreated  on 
Acquia  and  the  flotilla.  And  in  1863,  when  Grant  was 
baffled  on  the  line  of  the  Rapidan,  he  changed  his  base  as  he 
moved  around  Lee's  right  successively  to  the  Pamunkey  and 
to  the  James. 

The  supremacy  at  sea,  and  the  fact  that  the  theatre  of 
war  was  largely  bounded  by  coast  line,  gave  the  Federal 
Government  an  immense  advantage.  The  capture  of  the 
forts  at  Hatteras  Inlet,  of  Roanoke  Island,  Newberne,  New 
Orleans,  Fort  Fisher,  and  Fort  Pickens,  the  Peninsula  Cam- 
paign, and  the  supply  of  the  armies  operating  against  Rich 
mond  in  Grant's  campaigns,  were  feasible  mainly  because 
of  the  Government's  supremacy  at  sea. 

The  facility  of  procuring  the  supplies  depends  upon  the 
richness  and  financial  resources  of  the  country  and  the 
number  of  men  available  to  raise  the  crops  and  prepare  the 
needed  supplies.  During  the  Civil  War  the  population  of 
the  North  was  largely  in  excess  of  that  of  the  South,  and 
while  it  was  at  first  considered  that  the  slaves  at  the  South 
would  prove  a  source  of  anxiety  and  apprehension,  it  turned 
out  actually  that  they  were  trusted  to  take  care  of  the  fam- 
ilies where  the  able-bodied  white  men  had  gone  to  the  war, 
and  they  never  betrayed  their  trust.  They  were  largely 


Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field.  177 

engaged  in  building  fortifications,  and  raised  the  crops  upon 
which  the  entire  South  subsisted  during  the  whole  war. 
Both  sides  had  to  depend  to  a  considerable  extent  on  Europe 
for  supplies  of  arms  and  ammunition.  This  was,  of  course, 
more  true  of  the  South  than  of  the  North,  for  the  principal 
arsenals  for  the  manufacture  of  arms  were  situated  in  the 
Northern  States,  but  it  was  very  much  easier  for  the  North 
to  obtain  the  importations  than  it  was  for  the  South,  as 
vessels  containing  the  cargoes  were  obliged  to  run  the 
blockade  and  were  often  captured  when  they  attempted  it. 

The  South,  at  the  commencement  of  the  war,  was  able 
to  draw  upon  the  supplies  stored  in  the  arsenals  located  in 
that  section,  and  which  had  been  "well  stocked  by  the  prov- 
ident treason  of  Buchanan's  Minister  of  War."*  But  when 
these  resources  were  exhausted,  replacement  was  difficult, 
the  blockade  having  been  established,  though  extraordinary 
efforts  to  manufacture  the  military  supplies  were  made. 

The  Confederate  Government  enacted  a  law  providing 
that  a  certain  portion  of  the  cargo  of  every  vessel  entering 
its  ports  must  consist  of  arms  or  ammunition,  otherwise 
vessel  and  all  would  be  confiscated.  This  insured  a  con- 
stant supply;  and  though  the  soldiers  were  often  barefoot, 
ragged,  and  hungry,  they  never  lacked  arms,  nor  were  they 
defeated  for  want  of  ammunition. 

Procuration. 

The  principal  points  of  supply  for  the  Federal  armies 
for  the  supplies  furnished  by  the  Quartermaster's  and  Sub- 
sistence Departments  were  in  the  cities  of  Boston,  New 
York,  Philadelphia,  Baltimore,  Washington,  Cincinnati, 
Louisville,  St.  Louis,  Chicago,  New  Orleans,  and  San  Fran- 
cisco, and  in  each  of  these  cities  there  were  one  or  more 


*Goldwin  Smith— "The  United  States."— Mr.  Floyd. 

12  — 


178  Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field. 

officers  in  charge  of  the  de'pot  belonging  to  each  depart- 
ment, provided  with  ample  force  of  clerks,  laborers,  and 
mechanics.  There  were  large  establishments  at  Cincinnati, 
Louisville,  Jeffersonville,  and  Alexandria,  in  which  hard 
and  soft  bread  were  baked  by  the  Subsistence  Department, 
but  the  greater  part  of  the  bread  supplied  was  furnished 
from  New  York,  Baltimore,  and  St.  Louis.  There  were  also 
large  pork-packing  establishments  located  at  Louisville, 
Ky.,  operated  by  the  Subsistence  Department. 

The  principal  depots  for  the  purchase  and  manufacture 
of  clothing  were  at  Philadelphia,  New  York,  Boston,  Cin- 
cinnati, Louisville,  Indianapolis,  St.  Louis,  Detroit,  and  at 
Springfield,  Ills.  When  the  Rebellion  first  compelled  the 
Government  to  call  out  a  large  force,  the  stock  of  clothing 
on  hand  in  the  depots,  being  intended  only  for  the  supply  of 
the  regular  army,  about  1.3,000  strong,  was  inconsiderable. 
The  manufacture  of  cloth  for  army  clothing  was  engaged  in 
by  few  factories  throughout  the  country,  and  the  stock  of 
clothing  was  at  once  exhausted;  there  was  also  great  scar- 
city of  suitable  blankets  and  undergarments.*  The  troops 
being  received  generally  through  State  authorities,  these 
authorities  were  engaged  to  assist  the  Quartermaster's  De- 
partment to  provide  the  necessary  supplies.  Large  impor- 

*"Under  these  circumstances,  and  to  supply  the  immediate  and 
absolute  necessities  of  the  suffering  troops,  large  quantities  of  such 
materials  as  could  be  found  in  the  market  in  the  hands  of  the  dealers 
and  manufacturers— materials  manufactured  for  the  ordinary  cloth- 
ing of  the  people— were  purchased  and  made  up.  In  some  cases  the^e 
articles  were  redyed,  of  the  uniform  colors,  light  and  dark  indigo 
blue;  but  the  greater  part  of  the  gray,  brown,  and  black  cloths  pur- 
chased were  made  up  in  those  colors.  *  *  *  *  When  the  troops 
came  in  contact  with  the  enemy  on  thickly  wooded  fields,  mistakes 
occurred.  The  rebel  forces  were  generally  clothed  in  gray,  and  our 
own  troops,  in  some  cases,  fired  into  each  other.  This  caused  orders 
to  be  issued,  both  by  the  Eastern  and  Western  commanders,  prohibit- 
ing the  issue  or  use  of  clothing  of  any  but  the  established  uniform 
colors,  light  and  dark  blues."  (Report  of  the  Quartermaster-Gen- 
eral, November  18,  1862.) 


Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field.  179 

tations  were  made  by  merchants,  and  the  goods  thus 
imported  were  bought  by  the  State  authorities  and  by  the 
Quartermaster's  Department,  and  manufactured  by  con- 
tract, or  in  the  establishments  of  the  department,  into 
clothing. 

A  very  large  proportion  of  the  ordnance  supplies  was 
manufactured  in  the  arsenals,  foundries,  and  armories 
throughout  the  North,  of  which  there  wrere  twenty-eight  in 
number.  The  most  important  ones  were  located  upon  rail- 
roads or  water-ways.  Some  of  these  arsenals  were  devoted 
to  special  work,  as,  for  instance,  iron  gun  carriages  were 
manufactured  at  Fortress  Monroe,  Va.,  and  Watertown, 
South  Boston.  Wood  carriages  were  manufactured  at 
Watertown,  Watervliet  (Troy,  N.  Y.),  Allegheny  City,  and 
Washington,  D.  C.  Harness  was  made  at  Watertown  and 
Watervliet.  The  principal  repair  shops,  especially  for  small 
arms,  were  at  St.  Louis,  Mo.,  and  Washington,  D.  C.  Com- 
pressed bullets  were  made  in  the  arsenals  at  St.  Louis, 
Washington,  and  Allegheny  City,  and  large  quantities  were 
also  furnished  by  private  factories.  Ammunition  was  pre- 
pared at  all  the  arsenals  except  that  of  Fortress  Monroe. 
Guns  were  cast  in  the  foundries  at  Pittsburgh,  Reading, 
Cold  Spring,  South  Boston,  and  Providence.  The  armory  at 
Harper's  Ferry  having  been  destroyed  to  prevent  its  occupa- 
tion and  use  by  the  rebels,  the  Government  was  compelled 
to  rely  upon  the  single  armory  at  Springfield,  and  upon 
private  establishments  for  a  supply  of  arms.  The  capacity 
of  that  armory  was  largely  increased  until  it  was  capable  of 
producing  several  thousand  stands  cf  arms  per  month.  The 
demand  for  arms  caused  the  establishment  of  numerous 
manufactories  throughout  the  Northern  States,  and  these 
were  encouraged  by  the  Government. 

Combinations    among    manufacturers,    importers,    and 


180  Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field. 

agents,  for  the  sale  of  arms,  caused  a  great'  advance  in 
prices,  and  to  prevent  advantage  being  taken  of  the  neces- 
sities of  the  Government,  the  Customs  officers  were  directed 
to  deliver  to  Government  agents  all  arms  and  munitions 
that  were  imported  into  the  country. 

The  Ordnance  Department  likewise  furnished  all  the 
horse  shoes  and  nails  used  in  the  army  during  the  war.  The 
powder  was  furnished  by  private  manufacturers,  the  Ord- 
nance Department  being  charged  with  the  duty  of  making 
the  necessary  proof  upon  its  receipt.  The  purchase  of  arms 
abroad  continued  until  1863,  by  which  time  the  manufact- 
urers of  Pennsylvania  succeeded  in  furnishing  suitable  iron 
and  steel  for  the  purpose  of  manufacturing  arms. 

Prior  to  the  war  the  production  of  minerals  at  the  South 
was  insignificant — in  fact,  the  great  mineral  wealth  of  that 
section  was  not  then  known;  and  no  manufactories  or  foun- 
dries were  situated  in  that  region,  as  the  institution  of 
slavery  was  more  particularly  concerned  with  agricultural 
pursuits,  and  the  South  wras  supplied  with  machinery  and 
everything  that  it  required  from  factories  and  mills  in  the 
Northern  States.  The  establishment  of  the  blockade  cut  off 
the  possibility  of  supply  from  European  markets,  and  thus 
compelled  the  Confederate  States  to  rely  upon  the  ingenuity 
and  skill  of  their  inhabitants  to  produce  the  supplies  of  all 
kinds  required.  The  iron  mines  in  Georgia  and  Alabama 
were  operated  on  an  extensive  scale  and  yielded  all  the  iron 
used  in  the  manufacture  of  guns  and  projectiles.  The 
Tredegar  works,  near  Richmond,  were  the  largest  iron  mills 
in  the  South,  and  at  that  establishment  cannon  and  project- 
iles of  every  calibre  were  manufactured. 

A  few  of  the  machines  in  the  Harper's  Ferry  armory 
were  saved  by  the  Confederates  from  the  fire,  and  wrere  for- 
warded to  Richmond,  where  they  were  set  up. 


Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field.  181 

Nearly  all  the  Confederate  States  established  such  fac- 
tories as  were  needed,  all  of  which  were  eventually  placed 
under  the  exclusive  control  of  the  Confederate  Government. 
Shops  for  the  remodelling  of  old  guns  and  the  manufacture 
of  Minie  rifles  were  established  at  Memphis,  New  Orleans, 
Nashville,  Gallatin,  Richmond,  and  many  other  places. 

At  Dahlonega,  Georgia,  was  located  the  principal 
powder  mill  of  the  rebels;  and  their  factories  for  percussion 
caps  were  in  Richmond.  At  first  the  cartridge  factory  was 
at  Memphis,  but  was  later  moved  to  Grenada. 

All  the  horses  and  mules  used  in  the  army  were  pur- 
chased by  the  Quartermaster's  Department;  in  consequence 
ol  very  decided  objections  raised  by  the  cavalry  officers,  a 
Cavalry  Bureau  was  established  in  1863  by  General  Orders 
No.  230.  This  bureau  was  charged  with  the  organization 
and  equipment  of  the  cavalry  forces  of  the  army  and  with 
the  duty  of  providing  for  the  mounts  and  re-mounts  of  the 
same.  The  purchase  of  all  horses  for  the  cavalry  service 
were  to  be  made  by  the  officers  of  the  Quartermaster's  De- 
partment under  the  direction  of  the  chief  of  the  Cavalry 
Bureau,  and  depots  were  directed  to  be  established  for  the 
reception,  organization,  and  discipline  of  cavalry  recruits 
and  new  regiments,  and  for  the  collection,  care,  and  training 
of  cavalry  horses,  which  depots  were  to  be  under  the  control 
of  the  Cavalry  Bureau.  In  consequence  there  wTere  estab- 
lished, by  authority  of  this  order,  depots  at  Gisboro',  D.  C., 
St.  Louis,  Mo.,  Greenville,  La.,  Nashville,  Tenn.,  Harrisburg, 
Pa.,  and  Wilmington,  Delaware.  The  Gisboro'  depot  was 
the  principal  one  for  the  supply  of  the  armies  in  the  Atlantic 
States,  and  it  occupied  a  farm  of  about  625  acres  and  had  a 
capacity  of  providing  for  30,000  animals  at  the  de"pot,  but 
not  more  than  about  20,000  were  ever  on  hand  there  at  any 
one  time.  During  the  first  nine  months  of  1864  the  supply 


182  Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field. 

of  horses  by  the  Cavalry  Bureau  averaged  about  500  per 
diem.  The  supply  of  fresh  horses  to  General  Sheridan's 
army  during  his  campaign  in  the  valley  of  the  Shenandoah 
was  at  the  rate  of  150  per  diem.  Large  corrals  for  the  re- 
ception of  beef  cattle  were  also  established  at  various  points, 
notably  at  Louisville,  Kentucky,  which  corral  could  accom- 
modate between  30,000  and  40,000  head;  there  was  likewise 
a  large  corral  at  Alexandria,  Va. ;  and  a  large  herd  was  kept 
on  what  is  now  the  Monument  grounds  in  Washington,  D.  C. 

There  are  twTo  methods  of  procuring  the  supplies  re- 
quired for  an  army: 

1st.  By  entrusting  to  contractors  the  entire  work  of 
collecting  and  delivering  them  to  the  troops;  and, 

2d.  By  direct  purchases  made  by  designated  officers  of 
the  supply  departments. 

In  the  first  method  the  supply  departments  simply  exer- 
cise an  administrative  scrutiny  over  the  contracts  made  with 
various  firms  or  individuals. 

The  defects  of  this  system  are  universally  acknowl- 
edged, and  it  has  been  the  cause  of  disastrous  failures  in 
every  army  in  which  it  has  been  adopted.  Under  this 
system  the  success  of  the  most  important  military  operations 
is  dependent  upon  men  who  are  subject  to  no  military 
responsibility;  and  it  is  often  to  the  interest  of  the  contract- 
or to  fail  at  the  most  critical  juncture,  when  the  means  of 
supply  become  the  most  difficult  and  expensive.  Contracts 
are  never  fulfilled  to  the  letter,  and  never  will  be,  so  long  as 
avarice  exists.  General  Scott  said:  "The  method  is  be- 
lieved to  be  impolitic,  and  is  vicious  in  time  of  war;  also 
liable  to  many  objections  in  a  state  of  peace.  The  principal 
only  is  known  to  the  War  Office,  and  therefore  may  be  sup- 
posed to  be  free  from  this  objection;  but  his  deputies  and 
issuing  agents  are  appointed  without  the  concurrence  or 


Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field.  183 

knowledge  of  the  general  or  the  Government.  The  deputies 
or  issuing  agents  are  necessarily  as  well  acquainted  with  the 
numerical  strength  of  the  army  to  which  they  are  attached 
as  the  Adjutant-General  himself.  For  a  bribe  they  may 
communicate  this  intelligence  to  the  enemy,  or  fail  to  make 
issue  at  some  critical  moment,  and  thus  defeat  the  best  views 
and  hopes  of  the  Commander-in-chief."  From  the  close  of 
the  Kevolutionary  War  until  after  the  close  of  the  War  of 
1812  "the  mode  of  subsisting  the  army  by  contracts  for  com- 
plete rations  had  remained  substantially  unchanged,  but 
various  instrumentalities  and  combinations  of  instrument- 
alities for  carrying  it  into  execution  had  been  adopted. 
Throughout  all  these  changes  the  result  had  been  uniformly 
the  same — failure."* 

By  the  second  method,  the  officers  of  the  supply  depart- 
ments purchase  either  in  open  market,  or  after  making  a 
contract  with  dealers  for  the  delivery  of  the  supplies,  and 
upon  acceptance  the  supplies  are  forwarded  by  the  Govern- 
ment to  the  places  where  required.  The  advantage  of  this 
system  is  that  it  is  possible  to  accumulate  the  supplies  in 
a  distant  locality  without  the  likelihood  of  the  enemy's  hear- 
ing of  the  same  and  thus  obtaining  information  regarding  a 
contemplated  movement.  Furthermore,  by  this  system  it  is 
possible  to,  in  a  measure,  prevent  any  combinations  on  the 
part  of  dealers  to  advance  the  prices  of  supplies. 

The  Army  Regulations  and  Acts  of  Congress  in  force 
during  the  Civil  War  required,  in  general,  the  purchase  of 
all  supplies  for  the  army  to  be  made  under  contract;  and 
Section  16  of  an  Act  approved  July  17,  1862,  provided  that 
any  person  who  contracted  to  furnish  supplies  of  any  kind 
or  description  for  the  army  or  navy  should  be  deemed  as  a 
part  of  the  land  or  naval  forces  and  subject  to  the  rules  and 

*Barriger.— "Legislative     History    of    the    Subsistence    Depart- 
ment." 


184  Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field. 

regulations  for  the  government  of  the  same.  In  case  such 
contractor  should  be  found  guilty  of  fraud  or  willful  neglect 
of  duty,  the  above  cited  section  provided  that  he  should  be 
punished  as  the  court-martial  should  direct. 

The  fresh  beef  was  generally  furnished  on  the  hoof,  and 
purchased  under  contract.  During  the  war  the  troops  on 
the  coast  of  the  Carolinas  and  also  the  Gulf  posts,  including 
New  Orleans,  received  their  fresh  beef  by  shipments  of  the 
animals  from  New  York;  and  Louisville  and  Nashville  were 
the  supply  points  for  the  armies  operating  in  that  section. 

The  pay  of  the  army  was  provided  by  appropriation 
made  by  Congress.  The  enormous  sums  which  were  dis 
bursed  during  the  war  necessitated  some  extraordinary 
means  of  the  Government's  raising  the  same,  as  the  mere 
fact  of  a  war  of  that  character  tends  to  diminish  very  large- 
ly the  ordinary  receipts  of  the  Government. 

"Modern  warfare,  with  its  principle  of  an  uninterrupted 
and  regardless  employment  of  all  competent  forces,  would 
scarcely  be  conceivable  without  subscription  loans,  by 
which  loans  the  requisite  funds  are  procured."* 

Congress  met  at  the  call  of  the  President  on  July  4, 
1861,  and  on  the  17th  passed  a  bill  for  the  issue  of  bonds 
and  treasury  notes  to  the  amount  of  twro  hundred  and  fifty 
million  dollars.f  It  also  increased  the  duties  on  many 
articles,  passed  an  act  for  the  confiscation  of  property  of 
rebels,  and  levied  a  tax  of  twrenty  million  dollars,  appor- 
tioned among  the  States  and  Territories.  The  interest- 

*Von  der  Goltz.— "The  Nation  in  Arms." 

fin  August,  1861.  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  Chase  held  a  con- 
ference with  several  of  the  principal  bankers  of  New  York,  Boston, 
and  Philadelphia,  to  negotiate  a  National  loan,  and  when  it  looked 
as  if  negotiations  might  fail,  the  Secretary  stated  that  he  would  re- 
turn to  Washington  and  issue  notes  for  circulation,  "for  it  is  certain 
that  the  war  must  go  on  until  the  rebell'on  is  put  down,  if  we  have 
to  put  out  paper  until  it  takes  a  thousand  dollars  to  buy  a 
breakfast." 


Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field.  185 

bearing  debt  of  the  Government  in  1865  was  considerably 
over  two  thousand  millions  of  dollars. 

The  Confederate  Government  likewise  issued  large 
amounts  of  paper  money,  which  was  to  be  redeemable  six 
months  after  the  ratification  of  a  treaty  of  peace  with  the 
United  States.  The  South  early  resorted  to  requisition  and 
confiscation;  the  unconvertible  bank  bills  which  it  issued  in 
vast  volumes*  speedily  lost  all  value,  and  the  Confederate 
soldiers  waived  the  farce  of  being  paid  in  them.  The  South 
disposed  of  its  bonds  among  its  European  friends;  and  at  the 
close  of  the  war,  when,  of  course,  these  bonds  could  not  be 
paid,  "their  holders  were  thus  fined  for  abetting  or  confid- 
ing in  a  slave  power. "f 

The  central  de'pot  for  the  supply  of  the  Medical  Depart- 
ment was  at  Philadelphia,  with  storehouses  at  New  York, 
Philadelphia,  Baltimore,  Cincinnati,  Louisville,  St.  Louis, 
Memphis,  Nashville,  Chicago,  San  Francisco,  Hilton  Head, 
Salem,  Fortress  Monroe,  Newberne,  New  Orleans,  and  Wash- 
ington. There  were  in  the  United  States  at  the  termination 
of  the  war  over  two  hundred  general  military  hospitals,  con- 
taining 136,894  beds.  When  the  condition  of  a  patient  in 
general  hospital  was  so  far  improved  as  to  render  a  relapse 
improbable,  he  was  sent  to  a  camp  of  convalescents,  of 
which  there  were  several  situated  throughout  the  North,  at 
places  from  which  transportation  to  the  theatres  of  war  was 
comparatively  easy.  When  the  men  had  entirely  recovered 
their  health  and  strength,  they  were  armed  and  returned  to 

*By  November,  1864,  the  Confederacy  had  issued  over  four 
hundred  millions  of  dollars  of  treasury  notes,  which  were  selling  at 
sixty  to  one  for  specie  at  the  treasury.  The  supply  of  specie,  Feb- 
ruary 15,  1864,  was  but  seven  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  dollars. 
Bonds  and  certificates  were  not  salable,  taxes  were  with  difficulty 
collected.  (Campbell,  Assistant  Secretary  of  War  of  the  Confed- 
erate States.) 

fGoldwin  Smith. 


180  Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field. 

duty  in  detachments  of  sufficient  force  to  resist  attacks  by 
guerillas. 

In  preparing   supplies  for  a   campaign   the   following 
points  are  to  be  considered: 

1.  Their  composition. 

2.  The  probable  daily  consumption,  and  the  number  of 
days'  reserve  to  be  accumulated. 

3.  Where,  and  by  what  date  they  must  be  ready. 

4.  Whence  are  the  supplies  to  be  obtained,  and  how  are 
they  to  be  conveyed  to  their  destination? 

5.  How  are  the  expended  supplies  to  be  replenished? 
During  the  war  the  ration  was  composed  as  follows: 

twelve  ounces  of  pork  or  bacon,  or,  one  pound  and  four 
ounces  of  salt  or  fresh  beef;  one  pound  and  six  ounces  of  soft 
bread  or  flour,  or,  one  pound  of  hard  bread,  or,  one  pound  and 
four  ounces  of  corn  meal;  and  to  every  one  hundred  rations, 
fifteen  pounds  of  beans  or  peas,  and  ten  pounds  of  rice  or 
hominy;  ten  pounds  of  green  coffee,  or,  eight  pounds  of 
roasted  (or  roasted  and  ground)  coffee,  or,  one  pound  and 
eight  ounces  of  tea;  fifteen  pounds  of  sugar;  four  quarts  of 
vinegar;  one  pound  and  four  ounces  of  adamantine  or  star 
candles;  four  pounds  of  soap;  thirty  pounds  of  potatoes, 
when  practicable,  and  one  quart  of  molasses.  Desiccated 
compressed  potatoes  or  desiccated  compressed  mixed  veg- 
etables could  be  subtituted  for  beans,  peas,  rice,  hominy,  or 
fresh  potatoes,  at  fixed  rates.* 

*"During  the  Atlanta  campaign  we  were  supplied  with  all  sorts 
of  patent  compounds,  such  as  desiccated  vegetables,  and  concen- 
trated milk,  meat  biscuit,  sausages,  but  somehow  the  men  preferred 
the  simpler  and  more  familiar  forms  of  food,  and  usually  styled 
these  'desecrated  vegetables  and  consecrated  milk.'  "  (Sherman,  II.. 
391.)  The  method  of  preserving  food  products  in  hermetically 
sealed  tin  cans  was  but  little  used  until  after  the  close  of  the  Civil 
War;  it  has  now  been  brought  to  such  perfection  that  all  military 
authorities  agree,  preserved  and  prepared  foods  and  forage  must  bo 
largely  used  in  the  future  by  armies  in  the  field. 

Von  der   Goltz  says:    "Provisions  which   are   best,   and   at   the 


Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field.  187 

The  allowance  of  clothing  was  fixed  by  regulations  and 
the  men  drew  such  as  was  necessary,  but  were  by  orders 
obliged  to  carry  certain  articles  in  their  knapsacks;  many 
officers  reported  the  tendency  of  the  men  to  throw  away  the 
knapsacks  on  the  march ;  and  when  they  were  taken  off  prior 
to  going  into  battle  they  were  seldom  again  recovered. 

Fuel  is  one  of  the  most  essential  of  all  the  supplies  re- 
quired by  an  army  in  the  field,  and  on  account  of  its  great 
bulk  is  very  difficult  of  transportation.  In  a  well-wooded 
country,  and  when  on  the  march,  it  is  a  comparatively  easy 
matter  to  supply  the  fuel  required  solely  for  cooking  purpos- 
es, but  when  the  army  remains  stationary  for  any  length  of 
time  the  difficulty  increases,  and  wrhen  it  goes  into  winter 
quarters  the  task  becomes  one  of  the  greatest  importance 

same  time  most  agreeable  to  the  soldier,  are  always  those  that  are 
fresh.  *  *  *  But  fresh  provisions  have  this  disadvantage,  that 
they  take  up  a  comparatively  large  space,  that  they  easily  go  bad. 
are  difficult  to  keep,  and  are  difficult  to  cook.  *  *  How  often 
does  it  happen  in  war  that  just  when  the  water  has  begun  to  boil  in 
the  pots,  an  alarm  is  raised,  and  a  start  must  be  made.  No  attempt 
to  cook  fresh  provisions  should  be  made,  unless  it  is  certain  that  the 
troops  will  be  undisturbed.  Artificially  prepared  provisions  are  ac- 
cordingly an  excellent  makeshift.  They  take  up  but  little  room, 
and  are  not  nearly  so  heavy  as  the  fresh,  so  that  the  soldier  can 
carry  far  more  without  being  burdened  by  a  greater  weight.  A 
handful  of  compressed  coffee  squares,  or  a  few  bars  of  compressed 
soup  and  vegetables,  thrown  into  the  knapsack,  do  not  inconven- 
ience, and  in  the  hour  of  need  they  can  form  refreshment  and  nutri- 
ment for  a  considerable  time.  Nothing  is  required  save  boiling 
water,  for  all  the  various  condiments  have  been  already  added  to  the 
small  bodies.  A  few  minutes  are  sufficient  to  prepare  them,  and 
their  preparation  requires  no  knowledge  or  especial  dexterity.  The 
food  remains  clean  and  does  not  become  bad." 

Colonel  Maurice,  in  his  article  on  "War"  in  the  Encyclopaedia 
Britannica,  gives,  as  one  of  the  modern  conditions  affecting  strategy, 
"the  facility  afforded  for  the  supply  of  armies  by  compressed  food 
and  compressed  forage." 

Yon  Schellendorf  says:  "The  problem  of  feeding  an  army  in 
the  field  has  again  in  recent  years  been  facilitated  by  the  use  ot 
railways  and  the  partial  substitution  of  preserved  for  fresh  pro- 
visions." It  must  be  remembered,  however,  that  canned  meats, 
barrelled  pork,  bacon,  etc..  require  an  increase  of  transportation,  as 
only  cattle  on  the  hoof  furnish  their  own. 


188  Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field. 

and  the  supply  most  urgent.  The  theatres  of  operation 
during  the  Civil  War  were  generally  well  wooded  and  the 
troops  provided  the  fuel  by  their  own  labor.  The  fields  in 
the  different  theatres  of  operation  were  generally  enclosed 
by  the  ordinary  "rail"  fences,  and  the  order  published  in  the 
early  part  of  the  war  authorizing  the  use  of  the  "top"  rail  of 
the  same  for  fuel,  speedily  caused  the  obliteration  of  all  such 
landmarks.  Troops  not  in  the  enemy's  country  were  pro- 
vided by  contract  made  by  the  Quartermaster's  Department. 

The  fuel  required  for  the  large  fleet  of  ocean  steamers 
was  purchased  by  contract  principally  at  Philadelphia  and 
Pittsburgh,  and  that  required  by  the  steamboats  on  the 
Mississippi  and  tributary  rivers  was  cut  by  contract  along 
the  banks  of  those  rivers.  The  freedmen  were  employed  to 
cut  the  wood,  and  thus  were  given  much-needed  occupation, 
and  in  this  way  a  fund  was  created  sufficient  to  clothe,  feed, 
and  house  them.* 

The  supply  of  water  to  troops  in  the  field  is  sometimes 
a  most  difficult  problem,  and  particularly  so  in  a  desert 
country.  Under  such  circumstances  arrangements  must  be 
made  to  transport  a  supply  for  the  men  and  animals.  "It 
might  be  possible  on  an  emergency  to  do  without  firewrood 
and  straw',  but  water  is  absolutely  necessary.  It  must  be 
good,  sufficient  in  quantity,  and  accessible."! 

During  the  war  the  troops  were  enabled  to  obtain  an 
abundant  supply  of  water  from  the  numerous  streams  which 
intersected  the  country;  though  the  quality  was  in  many 
instances  very  bad  and  wras  the  cause  of  much  sickness,  but 
it  was  not  necessary  for  any  department  to  arrange  for  a 
supply  of  this  most  necessary  article,  except  at  such  enor- 
mous establishments  as  the  cavalry  d£p6t  at  Gisboro',  D.  C. 

*Grant's  Memoirs.  Vol.  I.,  page  420. 
tClarke.— "Staff  Duties." 


Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field,  189 

The  forage  ration  was  fourteen  pounds  of  hay  and 
twelve  pounds  of  oats,  corn,  or  barley.  For  mules,  fourteen 
pounds  of  hay  and  nine  pounds  of  oats,  corn,  or  barley. 

The  supply  of  small-arm  and  artillery  ammunition  must 
be  ample  to  enable  a  general  engagement  being  entered  into, 
even  if  the  same  is  brought  on  unexpectedly. 

The  daily  consumption  of  supplies  will  be  governed  by 
the  number  of  troops,  camp-followers,  and  animals  to  be 
provided,  and  whether  active  operations  are  undertaken  in 
which  general  engagements  are  to  be  brought  on. 

"He  who,  according  to  directions,  calculates  the  needs 
of  an  army  in  the  field  by  pounds,  and  provides  for  it  accord- 
ing to  the  most  careful  dispositions,  certainly  will  scarcely 
ever  run  the  risk  of  a  portion  of  the  supplies  he  has  furnished 
being  spoiled.  But  the  army  will  suffer  by  this  arrangement. 
Two  and  three  times  as  much  as  an  army  needs  must  be 
supplied,  if  it  is  to  be  kept  from  want;  double  and  treble  in 
respect  of  the  good  quality  of  the  provisions,  double  and 
treble  of  the  quantity."* 

From  May  1st  until  August  12th,  1864,  the  daily  av- 
erage number  of  rations  forwarded  from  Chattanooga  to 
Sherman's  army,  which  numbered  about  one  hundred  and 
five  thousand  men,  was  four  hundred  and  twelve  thousand — 
more  than  three  rations  for  every  man  that  left  Chattanooga 
on  that  campaign.! 

Transportation. 

The  second  subdivision  of  the  duties  performed  by  the 
service  acting  in  rear  consists  of  transportation  and  distribu- 
tion. The  following  are  the  means  of  transport  which  are 
at  various  times  available  for  use  in  forwarding  supplies  to 
armies  in  the  field: 

1.     Railroads. 
*  Von  der  Goltz. 
tSymonds.— "Report  of  a  Commissary  of  Subsistence." 


190  Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field. 

2.  Steamers,  sailing  vessels,  boats  by  sea,  on   rivers, 
lakes,  or  canals. 

3.  Wagons  or  pack-animals  on  ordinary  roads. 
Railroads. — The  employment  of  railroads  in  war  tends 

to  increase  that  important  factor  of  the  mobility  of  the 
troops.  It  is  fully  acknowledged  that  without  their  aid  it 
would  be  next  to  impossible  to  supply  regularly  the  large 
armies  that  would  be  employed  in  wars  at  the  present  age. 

"In  a  country  with  numerous  lines  of  railway  and  vast 
quantities  of  rolling  stock  ready  at  hand,  there  are  immense 
possibilities  of  attack  or  defense,  provided  it  possesses 
competent  military  force.  Great  bodies  of  men  and  material 
can  be  moved  over  extreme  distances  at  a  very  brief  notice, 
by  a  vigorous  government,  directed  by  the  necessary  skill 
and  ability.  To  make  the  result  of  full  value,  however,  both 
men  and  material  must  be  on  hand  in  entire  readiness  and 
fitted  for  instant  use  in  advance  of  the  movement."* 

When  railways  pass  directly  from  the  national  territory 
into  that  of  the  enemy,  as  was  the  case  during  the  Civil  War, 
they  can  carry  the  resources  of  the  former  right  through,  in 
which  case  its  territory  usually  becomes  a  great  base  of 
operations.  The  facility  of  transport  afforded  by  railways 
renders  the  establishment  of  great  magazines  at  the  junction 
of  important  lines  a  comparatively  easy  one,  "but  the  same 
principle  as  before  must  govern  the  selection  of  points  on 
which  to  establish  magazines,  and  the  direction  of  the  lines 
of  supplies."! 

"It  is  thus  evident  that  railways  have  become  the  true 
military  roads  of  an  army,  and  that  their  location  in  the 
future  will  have  a  determining  influence  on  the  plans  of  cam- 
paign to  be  adopted. "$ 

*Ho!abird.— "Transportation  of  Troops  and  Supplies." 

tHamley.— "Operations  of  War." 

tMichie.— "American  Military  Roads  and  Bridges." 


Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field.  191 

Early  in  the  war  the  Government  realized  the  impor- 
tance of  utilizing  the  railroads  for  transportation  of  troops 
and  supplies,  and  on  January  31,  1862,  Congress  passed  an 
Act  which  authorized  the  President,  when  in  his  judgment 
the  public  safety  required  it,  "to  take  possession  of  any  or 
all  railway  lines  in  the  United  States,  the  rolling  stock,  their 
offices,  shops,  buildings,  and  all  other  appendages,  and  to 
prescribe  rules  for  using  and  maintaining,  and  to  extend, 
repair,  and  build  the  same  in  the  manner  most  conducive  to 
the  interests  of  the  Government,  and  to  place  under  military 
control  all  officers,  agents,  and  employe's  belonging  to  the 
lines,  so  that  they  shall  be  considered  as  a  post-road  and  a 
part  of  the  military  establishment  of  the  United  States,  sub- 
ject to  all  the  restrictions  imposed  by  the  rules  and  articles 
of  war."  The  same  act  imposed  severe  penalties  on  any 
person  resisting  or  interfering  in  any  manner  with  the  unre- 
strained use  by  the  Government  of  such  property,  and  pro- 
vided further,  "that  the  transportation  of  troops,  munitions 
of  war,  etc.,  throughout  the  United  States,  shall  be  under 
the  immediate  control  and  supervision  of  the  Secretary  of 
War,  and  all  such  agents  as  he  may  appoint." 

On  February  11,  1862,  by  order  of  the  President,  a  mili- 
tary director  and  superintendent  of  railroads  in  the  United 
States  was  appointed  (I).  C.  McCallum),  with  authority  to 
take  possession  of,  hold,  and  use  all  railways,  engines,  cars, 
locomotives,  equipments,  etc.,  that  were  required  for  the 
transport  of  troops,  arms,  ammunition,  and  military  sup- 
plies of  the  United  States.  At  the  time  General  McCallum 
assumed  his  duties  indicated  above,  there  was  only  one  rail- 
road in  the  possession  of  the  Government,  that  from  Wash- 
ington to  Alexandria,  which  was  seven  miles  long. 

It  was  not  found  necessary  to  exercise  within  the  loyal 
States  the  power  conferred  upon  the  President  by  law,  to 


192  Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field. 

take  actual  military  possession  of  the  railroads  of  the 
country,  but  a  uniform  tariff  for  Government  transportation 
was  made  with  the  officials  of  the  different  railroads.  Some 
of  the  railroads  within  the  theatre  of  military  operations — 
as  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio,  the  Louisville  and  Nashville,  and 
the  Missouri  railroads — repaired  their  bridges,  restored  their 
track,  and  replaced  their  rolling  stock  at  their  own  expense. 
Others,  abandoned  by  their  disloyal  owners  and  managers, 
were  taken  possession  of,  repaired,  stocked,  and  managed  by 
the  Quartermaster's  Department. 

As  the  war  progressed,  the  nature,  capacity,  and  value 
of  railroads  were  better  understood  on  both  sides,  and 
systematic  and  determined  efforts  were  made  against  the 
lines  used  for  transporting  supplies  for  the  Federal  armies. 
The  destruction  of  track  and  bridges  was  greater  each  time 
the  roads  passed  within  the  enemy's  lines,  and  extraordinary 
efforts  had  to  be  made  to  meet  it. 

A  small  construction  corps,  numbering  three  hundred, 
was  at  first  formed;  this  was  later  enlarged,  until  at  the  end 
of  the  war  it  numbered  nearly  ten  thousand  men.  Store- 
houses were  established  at  principal  points,  with  an  ample 
stock  of  tools  and  materials  for  making  needed  repairs. 
This  construction  corps  was  at  all  times  prepared  for  any 
emergency,  either  to  build  bridges  of  great  length  and 
dimensions,  or  lay  miles  of  track  or  repair  damages  done  by 
guerrillas  and  raiding  parties.  The  attacks  on  the  line  in 
rear  of  the  army  were  of  such  frequent  occurrence  and  often 
of  so  serious  a  character  that  to  insure  speedy  repairs  it  was 
at  various  points  along  the  different  roads  operated,  and 
also  to  collect  supplies  of  construction  material,  such  as 
iron  rails,  chairs,  spikes,  cross-ties,  and  bridge  timbers,  at 
points  where  they  would  be  comparatively  safe  and  easily 
obtained  when  required. 


Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field.  193 

Seventeen  hundred  and  sixty-nine  miles  of  military 
railroads*  were,  during  the  war,  repaired,  stocked,  and 
operated  by  the  agents  of  the  Quartermaster's  Department, 
under  the  energetic  supervision  of  General  McCallum.  In 

*I. — THE  FOLLOWING  ROADS  WERE  OPERATED  IN  VIRGINIA. 

Terrain 'il  Stations.  Length 

Name  of  Line.                                         From  To          in  Miles. 

Alexandria  and  Washington Alexandria,  Washington,         7 

Alexandria,  London    &  Hampsh.,  Alexandria,  Vienna,                 15 

Orange  and  Alexandria Alexandria,  Rappahannock,  51 

Manassas  Gap Manassas,  Piedmont,            34 

Norfolk  and  Petersburg Norfolk,  Suffolk,                 23 

Seaboard  and  Roanoke Portsmouth,  Suffolk,                 18 

City  Point  and  Army Pitkin  Sta.,  Humphrey,          13 

Southside City  Point,  Burkeville,           62 

Richmond  and  Danville Manchester,  Danville,            140 

Winchester  and  Potomac Harper's  Ferry,  Stevenson,           28 

Richmond  and  Petersburg Petersburg,  Manchester,         21 

Clover  Hill  Branch Clover  Hill  Sta.,  Coal  Mines,         18 

430 

II. — THE  FOLLOWING  ROADS  WERE  OPERATED  IN  THE  DIVISION  OF 
THE  MISSISSIPPI. 

Terminal  Stations.  Length 

Name  of  Line.  From  To  in  Miles. 

Nashville  and  Chattanooga Nashville,        Chattanooga,          151 

Nashville,  Decatur  &  Stevenscn. .  Nashville,        Stevenson,  200 

Nashville  and  Northwestern Nashville,        Johnsonville,  78 

Nashville  and  Clarksville Nashville,        Clarksville,  62 

Shelby ville  Branch Wartrace,         Shelby ville,  9 

Chattanooga  and  Knoxville Chattanooga,  Knoxville,  112 

Knoxville  and  Bristol Knoxville,        Carter's  Sta.,          110 

Cleveland  and  Dalton Cleveland,        Dalton,  27 

Chattanooga   and  Atlanta Chattanooga,  Atlanta,  136 

Rome  Branch Kingston,         Rome,  17 

Atlanta  and  Macon Atlanta,  Rough  and  Ready,  11 

Memphis  and  Charleston Memphis,         Pocahontas,  75 

Mississippi  Central Grand  Jet,      Tallahatchie  Riv.,  48 

Mobile  and  Ohio Columbus, Ky.,  Union  Cy.,  Tenn.,  26 

1062 
III. — THE  FOLLOWING  LINES  WERE  OPERATED  IN  NORTH  CAROLINA 

Terminal  Stations.  Length 

From  To  in  Miles. 

Morehead  City Goldsborough 85 

Wilmington Goldsborough 95 

Goldsborough Raleigh 48 

228, 

The  only  line  in  Arkansas  used  for  military  purposes  was  a  por- 
tion of  the  Memphis  and  Little  Rock  Railroad  between  Duvall's 
Bluff,  on  White  River,  and  Little  Rock,  forty-nine  miles  long. 

13 


194  Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field. 

the  repair  of  so  many  miles  of  railroads  great  quantities  of 
iron,  burned  and  twisted  by  the  contending  forces,  both  of 
which  destroyed  railroads  which  they  were  obliged  to  aban- 
don, fell  into  the  possession  of  the  Federals.  To  make  this 
iron  serviceable  in  the  repair  of  the  railroads  leading  to  At- 
lanta and  the  Gulf,  after  the  capture  of  Chattanooga,  the 
rolling  mill  there  was  completed,  and  the  twisted  rails  re- 
rolled  at  a  cost  of  about  fifty  dollars  per  ton;  thus  effecting 
an  enormous  saving,  as  new  rails  delivered  in  Chattanooga 
cost  about  one  hundred  and  forty-five  dollars  per  ton.  The 
supply  of  rails  for  new  lines,  or  extension  of  old  ones,  in  the 
eastern  portion  of  the  theatre  of  operations,  was  obtained 
by  purchase,  manufacture,  and  by  taking  up  lines  unneces- 
sary for  military  purposes  in  that  section. 

The  celerity  with  which  the  Federal  forces  repaired  the 
roads  was  marvelous.  Early  in  October,  1863,  the  Orange 
and  Alexandria  railroad  was  thoroughly  destroyed  by  the 
rebels  from  Manassas  Junction  to  Brand}'  Station,  about 
twenty-two  miles.  Repairs  were  commenced  the  23d  of 
October,  and,  among  other  works,  the  Rappahannock  River 
bridge,  625  feet  long  and  35  feet  high,  was  rebuilt  in  nine- 
teen working  hours. 

During  Sherman's  advance  from  Chattanooga  to  At- 
lanta at  no  time  were  the  railroad  trains  more  than  five  days 
behind  the  general  commanding.  The  reconstruction  of  the 
bridges  over  the  Etowah  and  Chattahoochie  are  unpar- 
alleled feats  of  military  construction.  The  Etowah  bridge, 
625  feet  long  and  75  feet  high,  was  rebuilt  in  six  days  by  six 
hundred  men  of  the  construction  corps. 

The  Chattahoochie  bridge,  740  feet  long  and  90  feet  high, 
was  rebuilt  in  four  and  a  half  days  by  the  same  number  of 
men  belonging  to  the  corps.  The  repairs  of  the  various 
railroad  lines  were  accomplished  so  rapidly  as  to  almost 


Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field.  195 

justify  the  statement  of  a  Confederate  that  "old  Sherman 
carries  a  duplicate  tunnel  along."* 

The  principal  factors  in  the  transportation  of  armies 
and  supplies  by  rail  are  the  following: 

1.  The  capacity  of  the  train. 

2.  The  time  necessary  for  loading. 

3.  The  time  interval  between  trains. 

4.  The  rate  of  running. 

5.  Time  required  in  unloading. 

6.  Number  of  railways  available. 

On  a  railroad  which  is  employed  for  the  transportation 
of  troops  and  supplies,  the  ordinary  freight  and  passenger 
service  will  be  considerably  disturbed,  and  at  times  even  it 
may  be  necessary  to  entirely  suppress  them. 

In  April,  1864,  when  making  preparations  for  the  At- 
lanta campaign,  Sherman  found  the  capacity  of  the  rail- 
roads from  Nashville  forward  to  Decatur,  and  to  Chatta- 
nooga, so  limited  that  on  April  6th  he  issued  an  orderf  re- 
stricting the  use  of  the  railroad  plant  to  transporting  only 
the  essential  articles  of  food,  ammunition,  and  supplies  for 
the  army  proper,  and  cutting  off  all  civil  traffic.  The  com- 
manders of  posts  within  thirty  miles  of  Nashville  were  re- 
quired to  haul  the  stores  for  their  commands  from  that  place 
in  wagons;  the  troops  forwarded  to  the  front  were  obliged 
to  march,  and  the  beef  cattle  were  driven  in  herds. 

While  a  railroad  may,  during  the  period  of  preparing 
for  a  campaign,  be  devoted  exclusively  to  transportation 
of  supplies,  when  active  operations  commence,  the  reverse 
is  frequently  the  case,  as  the  fighting  line  needs  to  be  at  once 
and  strongly  reinforced  with  men. 

When  the  number  of  railway  lines,  which  can  be  used 

*Sherman's  Memoirs,  II.,  151. 

fG.  O.  No.  6,  Hdqrs.  Military  Div'n  of  Miss.,  April  6,  1864. 


196  Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field. 

as  lines  of  communication  during  a  campaign,  is  sufficient, 
it  is  advisable  to  assign  each  line  for  the  supply  of  one  or 
more  designated  corps;  where  several  armies  act  in  con  June 
tion,  such  assignment  is  particularly  desirable  whenever  it 
is  possible. 

When  the  armies  of  the  Ohio,  Cumberland,  and  Tennes- 
see were  in  the  vicinity  of  Chattanooga  (from  March  to  May, 
1864)  preparing  for  the  Atlanta  campaign,  the  supplies  were 
forwarded  from  Louisville  to  Nashville  by  rail  and  also  by 
the  Cumberland  River.  General  Thomas,  as  commanding 
general  of  the  Department  of  the  Cumberland,  exercised 
absolute  command  and  control  over  the  railroads  in  his  de- 
partment, and  the  other  armies  thought  that  his  (General 
Thomas's)  army  received  more  than  its  share  of  the  supplies 
arid  other  advantages  of  the  railroads.  "I  found  a  good 
deal  of  feeling  in  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  on  this  score, 
and  therefore  took  supreme  control  of  the  roads  myself, 
placed  all  of  the  army  commanders  on  an  equal  footing,  and 
gave  to  each  the  same  control,  so  far  as  orders  of  transporta- 
tion for  men  and  stores  were  concerned.''* 

Water  Transport. — While  transportation  by  rail  is  liable 
to  innumerable  interruptions  caused  by  obstruction  or  de- 
struction of  the  railroad  lines,  and  is  further  limited  by  the 
number  of  trains  that  can  be  sent  over  the  line  in  any  given 
time;  transports  by-  water,  on  the  other  hand,  are  liable  to 
none  of  these  accidents,  except  that  caused  by  ice,  when 
once  the  command  of  the  water-course  has  been  secured. 
There  is,  moreover,  no  limit  to  the  capacity  of  a  lake  or 
navigable  river,  so  long  as  there  are  boats  in  sufficient 
number;  but  a  railway,  especially  a  single-track  railway, 
may  be  overcrowded.  An  ordinary  Ohio  River  steamer,, 
carrying  both  passengers  and  freight,  has  a  capacity  of 


*  Sherman's  Memoirs,  II.,  9. 


Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field.  197 

about  five  hundred  tons.  To  supply  forty  thousand  men 
and  eighteen  thousand  animals  requires  about  two  hundred 
and  sixty  tons  daily;  therefore,  one  such  steamer  would 
carry  supplies  for  such  a  force  for  nearly  two  days.  Jomini 
says  that  rivers  are  excellent  lines  of  supply  and  powerful 
auxiliaries  in  the  establishment  of  good  lines  of  operation, 
but  never  the  line  itself. 

The  country  commanding  the  sea  by  its  naval  force  is 
only  limited  as  to  the  amount  of  stores  that  it  can  transport 
by  the  capacity  of  the  vessels  it  has  at  command.* 

The  demand  upon  the  Quartermaster's  Department 
compelled  it  to  employ  not  only  the  fleet  which  it  had  grad- 
ually acquired  by  purchase,  but  nearly  every  new  steam 
vessel  built  in  the  United  States  for  ocean  traffic. 

The  steamboats  used  on  the  rivers,  etc.,  were  either  con- 
structed or  purchased  by  the  Government,  or  captured  from 
the  enemy,  or  impressed  under  military  necessity,  either 
from  disloyal  or  loyal  owners,  or  they  were  chartered  at 
fixed  rates.  The  vessels  in  all  the  above  cases  being  some- 
times run  by  crews  in  direct  Government  pay,  sometimes  by 
individuals  under  contract  with  the  Government  to  man, 
victual,  and  equip,  and  sometimes  run  by  the  crews  found  on 
board,  whose  services  were  impressed  with  the  vessels,  and 
who  were  paid  by  the  owners.f 

On  the  17th  of  March,  1862,  the  transportation  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  to  Fortress  Monroe  for  the  Peninsula 

*The  Quartermaster's  Department  had  in  charge  during  the  war, 
for  use  on  the  ocean  and  lakes,  394  vessels,  having  a  gross  tonnage 
of  137,006  tons.  There  were  238  vessels  employed  on  the  ocean  and 
lake  service  owned  by  the  Government,  having  a  tonnage  of  165,248 
tons. 

t There  were  119  steamers,  305  barges,  and  109  coal  drayage 
boats  and  railroad  floats  belonging  to  the  United  States  on  the  Mis- 
sissippi River  and  its  tributaries  and  at  Mobile,  Alabama.  There 
were  1750  steamers  and  other  vessels  chartered  on  the  Mississippi 
and  its  tributaries  by  the  Quartermaster's  Department. 


198  Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field. 

campaign  was  commenced.  125,000  men,  14,592  animals, 
and  44  batteries  of  artillery,  and  the  wagons  and  am- 
bulances, pontoon  trains,  and  enormous  equipage  required 
for  an  army  of  such  magnitude,  were  transported  in  about 
four  hundred  steamers  and  sailing  craft.  Later,  during 
Grant's  campaign  against  Richmond,  a  large  fleet  was  con- 
stantly employed  in  supplying  the  armies  and  the  troops 
at  the  various  stations  along  the  coast  from  the  Chesapeake 
to  New  Orleans. 

The  greater  part  of  the  stores  intended  for  the  supply  of 
Sherman's  army  on  the  completion  of  its  march  to  the  sea, 
were  sent  to  Port  Royal  Harbor,  there  to  await  his  arrival 
at  some  point  on  the  coast  of  the  Carolines  or  Georgia,  and 
transports  were  dispatched  to  Pensacola  with  supplies  to 
await  the  arrival  of  the  troops,  in  case  some  unexpected  op- 
position compelled  General  Sherman  to  turn  his  course  to 
the  South.  When  he  appeared  in  the  rear  of  Savannah  and 
captured  Fort  McAllister  by  a  coup  de  main,  and  communi- 
cated with  the  naval  squadron,  the  transports  were  sent 
around  by  the  Ogeechee  and  Savannah  rivers,  and  light- 
draught  steamers  suitable  for  use  on  the  rivers,  which  had 
been  dispatched  on  the  first  news  of  his  approach,  arrived 
in  time  to  transfer  to  the  river  landings  the  clothing,  camp 
and  garrison  equipage,  quartermaster's  stores,  forage,  and 
provisions  which  had  been  sent  in  sea-going  vessels,  both 
sail  and  steam,  and  which  were  of  too  heavy  draught  to  enter 
the  Ogeechee  or  Savannah  rivers  at  that  time,  as  obstruc- 
tions in  the  channel  were  not  entirely  removed. 

Wagon  Transports. — The  introduction  of  steam  as  a 
motive  power  has  effected  a  remarkable  change  in  the 
water  and  land  transport  throughout  the  world.  But  even 
where  these  improved  means  of  locomotion  are  plentiful,  an 
army  requires,  also,  other  means  of  transport  on  account  of 


Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field.  .     199 

the  constant  shifting  of  direction  of  military  operations,  the 
destruction  of  railway  lines,  and  the  necessity  of  distribut- 
ing what  the  railways,  steamboats,  and  steamships  carry  in 
bulk.* 

The  wagon  trains  used  in  the  Federal  armies  during  the 
war  were  the  results  of  long  experience  and  operations  upon 
the  Western  plains.  The  wagons  and  harness  were  the 
model  so  successfully  used  there  in  the  movements  of  the 
troops  upon  the  high  and  narrow  plains  at  the  base  of  the 
Rooky  Mountains  and  along  the  rough  defiles  of  that  great 
chain.  Portable  forges,  with  boxes  of  smiths',  wheel- 
wrights', and  saddlers'  tools,  accompanied  all  the  larger  divi- 
sions of  the  trains,  and  spare  parts  of  materials  for  repair 
were  carried  with  them;  thus  any  ordinary  repairs  could  be 
made  during  the  night  halt. 

The  experience  of  the  war  convinced  all  officers  of  the 
Quartermaster's  Department  that  for  army  trains  mulesf 
are  much  superior  to  horses,  and  in  the  latter  part  of  the 
war  horses  almost  entirely  disappeared  from  the  trains, 
being  transferred  to  the  cavalry  or  artillery  and  replaced  by 
mules. 

General  Ingalls,  the  Chief  Quartermaster  of  the  armies 
operating  against  Richmond,  in  his  report  for  the  fiscal  year 
ending  June  30,  1864,  says:  "I  have,  during  the  year,  fre- 
quently reported  my  views  as  to  the  best  and  proper  means 
of  transportation  for  an  army.  I  do  not  think  that  the  kind 
and  amount  now  furnished  these  armies  could  be  improved 

""Much  suffering  has  been  caused  by  the  impossibility  of  fur- 
nishing supplies  to  the  wounded,  when  those  supplies  were  within  a 
few  miles  of  them  in  great  abundance."  (Report  of  the  Surgeon- 
General,  dated  November  10,  1862.) 

t"This  country  produces  in  great  abundance,  and  of  the  best 
quality,  one  of  the  most  valuable  animals  in  the  world  for  purposes 
of  war— the  army  mule."  (Holabird.— "Army  Wagon  Transporta- 
tion.") 


200  Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field. 

upon.  The  common  six-mule  wagon  has  proved  to  be  the 
most  economical  and  durable  for  years  past  of  any  ever 
tested." 

In  order  that  the  enormous  streams  of  supply  may  be 
uninterrupted,  the  wagon  roads  should  be  of  the  best  con- 
struction, drained,  hard,  and  smooth.  Up  to  the  time  of  the 
Civil  War  but  little  attention  had  been  given  to  the  wagon 
roads  throughout  the  country.  The  ordinary  dirt  roads  over 
which  the  armies  moved  during  that  war  were  soon  cut  up 
by  the  heavy  traffic  to  which  they  were  subjected,  and  in  wet 
weather  they  became  absolutely  impassable.  General  Me 
Clellan,  in  his  report  of  the  Peninsular  campaign,  tells  us: 
"On  the  15th  and  16th  (May,  1862)  the  divisions  of  Franklin, 
Smith,  and  Porter  were  with  great  difficulty  moved  to 
White  House,  five  miles  in  advance;  so  bad  was  the  road  that 
the  train  of  one  of  these  divisions  required  thirty-six  hours 
to  pass  over  this  short  distance." 

After  the  battle  of  Chickamauga  the  Army  of  the  Cum- 
berland was  encamped  in  and  around  Chattanooga.  Its  line 
of  communication,  along  the  south  tank  of  the  Tennessee, 
with  its  d£pot  at  Bridgeport,  was  broken  by  the  rebels;  and 
furthermore  the  destruction  of  the  railroad  bridge  at  that 
place  interrupted  the  communication  with  Nashville,  the 
base  of  supply.  The  wragon  trains  were  thus  obliged  to 
move  by  a  circuitous  route  along  the  bottom  lands  of  the 
Tennessee  and  Sequatchie  valleys  and  then  to  cross  Wald- 
ron's  Ridge  by  very  steep,  narrow,  and  rough  roads.  Until 
the  rains  commenced,  the  roads  were  practicable,  though 
difficult;  but  early  in  October  (1863)  they  became  impass- 
able, and  the  rebel  cavalry,  having  crossed  the  Tennessee 
above  Chattanooga,  attacked  the  trains,  entangled  in  the 
mud  of  the  Sequatchie  valley  and  the  rocks  of  the  western 
slope  of  Waldron's  Ridge,  and  destroyed  about  three  hun- 


.CALIF* 

Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field.  201 

dred  wagons,  and  killed  or  captured  eighteen  hundred  mules. 

The  roads  leading  from  the  main  d£pot  of  supply  of  an 
army  to  the  several  corps,  divisions,  brigades,  and  other  sub- 
divisions of  the  same,  were  especially  liable  to  be  rendered 
unserviceable  and  impassable.  To  remedy  this  recourse 
wras  had  to  "corduroying"  the  roads. 

Intimately  associated  with  the  maintenance  of  roads  is 
the  bridging  of  rivers,  streams,  and  torrents,  as  an  impass- 
able stream  or  a  swollen  torrent  may  lead  to  unfortunate 
results,  by  delaying  the  advance  of  very  much  needed  re- 
inforcements, or  of  very  urgent  supplies. 

Pontoon  trains  accompanied  all  the  armies  in  the  Penin- 
sular campaign,  and  "the  pontoons  were  used  in  discharging 
quartermaster  and  commissary  stores  at  Ship  Point;  in  dis- 
embarking General  Franklin's  command  at  West  Point,  and 
in  constructing  bridges  over  Hampton  Creek,  the  stream 
in  front  of  Yorktown,  and  upper  Chickahominy."*  "During 
the  year  1863  the  pontoon  trains  accompanied  the  army  in 
all  its  marches  backward  and  forward  through  Virginia, 
frequently  bridging  the  Potomac,  Rapidan,  and  Rappahan- 
nock.  *  *  *  During  the  campaign  of  1864,  trains  com- 
posed of  fourteen  pontoons  and  two  trestles  accompanied 
each  of  the  three  army  corps  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. "f 

SUPPLY  SERVICE  WORKING  IN  THE  FIELD. 

In  order  to  insure  the  continuity  of  the  service  of  supply 
for  troops  in  the  field,  that  is  to  say,  the  connection  between 
the  troops  during  the  operations  of  war  and  the  centres  of 
production  in  rear  of  the  army,  there  are  officers,  w'ith  neces- 
sary assistants,  belonging  to  the  various  departments  of  sup- 

*Michie. 

^'Organization   of   the   Bridge   Equipage  of   the   United    States 
Army."— War  Department,  1870. 


202  Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field. 

ply,  attached  to  each  of  the  different  organizations  of  an 
army. 

On  June  24,  1861,  General  McDowell  was  authorized  to 
divide  his  army  into  brigades  and  divisions.  By  an  order 
of  the  President,  dated  March  8,  1862,  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  was  divided  into  corps;  similar  organizations 
existed  in  the  other  Federal  armies.  Each  regiment  had 
an  officer  with  the  rank  of  lieutenant  who  was  charged  with 
the  duty  of  obtaining  supplies  from  the  different  supply  de- 
partments for  the  troops  in  the  regiment.  Each  brigade 
consisted  of  two  or  more  regiments,  and  had  an  officer 
assigned  to  it  from  each  one  of  the  supply  departments,  who 
was  designated  as  brigade  quartermaster,  commissary,  etc., 
respectively.  S'uch  officers  received,  took  charge  of,  and 
transferred  to  the  proper  officer  all  property  and  supplies 
furnished  for  the  use  of  the  brigade.  The  brigade  quarter- 
master also  had  charge  of  the  baggage  train,  material  and 
animals.  Each  division  consisted  of  two  or  more  brigades, 
and  had  officers  known  as  the  division  quartermaster,  com- 
missary, etc.,  to  perform  duties  relating  to  the  division  sim- 
ilar to  those  attributed  to  a  brigade.  When  several  divi- 
sions were  organized  into  a  corps,  a  chief  quartermaster, 
commissary,  etc.,  were  designated;  these  officers  had  the 
general  superintendence  of  the  affairs  of  their  departments 
within  the  corps.  When  several  corps  were  united  into  an 
army,  there  were  officers  appointed,  designated  as  chief 
quartermasters,  commissaries,  etc.,  for  the  army.  The 
medical  service  was  under  the  supervision  of  the  medical 
director,  "who  had  one  assistant.  Each  corps  had  its  medi- 
cal director;  each  division,  a  chief  medical  officer;  and  each 
regiment,  one  surgeon,  two  assistant  surgeons,  and  a  hospi- 
tal steward.  Each  of  these  officers  exercised  general  super- 
vision over  the  conduct  of  the  officers  and  agents  subordinate 


Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field.  203 

to  him  and  within  his  command.  Each  received  his  orders 
and  instructions  from  the  commander  of  the  body  of  troops 
to  which  he  was  attached,  and  also  from  his  immediate  supe- 
rior in  his  own  department. 

The  difficulties  of  supplying  armies  in  the  field  are 
mainly  caused  by  their  s.tate  of  concentration  and  by  their 
constant  change  of  locality.  The  supply  of  an  army  in  the 
field  is  dependent  upon,  first,  the  resources  of  the  country 
forming  the  theatre  of  operations,  in  the  way  of  food,  forage, 
transport,  and  communications;  second,  on  the  time  of  year 
and  the  climate;  third,  on  the  nature  of  the  war,  whether 
offensive  or  defensive;  fourth,  on  the  character,  condition, 
length,  and  number  of  the  lines  of  communication;  fifth,  on 
the  rapidity  of  the  movements;  sixth,  on  the  propinquity  of 
the  enemy  and  the  temper  of  the  inhabitants. 

"A  general  should  neglect  no  means  of  knowing  in  ad- 
vance and  in  its  details  the  country  in  which  he  is  going  to 
make  war.  He  should  procure  its  most  accurate  statistics; 
he  should  know  in  what  its  resources  of  every  kind  consist. 
*  *  *  The  least  negligence  in  this  study  may  have  the 
gravest  consequences."* 

At  the  outbreak  of  the  Civil  War  there  were  few  if  any 
good  maps  of  the  theatre  of  operations,  and  the  science  of 
statistics  had  not  then  received  much  attention  in  this  coun- 
try, consequently  the  knowledge  of  the  resources  of  the 
theatre  of  war  was  very  imperfect.  Later  on  very  accurate 
information  was  obtained  of  the  location  of  the  various  flour 
mills  and  other  centres  of  production  of  food  and  other 
supplies. 

The  Civil  War  was  really  a  war  of  conquest  and  of  in- 
vasion. "The  North,  therefore,  if  it  undertook  to  fight  for 
the  reestablishment  of  the  Union,  was  forced  to  commence  a 


*Mannont,  page  262. 


204  Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field. 

war  of  conquest.  No  other  phrase  can  so  precisely  desciibe 
the  kind  of  war  which  the  North  must  prosecute,  or  else 
acquiesce  in  the  permanent  dissolution  of  the  Union."* 

It  is  easier  to  provide  the  supplies  when  acting  on  the 
defensive  in  one's  own  country  than  when  engaged  in  war 
in  the  enemy's  territory;  for  regular  communications  with 
the  depots  and  magazines  can  be  organized,  and  if  obliged 
to  retire,  the  surplus  stores  can  be  destroyed  to  prevent  them 
falling  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy.  If  in  an  enemy's  coun- 
try the  troops  remain  stationary  and  the  lines  of  communica- 
tion are  secure  and  in  good  working  order,  the  question  of 
supply  is  comparatively  an  easy  one;  but  when  the  troops 
begin  to  move,  the  question  becomes  more  complicated  in 
proportion  to  the  rapidity  of  the  movement  and  the  size  of 
the  army.  Upon  the  march  the  extent  to  which  the  local 
resources  can  be  utilized  will  depend  upon  the  breadth  of 
the  march-front  and  the  rate  of  the  movement.  The  broader 
the  front  in  this  case  the  easier  the  supply.  When  leaving 
Atlanta,  Sherman  directed  that  the  habitual  order  of  march 
should  be,  wherever  practicable,  by  four  roads,  one  for  each 
corps  comprising  his  army,  as  nearly  parallel  as  possible, 
and  converging  at  indicated  points;  this  same  order  of 
march  was  adopted  in  his  campaign  through  the  Carolinas, 
and  thus,  in  both  instances,  he  was  able  to  fully  utilize  the 
local  resources.  The  propinquity  of  the  enemy  obliges  an 
army  to  diminish  its  march-front,  prevents  the  resources  of 
the  country  from  being  utilized,  and  also  impedes  the  sup- 
plies being  brought  from  the  rear,  as  the  trains  cannot  be 
brought  within  easy  distance  of  the  troops.  If  the  inhabit- 
ants are  hostile,  the  task  of  supplying  is  most  difficult,  as,  in 
that  case,  the  population  will  conceal,  carry  off,  or  destroy  its 
own  resources,  and  endeavor  to  capture  and  burn  the  supp\v 

*Ropes'  "Story  of  the  Civil  War." 


Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field.  205 

trains  of  the  invading  army.  "There  was  *  *  *  noth- 
ing in  the  temper  of  the  South  to  suggest  that  the  war  was 
carried  on  for  the  redress  of  grievances.  *  *  *  On  the 
contrary,  the  attitude  of  the  South  was  from  the  beginning 
one  of  resistance  to  the  uttermost."*  The  bitter  animosities 
and  burning  passions  gave  rise  to  the  most  implacable 
enmities,  which  raged  so  at  New  Orleans  and  culminated  in 
Washington,  in  April,  1865,  but  which  it  is  most  devoutly 
hoped  were  forever  calmed  and  obliterated  by  the  Message 
of  Peace  from  Mount  McGregor  twenty  years  after. 

There  are  two  methods  of  supplying  an  army  in  the 
field: 

1.  By  consignments  of  supplies  forwarded  by  the  ser- 
vice in  rear  to  an  advance  d£pot,  and  carried  from  that 
despot  by  the  supply  trains  of  the  army;  and, 

2.  By  utilizing  the  resources  of  the  country. 

The  supplies  an  army  carries  with  it  may  be  divided  into 
two  classes,  those  carried  by  the  troops  themselves,  and 
those  which  are  carried  in  the  trains.  The  quantity  of  sup- 
plies the  men  can  carry  is  limited  not  only  by  the  strength 
of  the  men,  but  by  the  rapidity  of  the  movement  which  is 
entered  upon.  The  amount  of  supplies,  and,  therefore,  the 
size  of  the  trains  containing  them,  are  dependent  upon  the 
distance  of  the  army  from  the  base  or  its  advance  depot. 

At  the  commencement  of  the  war  the  supplies  to  be 
carried  by  the  troops  were  prescribed  in  General  Orders, 
which  provided  that  in  ordinary  marches,  wThere  the  troops 
could  receive  daily  issues  from  the  trains,  they  should  carry 
only  two  days'  rations;  but  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the 
enemy,  and  where  the  exigencies  of  the  service  rendered  it 
necessary  for  the  troops  to  move  without  baggage  or  trains, 

*Ropes'  "Story  of  the  Civil  War,"  page  4. 


206  Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field. 

the  men  were  required  to  carry  with  them  from  eight  to 
twelve  days'  rations,*  which  were  arranged  as  follows: 

For  Eight  Days. 

5  days'  beef  or  mutton  to  be  driven  on  the  hoof 

or  collected  in  the  country  passed  over. 
3  days'  cooked  rations  in  haversack,  weight. .  .     5%  pounds. 
5  days'  rations  of  bread  and  small  stores  in 

knapsack,   weight 6 

A  change  of  underclothes  in  knapsack,  weight. .   2 
A  blanket,  weight 5j 

Total  weight 19         " 

For  Twelve  Days. 

9  days'  ration  of  meat  on  the  hoof. 

3  days'  cooked  rations  in  haversack,  weight 5%  pounds. 

9  days'  rations  of  biscuit  and  small  stores  in 

knapsack,  weight 10  J 

A  change  of  underclothes  in  knapsack,  weight.     2 
A  blanket,  weight 5j 

Total  weight 23£ 

The  men  carried  sixty  rounds  of  ammunition,  forty  in 
the  cartridge-boxes  and  twenty  in  their  pockets.  It  was  ob- 
served that  in  the  second  and  third  days  of  the  march  many 
men  abandoned  their  overcoats  and  blankets  if  the  weather 
was  warm. 

*  General  Orders  No.  7,  Headquarters  Military  Division  of  the 
Mississippi,  dated  April  18,  1864,  provided:  "II.  When  troops  are 
ordered  to  march  for  action,  or  to  be  in  condition  for  action,  all  en- 
cumbrances must  be  left  in  store  at  the  most  safe  and  convenient 
point.  Mounted  officers  (general,  regimental,  or  cavalry)  will  be  ex- 
pected to  carry  on  their  own  or  led  horses  the  necessary  bedding 
and  changes  of  clothing,  with  forage,  and  provisions  for  themselves 
for  three  days— which  must  last  five  days.  Infantry  officers  and 
soldiers  must  carry  on  their  persons,  or  on  led  horses  or  mules 
the  same;  to  which  end  will  be  allowed  to  each  company  when  prac- 
ticable— one  led  horse  or  pack-mule.  Artillery  can  carry  the  same 
on  their  caissons,  so  that  all  troops  must  be  in  readiness  for  motion 
without  wagons  for  a  five-days  operation." 


Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field.  207 

General  Ingalls  in  his  report  said:  "Our  troops  are  un- 
doubtedly loaded  down  on  marches  too  heavily  even  for  the 
road,  not  to  speak  of  battle.  I  have  witnessed  great  loss  of 
knapsacks  and  articles  of  clothing  on  the  routes  taken  by  our 
troops  at  the  commencement  of  the  campaigns.  In  my  re- 
port of  the  Chancellorsville  campaign  I  showed  you  that  the 
loss  of  knapsacks  of  those  actually  engaged  was  at  least 
twenty-five  per  cent.  I  am  in  favor  of  putting  the  lightest 
possible  weight  on  the  soldier,  consistent  with  his  wants  and 
the  character  of  the  service.  I  do  not  think  the  knapsack 
should  be  dispensed  with  altogether,  for  it  should,  ordina- 
rily, form  a  part  of  the  equipment,  but  on  short  campaigns, 
and  on  the  eve  of  battle  and  when  near  the  supply  trains,  a 
blanket  rolled  up  and  swung  over  the  shoulder,  and  looped 
up  under  the  arm,  is  sufficient  without  knapsack  or  overcoat. 
The  soldier  can  carry  three  days'  cooked  food  in  his  haver- 
sack. If  necessary,  he  can  carry  two  or  three  days'  bread 
and  some  underclothes  in  his  blanket.  Our  men  are  gen- 
erally over  loaded,  fed,  and  clad,  which  detracts  from  their 
marching  capacity,  and  induces  straggling."* 

As  the  war  progressed  the  tendency  to  abandon  the 
knapsacks  was  very  marked,  until  finally  they  were  seldom 
used  in  the  field,  and  the  suggestions  outlined  above  were 
adopted,  with  the  addition  of  half  of  a  shelter-tent  and  a 
rubber  blanket  (poncho)  to  the  blanket-roll. 

General  Sherman  says:  "Each  soldier  should,  if  not 
actually  'sick  or  wounded,'  carry  his  musket  and  equipments 
containing  from  forty  to  sixty  rounds  of  ammunition,  his 
shelter-tent,  a  blanket  or  overcoat,  and  an  extra  pair  of 
pants,  socks,  and  drawers,  in  the  form  of  a  scarf,  worn  from 
the  left  shoulder  to  the  right  side  in  lieu  of  knapsack,  and  in 
his  haversack  he  should  carry  some  bread,  cooked  meat,  salt, 

*  Report  dated  August  28,  1864. 


208.  Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field. 

and  coffee.  I  do  not  believe  a  soldier  should  be  loaded  down 
too  much,  but,  including  his  clothing,  arms,  and  equipment, 
he  can  carry  about  fifty  pounds  without  impairing  his  health 
or  activity." 

The  coffee  and  sugar  components  of  the  ration  were 
usually  mixed  together  by  the  men  when  stowing  them  in 
their  haversacks;  this  prevented  them  from  constantly  "nib- 
bling" while  on  the  march,  and  therefore  tended  to  husband 
the  supplies  carried. 

The  supplies  that  the  men  carried  with  them  were  re- 
plenished at  the  earliest  opportunity  from  those  carried  in 
the  trains. 

Depots. — Depots  are  classed  in  three  categories:  1st,  the 
base  depots;  2d,  advance  depots;  3d,  temporary  depots.  The 
base  depot,  from  its  name,  is  located  at  the  base  of  supply 
and  must  be  remote  from  the  theatre  of  operations.  The  ad- 
vance depots  are  those  formed  during  offensive  movements 
when  an  army  proceeds  so  far  from  its  base  that  it  would 
waste  time  by  drawing  supplies  directly  from  the  base. 
These  depots  are  supplied  with  stores  obtained  by  consign- 
ments from  that  at  the  base;  supplemented,  when  possible, 
by  others  procured  in  the  vicinity.  They  are  located  in  such 
places  where  the  supplies  can  be  brought  to  them  and 
carried  from  them  with  the  greatest  ease,  rapidity,  and 
safety,  and  where  they  can  be  most  easily  secured  from 
danger  of  hostile  attack. 

A  secondary  base  of  supply  is  an  advance  dep6t  of  suffi- 
ciently large  dimensions  to  make  an  army  independent  of 
the  base  when  the  line  of  communication  is  very  long.  As 
the  difficulties  of  supply  increase  with  the  length  of  the 
line  of  communication,  when  the  distance  of  an  army  from 
its  base  is  very  great  the  formation  of  a  secondary  base  be- 
comes indispensable  to  facilitate  the  transportation  of  sup- 


Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field.  209 

plies.  A  secondary  base  must  contain  a  surplus  of  such 
stores  as  an  army  needs,  so  as  to  provide  against  any  tem- 
porary interruption  on  the  lines  of  communication,  and  a 
very  complete  organization  is  essential,  as  a  variety  of  de- 
mands will  be  made  upon  it,  all  of  the  utmost  urgency  and 
admitting  of  no  delay.  Temporary  depots  are  small  ones, 
sufficient  to  provide  merely  for  the  daily  wants  of  the  troops. 
Such  depots  are  usually  temporary  in  character,  existing  for 
a  few  days,  and  sometimes  only  for  one  day. 

In  Sherman's  campaign  against  Atlanta  the  base  de'pot 
was  located  at  Louisville.  Nashville,  Chattanooga,  Knox- 
ville,  and  Johnsonville  were  the  advance  depots.  Allatoona, 
and  Big  Shanty  in  Georgia,  were  the  temporary  depots  con- 
taining supplies  intended  solely  for  the  immediate  use  of  the 
army.  The  depots  of  Nashville  and  Chattanooga  were  ex- 
panded so  as  to  form  a  secondary  base  of  supply,  and  a  thirty 
days'  supply  of  rations  for  100,000  men  and  clothing  for  six 
months  were  stored  at  Chattanooga.  During  Sherman's 
march  through  the  Carolinas,  de'pots  were  established  at  the 
following  places:  Sister's  Ferry,  Fayetteville,  Morehead 
City,  Newberne,  Goldsboro',  and  Raleigh. 

The  base  depots  for  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  were  at 
Alexandria,  Baltimore,  and  Annapolis.  During  the  Penin- 
sular campaign,  depots  were  located  at  Fort  Monroe,  Cheese- 
man's  Landing,  and  Brick  House  on  the  York  River,  and 
White  House  on  the  Pamunkey;  the  railroad  was  rebuilt 
from  White  House  as  far  as  Savage  Station  and  at  the  latter 
place  a  de'pot  of  supplies  was  established,  which  was  de- 
stroyed when  the  army  let  go  its  hold  on  the  Pamunkey  and 
established  itself  on  the  James  River,  when  the  de'pot  was 
located  at  Harrison's  Landing.  These  depots  were  changed 
in  accordance  with  the  movements  of  the  troops,  the  fleet 
with  the  transports  moving  around  to  the  different  places  so 

14 


210  Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field. 

as  to  be  in  easy  reaching  distance  of  the  trains.  In  the 
Maryland  campaign  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  supplied 
direct  from  the  base  at  Alexandria,  by  means  of  its  wagon 
trains,  until  after  the  recapture  of  Frederick.  The  destruc- 
tion of  the  railroad  bridge  over  the  Monocacy  necessitated 
the  formation  of  a  temporary  depot  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
river  while  the  bridge  was  being  rebuilt,  and  supplies  were 
shipped  there  over  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  railroad,  from  the 
base  dep6t  at  Baltimore.  After  the  battle  of  South  Moun- 
tain, a  depot  was  established  at  Hagerstown,  and  the  sup- 
plies forwarded  there  over  the  Cumberland  Valley  railroad. 
After  the  battle  of  Antietam,  the  supplies  were  forwarded 
from  Alexandria,  New  York,  Philadelphia,  and  Baltimore, 
and  an  advance  d£p6t  was  formed  at  Harper's  Ferry  and 
later  at  Berlin.  When  the  army  crossed  the  Potomac,  a 
d^pot  was  established  at  Salem  on  the  Manassas  Gap  rail- 
road, and  supplies  were  forwarded  there  from  Alexandria. 

When  the  army  entered  upon  the  Fredericksburg  cam- 
paign, depots  were  established  at  Acquia  and  Belle  Plain; 
the  former  assumed  the  proportions  of  a  secondary  base 
(although  it  was  never  so  designated),  and  large  wharves 
were  constructed  and  storehouses  erected  there  to  accom- 
modate all  the  supply  departments.  The  army  was  supplied 
from  these  depots  by  the  Acquia  and  Fredericksburg  rail- 
road, along  the  line  of  which  temporary  dep6ts  were  located 
at  convenient  points  for  the  delivery  of  the  supplies,  the 
principal  one  being  at  Falmouth. 

After  the  battle  of  Chancellorsville,  the  d£pot  at  Fal- 
mouth was  broken  up  and  the  army  moved  by  Dumfries, 
Fairfax,  Leesburg,  Edwards'  Ferry,  and  Poolesville  to  Fred- 
erick and  entered  upon  the  Gettysburg  campaign.  For  its 
supply  during  that  epoch  depots  were  established  at  West- 
minster and  Frederick;  the  supplies  were  forwarded  to  the 


Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field.  211 

former  from  Baltimore  over  the  "branch  road"  from  that 
place,  and  to  the  latter  over  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio. 

When  the  rebel  army  crossed  into  Virginia  after  the 
battle  of  Gettysburg,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  concentrated 
in  the  vicinity  of  Harper's  Ferry  and  Berlin  and  replenished 
its  supplies  from  the  d£p6ts  located  at  those  places  and  also 
from  the  one  at  Sandy  Hook;  the  lines  of  supply  were  the 
Chesapeake  and  Ohio  canal  and  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  rail- 
road. Having  crossed  the  Potomac,  the  army  was  supplied 
from  depots  at  Gainesville  and  White  House  on  the  Manas- 
sas  Gap  railroad,  and  also  from  the  one  at  Warrenton,  on 
the  branch  road  of  that  name.  The  army  then  took  up  a  line 
near  the  Kappahannock,  across  the  Orange  and  Alexandria 
railroad,  and  depots  were  established  at  Warrenton  Junc- 
tion, Warrenton,  and  Bealton. 

September  15,  1863,  the  army  advanced  to  Culpeper  and 
vicinity  and  remained  there  until  October  llth,  when  the 
movements  of  the  rebel  army  necessitated  a  rapid  march  to 
Centreville.  The  Orange  and  Alexandria  road  was  de- 
stroyed by  the  rebels  from  Broad  Run  to  theRappahannock, 
during  this  retrograde  movement,  and  while  it  was  being 
rebuilt,  the  depots  were  at  Manassas  and  Gainesville.  When 
the  concentration  at  Centreville  was  affected,  Fairfax  Sta- 
tion became  the  advance  d^pot.  The  enemy  retreated  to  the 
Rappahannock  and  was  pursued  by  the  Army  of  the  Poto- 
mac, which  forced  a  passage  of  that  river  and  drove  the 
enemy  to  the  Rapidan,  and  then  Brandy  Station  became  the 
advance  d£p6t.  While  at  Mine  Run  the  army  was  supplied 
by  its  trains  of  wagons  and  pack-mules,  from  that  de'pot. 

December  1st,  1863,  the  army  fell  back  and  occupied  its 
former  positions  in  the  vicinity  of  Culpeper  and  remained 
there  until  May  4,  1864,  when  the  grand  campaign  from  the 
Rapidan  to  the  James  was  commenced.  On  that  day  the 


212  Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field. 

depots  at  Brandy  Station  and  at  other  points  on  the  railroad, 
as  far  as  the  Rappahannock,  were  broken  up  and  all  surplus 
stores  sent  to  Alexandria.  Communications  were  opened 
with  Acquia  and  Belle  Plain,  the  river  was  cleared  of  ob- 
structions by  the  navy,  and  the  railroad  from  Acquia  to 
Fredericksburg  was  repaired.  During  the  flank  movement 
to  Spottsylvania,  the  trains  were  parked  at  Fredericksburg, 
and  the  depots  remained  unchanged.  On  May  21st  the 
depots  at  Acquia,  Belle  Plain,  and  Fredericksburg  were 
abandoned,  and  one  was  established  at  Port  Royal.  The 
army  crossed  the  Pamunkey  on  the  28th  and  took  up  a  po- 
sition at  Cold  Harbor,  and  on  the  31st  a  de'pot  was  estab- 
lished at  White  House.  June  12th  the  advance  across  the 
Chickahominy  to  the  James  was  commenced,  and,  on  the 
16th,  upon  reaching  the  latter  river,  a  de'pot  was  established 
at  City  Point.  During  the  siege  of  Petersburg  in  the  final 
operations  against  Richmond,  City  Point  was  made  a  sec- 
ondary base  of  supplies  for  the  armies  of  the  Potomac  and 
the  James;  and  separate  w7harves  wyere  provided  there  for 
unloading  the  various  kinds  of  supplies;  a  large  repair  depot 
for  the  wagon  transportation ;  twenty  large  ovens  construct- 
ed by  the  Subsistence  Department,  capable  of  producing  one 
hundred  and  ten  thousand  rations  of  bread  per  diem,  for  the 
supply  of  the  armies  of  the  Potomac  and  James;  and  the 
Medical  Department  had  large  permanent  hospitals  located 
there,  which  received  the  sick  and  wounded  from  the  field 
hospitals  and  from  which  the  convalescents  were  conveyed 
by  water,  in  steamers  specially  fitted  for  such  service,  to 
the  great  hospitals  at  Washington,  Philadelphia,  Baltimore, 
etc.*  Expense  depots  were  located  at  Cedar  Level,  Ber- 

*A11  of  these  improvements  were  rendered  absolutely  necessary 
in  order  to  create  a  depot  of  sufficient  magnitude  and  facilities  for 
the  supply  of  the  armies  lately  operating  against  Richmond.  Store- 
houses had  to  be  erected  to  protect  the  daily  supplies,  and  to  hold  in 


Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field.  213 

muda  Hundred,  and  at  Jones'  Hundred,  Point  of  Rocks, 
Deep  Bottom,  Broadway  Landing,  and  Varina  Landing. 

In  1862,  during  Grant's  campaign  against  Vicksburg, 
Holly  Springs  was  his  secondary  base  of  supply.  The  cap- 
ture of  that  place  by  Van  Dorn  and  the  destruction  of  sup- 
plies there  valued  at  over  a  million  dollars,  together  with 
the  demolition  of  the  railroad  between  Jackson,  Tenn.,  and 
Columbus,  Ky.,  by  Forrest,  caused  the  abandonment  of  the 
campaign. 

After  the  capture  of  New  Orleans,  that  city  became  the 
secondary  base  of  supplies  for  all  operations  throughout  the 
southwestern  portion  of  the  theatre  of  war. 

In  Banks'  Red  River  campaign  the  condition  of  the  river 
and  the  inability  of  the  transports  to  pass  the  falls  made  it 
necessary  to  establish  an  advance  de'pot  at  Alexandria; 
which  was  a  departure  from  the  plan  of  the  campaign,  as  no 
depot  at  any  point  on  the  Red  River  was  contemplated. 

Allowance  of  Transportation. — The  number  of  wagons  re- 
c[iiired  by  an  army  in  the  field  will  vary  according  to  the 
character  of  the  theatre  of  operations,  the  resources  of  the 
same  in  food  supplies,  and  the  railroad  and  water  transpor- 
tation, the  length  of  haul  from  the  depot  to  the  army  in  the 
field,  and  also  with  the  capacity  of  the  wagons.*  In  other 

depot  20  clays'  forage,  and  at  least  30  of  subsistence,  besides  large 
quantities  of  clothing,  ordnance,  and  hospital  stores.  Wharves  had 
to  be  pat  up  for  the  different  departments.  There  were,  generally, 
at  the  depot,  in  harbor,  from  150  to  180  vessels  of  all  kinds  daily, 
and  the  amount  of  business  transacted  was  immense.  The  daily 
supply  of  forage,  for  instance,  was  over  600  tons  of  grain  and  hay. 
I  make  these  remarks  simply  to  show  you  why  such  extensive  pre- 
parations were  necessary.  The  depot  was  and  is  the  most  perfect 
and  commodious  of  any  ever  established  anywhere  for  the  supply 
of  armies,  and  the  Government  has  gained  by  it  more  than  it  cost." 
Report  of  General  Rufus  Ingalls,  dated  June  24,  1865. 

*"One  good  six-mule  team,  in  the  best  season  of  the  year,  is  suf- 
ficient to  haul  this  load  (i.  c.,  3730  Ibs.)  and  its  own  forage  of  270  Ibs., 
or  a  total  of  4000  Ibs."  (Holabird.— "Army  Wagon  Transportation.") 


214  Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field. 

words,  as  the  distance  of  an  army  from  its  base  of  supply  in- 
creases a  greater  number  of  wagons  is  required.  The 
Comte  de  Paris  has  calculated  that  an  army  of  100,000  men 
to  move  ten  days  from  its  base  would  require  10,975  wagons 
drawn  by  65,850  animals.  In  order  to  prevent  tying  an 
army  to  its  base,  advance  depots  were  formerly  established 
at  places  separated  by  about  four  days'  march ;  the  introduc- 
tion of  steam  made  an  army  still  more  independent  of  its 
base ;  and  during  the  Civil  War,  as  the  character  of  the  coun- 
try favored  it,  an  innovation  was  effected  by  moving  these 
advance  depots  to  different  points  so  as  to  be  within  easy 
distances  from  the  army.  This  was  especially  the  case  with 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  as  the  fleet  of  transports  could 
move  around  by  the  rivers  and  Chesapeake  Bay  so  as  to  keep 
near  the  army  in  all  its  movements. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  war  the  amount  of  transporta 
tion  considered  essential  and  allowed  the  armies  was  so  ex- 
cessive that  General  Halleck  said:  "If  it  be  true  that  the 
success  of  an  army  depends  upon  its  'arms  and  legs,'  ours  has 
shown  itself  deficient  in  the  latter  of  these  essential  requi- 
sites. This  defect  has  been  attributed  to  our  enormous  bag- 
gage and  supply  trains.  *  *  *  There  is  no  doubt  that  the 
baggage  trains  of  our  armies  have  been  excessively  large. 
Every  possible  effort  has  been  made  *  *  *  to  reduce 
them;  but  it  is  no  easy  task.  Once  accustomed  to  a  certain 
amount  of  transportation,  an  army  is  unwilling  to  do  with- 
out the  luxuries  which  it  supplies  in  the  field."*  He  also 
stated  that  the  increase  of  the  army  ration,  "which  was  pre- 
viously larger  than  in  any  other  country,"  necessitated  a 
considerable  amount  of  transportation. 

The  allowance  of  transportation  was  reduced  from  time 

*  General  Halleck's  Report,  dated  November  25,  1862. 


Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field.  215 

to  time  by  orders*  from  Army  Headquarters,  until  it  was 
finally  reduced  to  the  following  for  the  armies  operating 
against  Richmond  :f 

The  Lieutenant-General  and  army  commanders  were 
allowed  such  transportation  as  was  deemed  necessary;  army 
corps  headquarters,  four  wagons  or  eight  pack-mules;  divi- 
sion headquarters,  three  wagons  or  five  pack-mules;  brigade 
headquarters,  two  wagons  or  five  pack-mules.  The  forego- 
ing wagons  and  pack  animals  included  the  transportation 
for  all  personal  baggage,  mess  chests,  cooking  utensils, 
desks,  papers,  etc. 

Each  regiment  of  infantry,  cavalry,  or  battalion  of 
heavy  artillery,  two  wagons;  for  each  battery  of  artillery, 
one  wagon.  The  number  of  wagons  allowed  for  artillery 
ammunition  depended  upon  the  number  and  character  of 
the  guns;  for  the  reserve  artillery  there  was  to  be  twenty 
rounds  of  ammunition  for  each  gun ;  for  small-arm  ammuni- 
tion there  were  allowed  three  wagons  for  every  one  thousand 
men  of  cavalry,  infantry,  and  heavy  artillery,  present  for 
duty;  for  fuses,  powder,  and  primers,  for  the  reserve  ammuni- 
tion train,  two  wagons.  For  the  general  supply  trains,  seven 
wagons  to  each  one  thousand  men  of  cavalry,  infantry,  and 
heavy  artillery,  for  forage,  subsistence,  etc.,  which  should 
carry  eight  days'  supply ;  to  each  cavalry  division,  exclusive- 
ly for  forage,  fifty  wagons;  to  each  battery,  for  its  subsist- 
ence, forage,  etc.,  four  wagons;  each  horse  battery,  for  the 
same  purpose,  four  wagons;  to  every  twenty-five  wagons  of 

*G.  O.  No.  130,  A.  G.  O.,  September  14, 1862. 
G.  O.  No.  160,  A.  G.  O.,  October  18,  1862. 
G.  O.  No.  274,  A.  G.  O.,  August  7,  1863. 

tSpecial  Orders  No.  44,  Headquarters  Armies  U.  S.,  City  Point, 
Va.,  June  28,  1864.  This  order,  published  the  third  year  of  the  war, 
may  be  very  properly  be  considered  as  the  standard  upon  which, -in 
the  future,  all  estimates  for  allowance  of  transportation  for  armies 
in  the  field  will  be  based. 


216  Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field. 

artillery  ammunition  train,  five  wagons  additional,  for  tho 
forage  of  the  animals  and  the  subsistence  of  the  men.  Am- 
munition trains  were  loaded  exclusively  with  ammunition. 
To  each  brigade,  for  hospital  supplies, three  wagons;  to  each 
corps  headquarters,  for  forage  and  subsistence,  three  wag- 
ons; each  division,  two;  each  brigade,  one  wagon, for  similar 
purposes;  and  to  each  brigade,  one  wagon,  for  commissary 
stores  for  sales  to  officers.*  The  unit  of  organization  for  the 
supply  trains  of  subsistence,  ordnance,  and  forage  was  by 
division,  and  the  division  quartermasters  were  responsible 
for  them.  Brigade  and  regimental  quartermasters  were  re- 
sponsible for  the  brigade  and  regimental  baggage  trains  re- 
spectively. It  was  found  by  experience  that  the  advantage 
of  keeping  up  regularly  organized  pack  trains  was  not  com- 
mensurate with  the  expense;  and  to  provide  for  emergencies 
when  they  could  very  advantageously  be  used,  two  hundred 
pack  saddles  were  carried  in  the  wagon  trains  of  each  corps; 
and  in  cases  where  it  was  necessary  to  pack  baggage,  pro- 
visions, and  ammunition  for  short  distances  over  rough 
roads  and  broken  country,  the  pad-  trains  were  made  up 
temporarily  by  taking  mules  from  the  wagons,  not  exceed- 
ing two  mules  from  any  one  wagon. 

Size  of  Trains. — The  Army  of  the  Potomac  in  its  first 
operations  upon  the  Peninsula  was  supplied  by  means  of  a 
flotilla  sent  down  the  Potomac  River  and  Chesapeake  Bay, 
which  established  advance  depots  at  the  points  indicated 
above,  and,  as  such  places  were  within  easy  distance  of 
the  troops,  large  supply  trains  wrere  unnecessary.  General 
Ingalls  reports  on  the  first  of  July,  1862,  as  the  result  of  an 
inspection  then  made,  that  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  had 
in  its  possession  the  following  means  of  transport:  3100 

*  Para  graph  III.  of  General  Orders  No.  7,  1804,  Military  Division 
of  Mississippi,  restricted  the  officers  to  the  same  food  as  the  men 
were  provided  with. 


Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field.  217 

wagons;  350  ambulances;  17,000  horses  and  8,000  mules; 
the  army  numbered  80,000,  or  forty  wagons  in  all  to  every 
thousand  men.  After  the  battle  of  Antietam,  the  size  of  the 
train  with  the  army  was:  3911  wagons;  907  ambulances; 
12,483  mules  and  8693  horses,  not  including  those  with  the 
artillery  and  cavalry;  the  army  numbered  110,000  men,  or 
forty-nine  wagons  for  every  thousand  men. 

In  the  Gettysburg  campaign  the  trains  numbered  over 
four  thousand  heavy  w-agons.  After  the  retreat  of  the  rebel 
army  from  Gettysburg,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  or- 
dered concentrated  at  Middletown  on  the  evening  of  July 
7th,  and  no  trains  but  ammunition  wagons,  medical  wagons, 
and  ambulances  were  permitted  to  accompany  the  troops. 
The  supply  and  baggage  wagons  were  ordered  to  be  parked 
in  the  Middletown  valley  on  the  roads  taken  by  their  respect- 
ive corps.  After  crossing  the  Rapidan,  in  Grant's  advance 
upon  Richmond,  the  troops  that  composed  the  armies  on 
that  river  numbered  about  125,000  men.  There  were  4300 
wagons;  835  ambulances;  29,945  cavalry,  ambulance,  and 
team  horses;  4046  private  horses  and  22,528  mules;  thirty- 
four  wagons  to  every  thousand  men.  In  the  Appomattox 
campaign  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  numbered  107,777  men ; 
there  wrere  25,796  horses  and  mules;  2448  wagons;  twenty- 
two  wagons  and  239  draft  animals  per  thousand  men. 

On  July  1st,  1864,  General  Sherman's  army,  which  was 
composed  of  the  armies  of  the  Ohio,  Cumberland,  and  Ten- 
nessee, numbered  about  100,000  men,  and  had  about  28,300 
horses,  32,600  mules,  5180  wagons,  and  860  ambulances,  or 
sixty  wagons  to  every  thousand  men.  On  leaving  Atlanta, 
November  15,  1864,  General  Sherman's  army  consisted  of 
63,680  men,  14,780  horses,  19,410  mules,  2520  wagons,  and 
440  ambulances;  forty  wagons  to  every  thousand  men. 

From  the  foregoing  it  is  seen  that  the  size  of  the  trains 


218  Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field. 

decreased  in  each  successive  campaign,  and  at  times  the 
armies  were  sent  forward  without  any. 

Composition  and  Movement  of  the  Trains. — The  trains 
moved  as  follows:  Wagons  containing  small-arm  ammu- 
nition coming  first,  and  then  those  containing  the  ordnance, 
subsistence,  and  forage,  following  after  in  the  order  named, 
and  the  sutlers'  wagons  bringing  up  the  rear  of  the  column. 

"In  a  forward  movement  our  trains  are  never  in  the  way 
of  the  troops;  on  the  contrary,  each  corps  has  its  train  which 
follows  it  on  the  march,  and  which  forms  its  indispensable, 
movable  magazine  of  supplies.  Wagon  trains  should  never 
be  permitted  to  approach  within  the  range  of  battle-fields. 
They  should  be  parked  in  safe  and  convenient  places  out  of 
risk,  and  well  guarded.  Troops  should  go  forward  to  battle 
lightly  loaded,  and  without  wagons  except  for  extra  ammu- 
nition. If  they  are  successful,  the  trains  can  be  brought  up 
very  quickly;  if  defeated,  they  will  find  an  unobstructed 
road,  and  will  get  back  to  their  wagons  soon  enough."* 

General  Ingalls  says  of  the  Gettysburg  campaign  that 
the  wagon  train  and  all  impedimenta  were  assembled  at 
Westminster,  a  distance  of  about  twenty-five  miles  in  the 
rear  of  the  army;  no  baggage  was  allowed  in  the  front,  a 
portion  only  of  the  ammunition  wagons  and  ambulances 
were  brought  up  to  the  immediate  rear  of  the  lines.  By  this 
arrangement,  which  was  always  made  in  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  on  the  eve  of  battle  and  marches  in  the  pres- 
ence of  the  enemy,  experienced  officers  were  enabled  to  sup- 
ply their  demands  without  risking  the  loss  of  trains  or  ob- 
structing roads  over  which  the  columns  marched.  Empty 
wagons  were  sent  to  the  rear  and  loaded  ones  or  pack  trains 
brought  up  during  the  night  or  at  such  times  and  places  as 
did  not  interfere  with  the  movements  of  the  troops.  He  also 

*General  Ingalls'  Report,  dated  September  28,  1863. 


Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field.  219 

adds  that  in  this  campaign  the  trains,  large  as  they  were, 
never  delayed  the  march  of  a  column,  and,  excepting  the 
small-arm  ammunition  trains,  were  never  seen  by  the  troops. 
The  main  trains  were  conducted  on  roads  to  the  rear  of  the 
army  without  the  loss  of  a  wagon. 

In  Sherman's  march  to  the  sea,  in  starting  out  from 
Atlanta,  the  empty  wagons  to  be  loaded  with  forage  and 
other  supplies  taken  from  the  country  were  at  the  head  of 
the  trains,  so  that,  when  reaching  farm-houses  and  other 
points  where  supplies  were  obtained,  the  wagons  turned  out 
of  the  road  and  were  loaded  by  the  time  the  rear  of  the  gen- 
eral supply  trains  came  up  to  them,  and  then  fell  into  their 
proper  places. 

In  the  Red  River  expedition  the  column  was  preceded 
by  the  cavalry,  which  was  followed  by  its  wagon  trains  and 
then  the  infantry.  On  approaching  Sabine  Cross-roads, 
April  8,  1864,  it  was  confronted  by  a  Confederate  force  com- 
manded by  General  Richard  Taylor,  and  after  a  short  conflict 
the  cavalry  was  driven  back,  and  as  the  wagons  blocked  the 
roads  the  infantry  were  unable  to  be  brought  to  the  front, 
and  in  consequence  the  Federals  lost  their  trains. 

General  Grant  says*  there  never  was  a  better  organized 
corps  than  that  of  the  quartermaster's  corps  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  in  1864.  The  wagon  train  would  have  extended 
fr\un  the  Rapidan  to  Richmond  if  marched  in  single  file  upon 
one  road.  General  Ingalls  had  each  wagon  marked  with 
the  corps  badge,  division  color,  and  the  number  of  the 
brigade,  so  that  the  particular  brigade  to  which  each  wagon 
belonged  could  readily  be  told.  The  wagons  were  also 
marked  to  indicate  the  contents:  if  ammunition,  whether 
for  artillery  or  infantry;  if  forage,whether  grain  or  hay;  if 
rations,  whether  bread,  pork,  beans,  rice,  sugar,  coffee,  or 

*Memoirs,  Volume  II.,  page  198. 


220  Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field. 

whatever  other  components  of  the  ration.  As  soon  as  a 
wagon  was  emptied,  it  was  at  once  dispatched  to  the  base  to 
obtain  a  load  of  precisely  the  same  article  as  that  which  had 
been  taken  from  it. 

Ambulances — Hospital  Supplies. — An  Act  of  Congress  ap- 
proved March  11,  1864,  provided  that  there  should  be  fur- 
nished to  each  army  corps  twro-horse  ambulances  on  the 
following  basis:  three  to  each  regiment  of  infantry  of  five 
hundred  men  or  more;  two  to  each  regiment  of  infantry  of 
two  hundred  men  and  less  than  five  hundred  men;  one  to 
each  regiment  of  infantry  of  less  than  two  hundred  men; 
two  to  each  regiment  of  cavalry  of  five  hundred  or  more; 
one  to  each  regiment  of  cavalry  of  less  than  five  hundred 
men;  and  one  for  each  battery  of  artillery;  two  ambulances 
to  headquarters  of  each  army  corps;  and  to  each  division 
train  of  ambulances,  two  army  wagons.  The  Medical 
Director  of  the  army  corps  was  given  charge  of  the  direction 
and  supervision  of  all  ambulances,  medicine  and  other 
wagons,  horses,  mules,  harness,  etc.,  and  of  all  officers  and 
men  detailed  to  assist  the  management  thereof  in  the  corps 
in  which  he  was  serving.  Officers  and  men  were  detailed 
from  each  corps  for  service  in  its  own  ambulance  corps.  The 
field  hospital  of  each  corps  was  located  about  three  miles  in 
rear  of  the  line  of  battle,  and  there  were  assembled  the  medi- 
cine wagons,  four  army  wagons  containing  one  thousand 
rations,  clothing,  and  other  supplies.  The  field  hospital  was 
composed  of  the  same  number  of  sections  as  there  were  divi- 
sions in  the  corps,  each  section  being  under  charge  of  the 
medical  officer  of  the  division  to  which  it  appertained. 
Necessary  assistants  were  detailed  in  these  hospitals  and 
the  remainder  of  the  surgeons  were  on  the  battle-field,  where 
they  took  advantage  of  any  shelter  to  form  small  temporary 
hospitals,  in  the  rear  of  which  ambulances  were  stationed. 


Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field.  221 

The  litter-bearers  brought  the  wounded  to  these  temporary 
hospitals,  from  which  they  were  transferred  to  the  field 
hospital,  and  eventually  to  the  permanent  hospitals  located 
at  the  depot  of  supplies,  and  thence  transferred  to  the  gen- 
eral hospitals  in  different  parts  of  the  country. 

"We  began  the  war  with  methods  borrowed  from  Eu- 
rope. We  ended  with  methods  that  were  developed  by  the 
cries  of  our  wounded  for  relief.  We  realized  that  to  enable 
a  medical  department  to  care  properly  for  the  wounded  of 
an  army  it  must  have  full  control  of  all  the  men  and  material 
needful  to  this  end,"* 

There  were  various  charitable  organizations  instituted 
during  the  war  for  the  purpose  of  relieving  the  sick  and 
assisting  the  wounded;  among  these  may  be  mentioned  the 
Sanitary  Commission,  the  officers  of  which  received  dona- 
tions of  supplies  and  money  from  all  the  loyal  States. 
"Wherever  our  armies  fought,  wherever  there  were  any  suf- 
ferings to  assuage  or  sick  to  relieve,  upon  the  field  of  battle 
or  in  the  hospital,  amongst  the  camps  and  in  the  garrisons, 
for  the  men  assembled  under  the  flag  and  for  those  whom 
sickness  or  wounds  sent  singly  to  their  homes,  the  Sanitary 
Commission  was  always  there,  as  indefatigable  in  its  devo- 
tion as  it  was  inexhaustive  in  its  assistance."t 

General  Sherman  says:  "For  the  more  delicate  and 
costly  articles  of  food  for  the  sick  we  relied  mostly  on  the 
agents  of  the  Sanitary  Commission.  I  do  not  wish  to  doubt 
the  value  of  these  organizations,  which  gained  so  much  ap- 
plause during  our  Civil  War,  for  no  one  can  question  the 
motives  of  these  charitable  and  generous  people;  but  to  be 
honest,  I  must  record  an  opinion  that  the  Sanitary  Commis- 

*Major  Smart.— "Medical  Department  of  the  Army." 
tDe  Trobriand.— "Army  of  the  Potomac." 


222  Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field. 

sion  should  limit  its  operations  to  the  hospitals  at  the  rear, 
and  should  never  appear  at  the  front."* 

Sutlers. — The  laws  of  Congress  authorized  the  appoint- 
ment of  a  sutler  for  each  regiment  in  the  army.  But  one 
sutler  was  allowed  to  a  regiment  and  the  various  stores 
which  they  were  permitted  to  sell  were  also  denned  by  law, 
with  a  restriction  limiting  the  lien  to  one-sixth  of  the  month- 
ly Pay  of  the  officers  and  men.  In  General  Halleck's  report 
dated  November  15,  1863,  in  speaking  of  the  reduction  of  the 
size  of  the  army  trains,  he  says:  "In  this  connection  I 
would  respectfully  call  attention  to  the  present  system  of 
army  sutlers.  There  is  no  article  legitimately  supplied  by 
sutlers  to  officers  and  soldiers  which  could  not  be  furnished 
at  a  much  less  price  by  the  Quartermaster  and  Commissary 
Departments.  Sutlers  and  their  employe's  are  now  only 
partially  subject  to  military  authority  and  discipline,  and  it 
is  not  difficult  for  those  who  are  so  disposed  to  act  the  part 
of  spies,  informers,  smugglers,  and  contraband  traitors. 
The  entire  abolition  of  the  system  would  rid  the  army  of  the 
incumbrance  of  sutler  wagons  on  the  march,  and  the 
nuisance  of  sutler  stalls  and  booths  in  camp."t 

Beef  Cattle  Herds. — The  beef  on  the  hoof  accompanying 
the  armies  was  under  the  entire  control  of  the  commissary 
officers.  tThe  herds  of  beef  cattle  were  driven  by  special 
drivers,  who  were  directly  under  the  orders  of  the  chief  com- 
missary of  the  army,  or  of  an  arm}7  corps  if  operating  de- 
tached. The  position  of  the  herd,  its  places  of  holding,  and 
the  rate  of  march  were  all  controlled  by  the  chief  commis- 

*Sherman's  Memoirs,  Volume  II.,  page  392. 

tSee  also  Par.  II.,  G.  O.  No.  130.  A.  G.  O.,  1862,  which  states  that 
the  trains  were  increased  by  carrying  sutlers'  goods  in  them  under 
guise  of  being  Government  supplies,  and  prescribed  severe  penalties 
for  any  one  permitting  that  abuse. 


Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field.  223 

sary,  who  received  orders  on  such  matters  only  from  the 
general  upon  whose  staff  he  was  serving.  The  movements 
of  the  herd  were  so  arranged  that  such  number  of  cattle  as 
were  required  to  furnish  the  meat  ration  equivalent  to  the 
number  of  days'  rations  of  hard  bread,  coffee,  sugar,  and  salt 
carried  in  the  men's  haversacks,  marched  as  a  unit  of  brigade 
organization;  the  number  necessary  to  constitute  the  meat 
ration  corresponding  with  the  number  of  days'  rations  in  the 
soldiers'  knapsacks,  were  marched  as  a  division  unit.  The 
main  or  corps  herd  comprised  a  sufficient  number  of  cattle 
to  furnish  rations  corresponding  to  the  number  carried  in 
the  trains.  In  addition  to  these,  there  was  a  general  herd 
provided  as  a  reserve  upon  which  drafts  could  bemadewhen1 
necessary  to  replenish  the  corps  herds.*  The  butchers  con- 
nected with  the  brigade  organization  slaughtered  the  cattle 
at  night  and  then  the  meat  was  cooked,  and,  if  upon  the 
inarch,  it  was  issued  to  the  men  either  late  that  night  or 
early  the  next  morning  so  that  it  could  be  placed  in  the 
haversacks.  It  was  found  necessary  during  the  war,  when 
the  army  was  encamped  for  any  length  of  time  in  the  same 
place,  to  frequently  change  the  location  of  the  herd  in  order 
to  obtain  better  pasturage  and  water,  and  also  to  avoid  any 
unsanitary  conditions  which  are  likely  to  arise  from  the  con- 
tinued holding  of  a  large  number  of  animals  in  the  same 
locality.  No  epidemic  or  disease  was,  during  the  last  war, 
directly  traceable  in  any  way  to  the  large  herds  of  cattle 
which  were  then  so  generally  used.  Although  in  wars  on  the 
continent  of  Europe,  as  in  1813  and  later  in  1870-71,  great  epi- 
demics were  traced  directly  to  the  large  herds  of  cattle  then 
brought  together,  some  of  which  were  found  to  be  diseased. 
The  difficulty  of  obtaining  proper  pasturage,  the  slow 
rate  of  movement  which  the  herd  is  capable  of,  and  the  fact 
that  one  or  more  roads  in  rear  of  the  army  must  be  given  up 

*Wilson.— "Feeding  a  Great  Army." 


224  Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field. 

to  the  use  of  the  herd,  are  (now  that  the  method  of  shipping 
dressed  meats  by  means  of  the  cold  storage  system  is  so 
much  in  vogue)  very  potent  objections  to  the  practice  of 
furnishing  the  beef  supply  of  an  army  by  means  of  a  cattle 
herd.  But  it  must  be  remembered  that  if  this  method  of 
supply  is  to  be  abandoned,  a  large  increase  will  be  required 
in  the  transportation  furnished  the  various  armies. 

UTILIZING  THE  LOCAL  RESOURCES. 

The  right  of  armies  to  take  from  the  country  all  that 
they  require  for  their  sustenance  is  indisputable;  though  we 
usually  understand  that  the  expression  "living  upon  the 
country"  has  direct  application  to  the  enemy's  country. 
Military  necessity,  as  understood  by  all  civilized  nations, 
permits  in  an  enemy's  country  the  enforcement  of  all  those 
measures  which  are  indispensable  for  securing  the  end  of 
the  war,  and  which  are  lawful  according  to  the  modern  law 
and  usages  of  war,  and  also  permits  an  army  to  make 
use  of  the  resources  of  its  own  country  when  face  to  face 
with  the  enemy,  because  of  the  absolute  necessities  of  the 
case  and  of  the  paramount  duty  to  defend  the  country 
against  invasion. 

There  are  four  methods  of  utilizing  the  resources  of  the 
country:  1.  By  billeting  or  quartering  the  troops  upon  the 
inhabitants,  a  right  maintained  by  General  Orders  No.  100, 
when  in  an  enemy's  country;  2.  By  contributions  levied 
upon  the  country;  3.  By  making  requisition  for  such  sup- 
plies as  are  required  to  satisfy  the  wants  of  an  army;  and, 
4.  By  foraging  upon  the  country,  or  the  collection  of  supplies 
found  therein  by  the  troops  themselves. 

Billeting. — Supplies  of  food  are,  as  a  rule,  to  be  found 
for  several  days  in  every  town  or  village,  and  every  house- 
holder usually  has  a  sufficient  quantity  of  the  same  to  pro- 


Art  of  Supplying  Armies,  in  the  Field.  225 

vide  his  family  for  a  few  days;  consequently,  at  least  the 
same  number  of  men  as  there  are  numbers  in  the  household 
can  obtain  subsistence  there  a  day  or  two.  When  troops  are 
billeted  upon  the  inhabitants,  the  number  assigned  to  each 
household  is  dependent  upon  the  number  composing  the 
family  of  the  same.  An  exception  should  always  be  made 
in  favor  of  the  poorer  classes,  who,  at  the  best  of  times,  are 
barely  able  to  provide  for  their  own  families.  The  following 
exceptions  are  usually  made:  1st.  Any  householder  who 
has  entertained  a  wrounded  man  in  his  house  is  "exempted 
from  the  quartering  of  troops,  as  well  as  from  a  part  of  the 
contributions  of  war  which  may  be  imposed."*  2d.  Chari- 
table institutions,  hospitals,  asylums  for  aged  and  infirm, 
unprotected  women,  and  educational  institutions  for  young 
girls  should  not  have  troops  billeted  upon  them.  The  ad- 
vantage to  be  derived  by  this  system  of  subsistence  is  that 
the  men  at  the  end  of  a  day's  march  find,  as  a  rule,  their 
meal  ready  cooked  and  prepared,  or,  at  any  rate,  will  have 
to  trouble  themselves  very  little  with  cooking  and  preparing 
it.  The  great  disadvantages  are  that  it  causes  very  great 
dispersion  and  separation  of  the  different  units  composing 
the  army,  and,  except  in  very  thickly  settled  countries, 
obliges  a  command  to  spread  out  over  too  large  a  portion  of 
the  country  in  order  to  obtain  subsistence.  The  men,  further- 
more, live  in  the  kitchen  and  are  very  apt  to  obtain  either  by 
force  or  in  other  ways  more  supplies  than  they  are  entitled 
to;  and,  furthermore,  very  many  indignities  are  liable  to  be 
offered  to  the  female  portion  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  coun 
try,  as  their  natural  protectors  are,  in  many  instances,  en- 
rolled in  the  ranks  of  the  enemy's  army.  Moreover  this 
method  may  lead  to  oppression  on  the  part  of  the  troops,  if 

*Artiele  V.,  Geneva   Convention  of  1864,   acceded   to  by    U.   S., 
March  1st.  1882. 

15 


226  Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field. 

they  are  not  treated  as  liberally  as  they  consider  they  should 
be,  and  it  will  provoke  frequent  disputes  if  more  is  demand- 
ed from  the  inhabitants  than  they  can  fairly  be  expected  to 
furnish;  and  the  dispersion  of  the  troops  prevents  the 
officers  enforcing  strict  compliance  with  orders,  and,  there- 
fore, is  subversive  of  discipline.  This  method  of  subsisting 
the  troops  was  not  resorted  to  upon  any  occasion  during  the 
Civil  War,  although  the  Government,  in  General  Orders  No. 
100,  Section  37,  reserved  the  right  to  do  so  in  the  enemy's 
country. 

Contributions. — Contributions  in  money  were  formerly 
imposed  upon  cities  and  districts  instead  of  subjecting  them 
to  pillage.  They  are  now  recognized  as  one  of  the  justifi- 
able means  of  causing  the  inhabitants  of  an  enemy's  country 
more  fully  to  feel  the  rigors  of  war,  and  thus  are  means  of 
bringing  the  same  to  a  speedy  termination.  The  Army 
Regulations  of  1863  provided  that  when  the  wants  of  the 
army  absolutely  required  it,  and  under  special  instructions 
from  the  War  Department,  that  the  General  of  the  Army 
was  authorized  to  levy  contributions  in  money  on  the 
enemy's  country  occupied  by  the  troops.  But  no  other  com- 
mander could  levy  such  contribution  without  written 
authority  from  the  General  Commanding  in  chief.  "Con- 
tributions are  principally  possible  in  large  towns  and  cities, 
and,  as  a  rule,  are  the  only  demands  that  can  be  made  on  a 
manufacturing  population."* 

Contributions  have  the  following  advantages  over 
requisitions  in  kind:  1.  The  collection  is  less  difficult. 
2.  While  the  burden  of  the  requisition  bears  almost  entirely 
upon  the  producers  and  manufacturers,  contributions  bear 
upon  each  one  in  proportion  to  his  financial  resources,  and 
are  consequently  less  of  a  hardship.  3.  They  can  be  made 


*Furse.— "Lines  of  Communication  in  War." 


Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field.  227 

over  a  wide  extent  of  territory,  as  money  is  easily  trans- 
ported. They  should  not  be  imposed  in  excess  of  military 
necessity,  and  the  amount  should  be  fixed  in  accordance  with 
the  wealth  of  the  country  and  so  as  not  to  affect  social  con- 
ditions, but  it  is  perfectly  permissible  to  make  contributions 
excessive,  provided  the  purpose  is  by  such  means  to  effect 
a  more  speedy  termination  of  the  war.  Private  property 
and  the  person  of  the  peaceable  inhabitants  who  are  citizens 
of  the  occupied  territory  are  respected,  as  war  is  waged 
against  a  State  and  not  against  individuals,  and  consequent- 
ly contributions  are,  as  a  rule,  imposed  on  municipalities. 
The  sum  demanded  should  be  collected  through  the  local 
civil  authorities,  if  any  remain  in  the  country,  and  should 
by  them  be  handed  over  to  the  proper  officer  in  the  invad- 
ing army,  to  be  by  him  accounted  for  in  accordance  with 
instructions. 

The  contributions  imposed  during  the  Civil  War  were 
not  intended  to  secure  funds  to  provide  the  necessary  sup- 
plies for  the  armies,  but  were  usually  resorted  to  as  a  spe- 
cies of  reprisal,  as  shown  by  the  following  order,  viz.: 
"Special  Orders  No.  40. 

"Hdqrs.  Left  Wing,  16th  Army  Corps, 

"Pulaski,  Tenn.,  December  16,  1863. 

"I.  In  accordance  with  the  orders  of  Ma j. -Gen.  U.  S. 
Grant,  Perry  Nicks,  of  Lewis  County,  Tenn.,  having  been 
damaged  by  guerrillas,  citizens,  etc.,  to  the  amount  of  $800, 
It  is  hereby  ordered  that  an  assessment  to  that  amount  be 
made  upon  the  known  rebels  of  that  county,  and  collected 
in  money,  cotton,  or  stock,  and  turned  over  to  Mr.  Nicks.  A 
full  account  and  report  of  the  transaction  under  this  order 
will  be  made  to  these  headquarters.  Major  Murphy,  of 

Fifth  Tennessee  Cavalry,  is  requested  to  carry  out  this  order. 
*  *  *  *  *  * 

"By  order  of  Brig.-Gen.  G.  M.  Dodge. 

"J.  W.  Barnes, 
"Lieutenant  and  Acting  Asst.  Adjutant-General." 


228  Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field. 

Requisitions. — Requisitions  are  demands  for  necessary 
supplies  and  services  made  on  the  inhabitants  of  certain 
districts  or  localities,  through  their  civil  authorities,  to 
satisfy  the  requirements  of  an  army.  They  are  accompanied 
by  force,  if  necessary  to  resort  to  such  extreme  measures,  to 
exact  the  fulfilment  of  the  demands. 

Requisitions  are  of  comparatively  recent  date.*  In 
former  times  the  invader  possessed  the  right  of  booty  and 
pillage,  the  practice  of  which  was  most  unfortunate  for  the 
army,  as  it  embittered  the  population  and  compromised  the 
safety  of  the  troops  in  an  enemy's  country,  and  in  the  event 
of  any  real  or  imagined  injury  being  done  them,  it  gave  rise 
to  redress  and  reprisals;  it  furthermore  caused  the  interrup- 
tion of  all  commercial  transactions,  and  stores  were  not  of- 
ered  for  sale,  as  private  individuals  were  compelled  to  submit 
their  supplies  to  the  rapacity  of  the  enemy. 

Requisitions  may  be  considered  under  two  aspects,  ac- 
cording to  whether  they  are  made  in  an  enemy's  country  or  in 
-the  national  territory.  In  the  latter  instance  they  are  only 
made  in  case  of  urgent  necessity,  and  receipts  are  alwrays 
given,  which  are  eventually  paid.  In  our  own  territory  we 
can  count  on  the  patriotic  feeling  of  the  people  and  on  their 
obedience  to  the  mandates  of  the  civil  authorities.  To  en- 


*  Requisitions  were  first  employed  by  Washington  and  so  named 
by  him  during  the  Revolutionary  War.  "In  order  to  provide  for  the 
\vants  of  the  Continental  troops  who  were  in  need  of  food  and 
clothing,  and  even  shoes,  he  frequently  resorted  to  requisitions,  but 
'always  exercised  great  moderation  and  endeavored  to  protect 
private  property.  He  never  resorted  to  such  means  except  in  cases 
of  urgent  necessity,  and  then  asked  in  a  detailed  manner  for  such 
articles  as  were  indispensable  for  his  army,  employing  the  form  of 
a  request,  reserving  vigorous  measures  for  the  recalcitrant.  Fur- 
thermore, he  gave  receipts  for  the  articles  received,  which  were 
eventually  paid.'  " 

Cf.  Georges  Ferrand,  "Requisitions  Milituires"  page  3,  and 
Calvo,  "Droit  International  Theorique  et  Pratique,"  Section  2235;  also 
Rouard  de  Card,  "La  Guerre  Continentale"  etc.,  page  170,  quoted  by 
Georges  Ferrand,  page  3,  "Requisitions  MWtaires" 


Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field.  229 

force  requisitions,  however,  when  campaigning  in  a  friendly 
State,  is  a  delicate  operation;  for,  to  all  appearances,  the 
people  are  subjected  to  the  same  exactions  as  are  enforced 
on  the  inhabitants  of  a  hostile  country.  Even  in  an  enemy's 
country  requisitions  should  never  be  imposed  in  too  arbi- 
trary a  manner.  Before  making  any  exactions  an  estimate 
should  be  formed  of  all  the  resources  which  the  inhabitants 
can  be  made  to  surrender  without  subjecting  them  to  serious 
want. 

Vauchelle  remarks:  ''These  demands  should  be  imposed 
and  apportioned  with  judgment  and  moderation,  taking  into 
consideration  the  population,  the  geographical  situation, 
the  nature  of  the  products,  the  richness  of  the  country,  and 
also,  when  possible,  proportioning  the  extent  of  the  demands 
to  the  grievances  of  the  conquerors.  To  ravage  a  country 
you  reduce  the  inhabitants  to  misery,  to  despair,  flight,  etc. ; 
and  then  you  not  only  deprive  yourself  of  their  favorable  co- 
operation, but,  on  the  day  of  reverse,  you  will  find  in  these 
same  men  implacable  and  cruel  enemies." 

Requisitions  are  further  divided  into  two  categories: 
first,  those  that  are  paid  for;  and,  second,  those  that  are  not, 
but  are  imposed  as  a  species  of  fines  to  help  reduce  the  cost 
of  the  war. 

Jomini  says:  UA  general  should  know  how  to  turn  to 
advantage  all  the  resources  existing  in  the  country  which  he 
invades;  he  should  make  use  of  the  authorities,  when  they 
remain  there,  to  impose  uniform  and  lawful  requisitions, 
which  he  will  cause  to  be  paid  for.  promptly  if  he  has  the 
means;  when  the  authorities  do  not  remain,  he  should  ap- 
point provisional  ones,  composed  of  well-known  men  and  in- 
vested with  extraordinary  powers.  They  will  have  the  sup- 
plies requisitioned  collected  in  the  safest  places  and  the 


230  Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field. 

most  favorable  for  the  movements  of  the  ariny^  and  in  the 
vicinity  of  the  principal  lines  of  operations." 

Such  requisitions  as  were  imposed  during  the  late  war 
were  ordinarily  not  paid  for  at  the  time.  Resort  was  fre- 
quently had,  and  particularly  by  the  Confederates  in  their 
various  raids  throughout  the  border  States,  to  requisitions 
exacting  the  delivery  of  certain  supplies.  These  requisi- 
tions were  made  upon  the  local  authorities  and  were  usually 
of  the  form  given  below : 

"Headqrs.  2d  Army  Corps,  A.  N.  V., 

k'June  27,  1863. 
"To  the  Authorities  of  Carlisle,  Pa.: 

"By  direction  of  Lt.-Gen'l  K.  S.  Ewell,  I  require  the  fol- 
lowing articles: 

"5000  suits  clothing,  including  boots,  shoes,  and  hats. 

"5000  bushels  grain  (corn  or  oats). 

"10,000  pounds  sole  leather. 

"10,000  pounds  horseshoe  nails. 

"Also  use  of  printing  office  and  two  printers,  to  report 
at  once. 

"All  articles  except  grain  will  be  delivered  at  the  Court 
House  Square  at  once. 

(Signed)     "Jolm  A.  Harman, 
"Major  and  Chief  Quartermaster, 

"2d  Army  Corps,  A.  N.  V." 

Foraging  upon  the  Country. — Foraging  upon  a  country  is 
to  collect  the  supplies  for  men  and  horses  either  from  the 
enemy  or  from  friends  by  impressment.  This  method  differs 
from  requisitions  in  that  the  collection  is  made  directly 
by  the  troops  without  the  assistance  of  the  local  civil 
authorities.* 

*"Of  course,  you  cannot  question  my  right  to  'forage  upon  the 
country.'  It  is  a  war  right  as  old  as  history.  The  manner  of  secur- 
ing it  varies  with  circumstances,  and  if  the  civil  authorities  will  sup- 
ply my  requisitions,  I  will  forbid  all  foraging.  But  I  find  no  civil 
authorities  who  can  respond  to  calls  for  fornse  or  provisions;  there- 
fore must  collect  directly  from  the  people."  General  Sherman  to 
Wade  Hampton,  February  24th,  1805.  See  also  Century  Dictionary. 


Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field.  231 

Instructions  were  given  to  generals  operating  in  hostile 
territory,  to  subsist  their  armies  whenever  possible   upon 
the  country,  receipting  and  accounting  for  everything  taken, 
so  that  all  loyal  persons  might  afterwards  be  remunerated 
for  their  losses.*    The  supplies  obtained  in  accordance  with 
the  instructions  referred  to  were  gathered  by  detachments 
designated  from  the  various   corps  throughout  the  army. 
The  laws  of  the  United  States  and  the  general  laws  of  war 
authorized  in  certain  cases  the  seizure  and  conversion  of 
private  property  for  the  subsistence,    transportation,    arid 
other  uses  of  the  army,  and  provided  that  all  property  law- 
fully taken  from  the  enemy  or  from  the  inhabitants  of  an 
enemy's  country  instantly  became  public  property  and  was 
to  be  used  and  accounted  for  as  such.     The  Articles  of  War 
(Art.  52)  prescribed  the  severest  penalty,  death  or  such  other 
punishment  as  the  court  directed,  for  any  officer  or  soldier 
who  should  quit  his  post  or  colors  to  plunder  and  pillage; 
and  the  penalty  was  the  same  whether  the  offense  was  com 
mitted  in  our  own  or  the  enemy's  territory.     A  very  marked 
distinction  was  thus  drawn  between  foraging  or  the  collec 
tion  of  supplies  by  properly  deputed  forces,  acting  under 
lawful  orders,  and  pillaging  or  plundering  by  individuals 
or  squads.     All  property,  public  or  private,  taken  from  the 
enemy,  was  to  be  inventoried  and  duly  accounted  for.     If  the 
property  taken  was  claimed  as  private,  receipts  were  to  be 
given  such  claimants  or  their  agents,  and  officers  were  held 
strictly  responsible  for  all  property  taken  by  them  or  by 
their  authority  and  it  was  accounted  for  the  same  as  any 
other  public  property. 

When  foraging   bodies   were   sent  out  to   collect   pro- 
visions or  other  stores,  the  commanding  officer  of  such  party 

*Order  of  the  President,  dated  July  22,  1862,  published  in  G.  O. 
No.  109,  A.  G.  O.,  1862. 


232  Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field. 

was  held  responsible  for  the  conduct  of  his  command  and 
required  to  make  a  true  report  of  all  property  taken. 

In  order  to  enable  the  troops  to  utilize  the  supply  of 
corn  which  was  sometimes  found  in  great  abundance,  port- 
able mills  for  grinding  the  same  were  in  some  instances 
provided,*  and  proved  quite  useful  in  the  Army  of  the  Ten- 
nessee. Suitable  mills  for  grinding  wheat  were  not  made. 
The  objection  to  using  portable  mills  is  that  it  is  practically 
impossible  to  properly  bolt  the  meal  or  flour  with  them,  and 
in  consequence  it  is  very  liable  to  cause  sickness  by  creating 
stomach  troubles;  but  such  flour  or  meal  can  be  used  to  ad- 
vantage if  mixed  with  other  of  good  quality. 

General  Johnston  said,  in  speaking  of  the  methods 
adopted  by  the  Confederates  to  obtain  their  supplies  in  the 
States  in  rebellion,  that  "supplies,  also,  instead  of  being 
honestly  raised,  were  impressed  by  a  band  of  commissaries 
and  quartermasters,  who  only  paid  one-half  the  market 
value.  As  might  have  been  expected,  this  was  enough  to 
prevent  them  getting  anything.  These  they  took  by  force, 
and  did  it  with  the  greatest  injustice.  You  can  imagine 
what  disorganization  of  labor  and  what  discontent  this 
produced."! 

During  the  early  part  of  the  war  there  seemed  to  be 
some  hesitation  among  the  commanders  of  the  Federal 
armies  about  utilizing  the  resources  of  the  enemy's  country 
in  order  to  obtain  the  supplies  for  their  armies.J 

In  speaking  of  the  collection  of  supplies  by  the  forag 
ing  parties,  General  Sherman  says  that  each  brigade  com- 
mander had  authority  to  detail  a  party  of  foragers  of  about 

""'Movable  columns  in  the  field  should  be  furnished  with  hand 
and  hor^e  mills  for  grinding  the  grain  which  they  procure  in  the 
country."  Par.  III.,  G.  O.  No.  2784,  A.  G.  O.,  1863. 

tSwinton's  "Campaigns  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,"  page  572, 
^General  Halleck's  Report,  November  15,  1863;  and  Grant's  Me- 
moirs, Volume  I.,  page  369. 


Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field.  233 

fifty  men  with  one  or  two  commissioned  officers.  This  party 
was  sent  out  before  daylight,  being  informed  of  the  route  of 
the  day's  march,  and  proceeded  five  or  six  miles  from  the 
road  travelled  by  the  brigade  and  then  visited  every  planta- 
tion and  farm  within  range.  Wagons  of  some  sort  were 
obtained,  which  were  loaded  with  the  supplies  collected,  and 
then  the  party  regained  the  main  road  and  waited  until  the 
arrival  of  the  train,  when  the  supplies  were  turned  over  to 
the  brigade  commissary  or  quartermaster.  General  Sher- 
man states:  "No  doubt,  many  acts  of  pillage,  robbery,  and 
violence  were  committed  by  these  parties  of  foragers,  usual- 
ly called  'bummers,'  *  *  *  but  these  acts  were  excep- 
tional and  incidental.  No  army  could  have  car- 
ried along  sufficient  food  and  forage  for  a  march  of  three 
hundred  miles;  so  that  foraging  in  some  shape  was  neces- 
sary. The  country  was  sparsely  settled,  with  no  mag- 
istrates or  civil  authorities  who  could  respond  to  requisi- 
tions, as  is  done  in  all  the  wars  of  Europe;  so  that  this  system 
of  foraging  was  simply  indispensable  to  our  success." 

The  supply  of  forage  for  the  animals  in  an  army  is  at 
all  times  a  most  difficult  task,  as  the  bulk  to  be  supplied  is 
so  enormous.  There  was  much  suffering  and  great  loss 
among  the  animals  in  the  several  armies  when  they  went 
into  winter  quarters,  owing  to  the  difficulty  of  obtaining 
forage;  this  was  particularly  the  case  in  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland  when  in  the  vicinity  of  Chattanooga,  in  1863. 
When  upon  a  campaign  it  is  usually  possible  to  collect  all 
of  the  long  forage  and  most  of  the  grain  the  animals  require; 
this  was  strikingly  shown  in  Sherman's  march  to  the  sea, 
and  is  concisely  expressed  in  his  letter  to  the  Quartermaster- 
General  dated  December  25,  1864.*  A  large  body  of  cavalry, 
and  especially  an  independent  cavalry  command,  may  eften 

*Rebellion  Records,  Volume  XLV.,  page  512. 


Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field. 

be  unable  to  provide  forage  for  its  animals  even  in  a  rich 
country,  for  if  in  pursuit  of  the  enemy  it  cannot  take  time 
to  search  for  the  grain  during  the  march,  otherwise  it  is  like- 
ly that  but  little  damage  could  be  inflicted  upon  the  enemy. 
Whenever  cavalry  is  to  rest  and  recuperate  from  the  strain 
of  a  hard  campaign,  it  cannot  be  expected  that  the  command 
will  be  able  to  provide  forage  for  its  animals;  for  10,000  or 
15,000  horses  consume  the  surplus  of  a  very  rich  district  in 
an  incredibly  short  time,  and  if  the  horses  and  men  are  sent 
out  to  scour  the  country  for  forage,  neither  will  obtain  the 
rest  needed;  and  therefore  depots  of  grain  and  hay  must  be 
provided  in  such  cases.  General  J.  H.  Wilson,  in  his  report* 
dated  February  6,  1865,  of  the  pursuit  of  Hood's  army  and 
his  march  from  Athens,  Ga.,  to  Gravelly  Springs,  Ala.,  sets 
forth  the  difficulty  of  providing  forage  for  the  horses  under 
such  circumstances. 

The  great  objection  to  the  method  of  supplying  an  army 
by  means  of  foraging  upon  the  country  is  that  it  is  almost 
impossible  to  prevent  the  men  from  scattering  over  a  wide 
extent  of  the  country  in  search  of  food  and  plunder,  and  as 
a  consequence  the  number  of  stragglers  and  skulkers  largely 
increases  and  the  discipline  of  the  army  is  apt  to  be  very 
lax.f  The  armies  in  the  western  part  of  the  theatre  of 
operations  resorted  to  foraging  quite  generally  during  the 
latter  portion  of  the  war,  and  this  system  was  also  employed 
by  the  cavalry  when  on  their  raids.  The  Confederate  army 
at  all  times  adopted  this  system.  The  Confederate  reports 
are  replete  with  evidence  of  the  enormous  straggling  in  their 
armies,  and,  in  speaking  of  his  campaign  in  Maryland,  Lee 

*Rebellion  Records,  Volume  XLV.,  page  513. 

t"Of  all  things,  the  most  important  is,  that  the  men,  during 
marches  and  in  camp,  keep  their  places  and  do  not  scatter  about  as 
stragglers  or  foragers,  to  be  picked  up  by  a  hostile  people  in  detail." 
Special  Field  Orders  No.  119,  Headquarters  Military  Division  of 
Mississippi,  November  8,  1864. 


Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field.  235 

says:  "The  arduous  service  in  which  our  troops  had  been 
engaged,  their  great  privations  of  rest  and  food,  and  the  long 
marches  without  shoes  over  mountain  roads,  had  greatly  re- 
duced our  ranks.  *  *  *  These  causes  had  compelled 
thousands  of  brave  men  to  absent  themselves  and  many 
more  had  done  so  from  unworthy  motives.''*  And  General 
D.  H.  Hill  also  says:  "Thousands  of  thieving  poltroons  had 
kept  away  from  sheer  cowardice.  The  straggler  is  generally 
a  thief,  and  always  a  coward,  lost  to  all  sense  of  shame;  he 
can  only  be  kept  in  ranks  by  a  strict  and  sanguinary  disci- 
pline.'^ Swinton  says,  page  67,  that  during  the  Maryland 
campaign  Lee  lost  over  twenty-five  thousand  from  his  effect- 
ive strength  by  straggling.  When  dealing  with  this  evil  in 
his  army  General  Sherman  ordered  :£  "The  only  proper  fate 
of  such  miscreants  is  that  they  be  shot  as  common  enemies 
of  their  profession  and  country,  and  all  officers  and  privates 
sent  to  arrest  them  will  shoot  them  without  mercy  on  the 
slightest  impudence  or  resistance." 

An  Act  of  Congress  approved  July  2,  1864,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  regulating  commercial  intercourse  between  loyal  and 
insurrectionary  States,  and  to  provide  for  the  collection  of 
private  and  abandoned  property,  provided  that  all  moneys 
arising  from  the  leasing  of  abandoned  lands,  houses,  and 
tenements,  or  from  sales  of  captured  and  abandoned  prop- 
erty, should  be  paid  into  the  Treasury  of  the  United  States. 
In  conformity  with  the  above  laws  of  Congress,  General 
Sherman  issued  instructions  prohibiting  trade  in  his  army 
in  the  field  or  with  moving  columns  of  troops,  save  that 
necessary  to  supply  the  wants  of  the  troops  themselves. 
This  was  probably  done  as  a  precautionary  measure,  as 

"Confederate  Reports  of  Maryland  Campaign,  Vol.  I.,  page  35. 
tConfederate  Reports  of  Maryland  Campaign,  Vol.  II.,  page  119. 
JG.   O.   No.   18,    Headquarters   Military   Division  of   Mississippi, 
June  21,  1864. 


236  Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field. 

spies,  on  a  pretext  of  being  on  mercantile  errands,  have  often 
gained  admission  within  the  lines  of  an  army  and  thus  ac 
quired  very  valuable  information.  General  Sherman  also 
ordered  that  all  such  cotton  as  was  found  should,  when 
transportation  to  the  rear  was  practicable,  be  consigned  to 
some  quartermaster  at  the  base,  to  be  by  him  delivered  to 
the  agent  of  the  Treasury  Department,  and,  moreover,  it  was 
to  be  treated  as  the  captured  property  of  an  enemy  and  in- 
voiced accordingly,  and  no  claim  of  private  interest  in  it  was 
to  be  entertained  by  the  military  authorities. 

The  exportation  from  any  of  the  States  in  rebellion, 
although  fully  occupied  by  Federal  forces,  of  such  supplies 
as  were  necessary  for  armies,  was  frequently  prohibited  in 
General  Orders.  As,  for  instance,  by  General  Sherman  in 
General  Orders  No.  20,  dated  July  13,  1864,  prohibiting  the 
exportation  of  grain  and  hay  raised  in  the  State  of  Tennes- 
see, and  providing  that  the  Quartermaster's  Department 
should  purchase  the  same  required  for  consumption  by  the 
army. 

There  were  immense  amounts  of  abandoned  and  cap- 
tured property  disposed  of  by  the  Government  during  the 
war,  and  on  February  19,  1867,  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury 
reported  that  the  net  amount  received  from  the  sale  of  the 
same  and  covered  into  the  Treasury  was  over  twenty-five 
millions  of  dollars.* 

In  order  to  provide  for  the  supply  of  an  army  in  the  por- 
tion of  an  enemy's  country  occupied  by  it,  the  commanding 
general  exercises  direct  military  control  over  the  same  or 
administers  the  affairs  of  the  country  with  the  assistance  of 
the  local  authorities,  if  they  remain,  or,  if  not,  with  those 
whom  he  has  appointed  in  their  stead.  It  is  perfectly  law- 

*See    House    Executive    Document   No.    97,    39th    Congress,    2d 
Session.  ' 


Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field.  237 

ful,  according  to  the  rules  of  war,  for  him  to  compel  the 
withdrawal  from  city  or  town  of  such  portion  of  the  ene- 
my's subjects  as  he  may  designate,  in  order  to  secure  a 
greater  supply  of  provisions  and  so  forth  for  the  use  of  his 
army,  and  oblige  the  enemy  to  deplete  his  own  resources  in 
order  to  supply  inhabitants  expelled  from  the  town  or  city.* 

In  a  communication,  dated  September  12,  1864,  ad- 
dressed to  the  mayor  and  a  committee  from  the  City  Council 
of  Atlanta,  General  Sherman  said:  "We  must  have  peace, 
not  only  at  Atlanta,  but  in  all  America.  To  secure  this  we 
must  stop  the  war  that  now  desolates  our  once  happy  and 
favored  country.  *  *  *  You  might  as  well  appeal 
against  the  thunder-storm  as  against  these  terrible  hard- 
ships of  war.  They  are  inevitable,  and  the  only  way  the 
people  of  Atlanta  can  hope  once  more  to  live  in  peace  and 
quiet  at  home  is  to  stop  the  war.  *  *  *  Now  you  must 
go,  and  take  writh  you  the  old  and  feeble,  feed  and  nurse 
them,  and  build  for  them,  in  more  quiet  places,  proper  habi- 
tations." *  *  * 

If,  under  the  conditions  of  modern  warfare,  an  attempt 
was  made  to  bind  an  army,  as  regards  its  supplies,  to  any 
one  particular  form  or  system  of  providing  the  same,  it  would 
soon  be  found  utterly  incapable  of  making  war,  or,  at  any 
rate,  would  be  at  a  great  disadvantage  when  opposed  by  an 
army  supplied  by  different  methods  according  to  circum- 
stances. 

Freedom  of  movement  is  only  possible  where  a  judicious 
use  of  the  resources  of  the  theatre  of  war  is  made;  but  as 
large  armies  cannot  be  supplied  entirely  from  the  same  and 
be  held  in  that  state  of  concentration  which  insures  the  best 
results  being  obtained,  such  resources  must  be  supplemented 

*"War  is  not  carried  on  by  arms  alone.  It  is  lawful  to  starve  the 
hostile  belligerent,  armed  or  unarmed,  so  that  it  leads  to  the  speedier 
subjection  of  the  enemy."  General  Orders  No.  100,  paragraph  17. 


238  Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field. 

by  obtaining  a  portion  of  the  needed  supplies  from  the  base 
and  advance  de'pots;  and  this  is  especially  necessary  as  re- 
gards the  ammunition  supply,  which  in  general  must  be  ob- 
tained from  the  national  territory. 

The  marked  features  connected  with  the  supply  of  the 
Federal  armies  during  the  Civil  War  were:  the  use  of  rail- 
roads and  navigable  rivers,  and  the  facility  with  which  the 
depots  of  supply  were  constantly  changed  so  as  to  be  always 
in  touch  with  the  armies  in  all  their  various  movements,  and 
always  so  located  as  to  be  within  ready  access  by  the  wagon 
trains. 

General  Baratier  says  that  if  it  is  not  always  possible 
to  approve  the  strategy  employed  by  some  of  the  Federal 
commanders,  or  to  admire  their  methods  of  conducting  the 
different  campaigns,  one  is,  however,  "amazed  by  the  vigor- 
ous and  liberal  policy  which  directed  the  organization  and 
maintenance  of  the  large  armies,  which  were  at  all  times 
furnished  with  great  possibilities  for  action."*  In  this  con- 
nection it  may  be  said  that  the  results  of  a  campaign  are 
gauged  by  the  victories  and  other  feats  of  arms  which  are 
exhaustively  described  by  the  many  participants  therein; 
but  it  is  very  seldom  adequate  credit  is  accorded  the  efforts 
of  the  administrative  officers,  who  indirectly  contribute  very 
greatly  to  the  successful  issue,  although  the  work  of  such 
officers  never  ceases,  nor  can  flag  for  one  instant.  When  the 
army  is  upon  the  march,  these  departments  are  strained  to 
their  utmost  capacity  to  supply  the  wants  of  the  same;  and 
when  it  goes  into  winter  quarters  or  halts  to  recuperate  its 
strength,  the  same  unremitting  care  and  attention  must  be 
given  by  the  administrative  officers. 

As  a  consequence  this  great  subject  of  the  art  of  supply- 

*Earatier.— "L'Art  de  ramtailler  les  grandcs  Armtes." 


Art  of  Supplying  Armies  in  the  Field.  239 

ing  troops  in  the  field  is  very  apt  to  be  neglected  in  time  of 
profound  peace,  but,  as  General  Lewal  says:  "In  time  of 
war  every  moment  is  precious;  to  hesitate  before  acting  is 
a  fault;  to  ask  for  instructions,  to  await  for  orders  for  sup- 
plying the  troops  would  be  almost  criminal."* 


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